Hi,

good work
I think this is in good shape, but i am really far from being an expert on this (as my question below reflect)
I have some comments and questions.

2.  Introduction

  Secure Neighbor Discovery [RFC3971] Utilizes X.509v3 certificates for
  performing router authorization.  It uses the X.509 extension for IP
  addresses to verify whether the router is authorized to advertise the
  mentioned IP addresses.

s/addresses/prefixes

  The SEND specification does not describe the set of extensions that
  need to be supported

This is strictly true, right? I mean section 6.3.1. Router Authorization Certificate Profile of the send spec does define the cert profile.

4.1.  Extended Key Usage Values


 The inclusion of the router authorization value indicates that the
  certificate has been issued for allowing the router to advertise
  prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509 extensions for IP
  addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]

I understnad that this means that the router is auhtorized to advertise the prefix included in the RADV ND message, right? I think this shoudl be described more explicitly, I mean, the main contribution of the draft is to define these EKU, so it should if very precisely, right? would these apply to DHCP prefix delegation for instance?


  The inclusion of the owner authorization value indicates that the
  certificate has been issued for allowing the node to use the
  address(es) or prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509
  extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]

i am not sure what do you mean about this
Are you aiming for the case we use SEND with non cga addresses? If so, it should be more clearly stated. In particualr, i fail to understnad why a host could announce more that one address i.e. why prefixes are acceptbale. Maybe describing thesecould help

then the draft reads:

  Inclusion of multiple values indicates that the certified public key
  is appropriate for use by a node performing more than one of these
  functions.

    send-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) TBA1 }

    id-kp-sendRouter OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 1 }

    id-kp-sendProxy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 2 }

    id-kp-sendOwner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 3 }


I don't understnad what do you mean by the data strcuture you include here... could you clarify? (is it just an example? if, so, please tag it as one)

then...

  Certificate-using applications MAY require the extended key usage
  extension to be present in a certificate, and they MAY require a
  particular KeyPurposeId value to be present (such as id-kp-sendRouter
  or id-kp-sendProxy)

where are these keypurposeid are defined?
maybe additng a reference would be useful


then it reads

5.  Backward Compatibility

  The disadvantages of this model are related to the fact that the SEND
  specification was developed before the standardization of the RPKI.
  Hence, SEND is not completely compliant with the RPKI specifications
  since it defines its own IP prefix validation routine and it is not
  suitable for the use with CRLs, while the RPKI suports only CRLs.
  This means that SEND implementations supporting this profile will not
  be able to interoperate with legacy SEND implementations.

I don't fully understnad the implications of this
I mean, what needs to be changed in a current send implementation to be compatible with this new format? I mean, the optimal would be that current send implementations accept RPKI certs but skip the new extensions and that new send implementations are able to read the new extensions defined by this document. is this not possible?

I am missing the part where you actually defines the EKU values for the 3 usages you have defined... wouldn't this be in the IANA cosiderations part of the draft? If not, shouldn't this be somehwere else? I mean, i understnad you are assigning 3 values of a registry for that usage? Or does this work in a different way?

Regards, marcelo




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