Sambaluk on Farmelo, 'Churchill's Bomb: How the United States Overtook Britain
in the First Nuclear Arms Race' [review]
by System Administrator
Graham Farmelo. Churchill's Bomb: How the United States Overtook Britain in the First Nuclear Arms Race. New York: Basic Books,
2013. 554 pp. $29.99 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-465-02195-6; $29.99 (e-book), ISBN 978-0-465-06989-7.
Reviewed by Nicholas Sambaluk (United States Military Academy)
Published on H-War (July, 2015)
Commissioned by Margaret Sankey
Graham Farmelo’s combination of a significant subject, engaging writing style, and effective research makes Churchill’s Bomb a
strong book. An advocate of the idea of science, Winston Churchill short-circuited his country’s scientific development by relying
on too small a pool of scientific advice and mishandling a delicate wartime dynamic with the United States during World War II.
Farmelo illuminates the complexity of Churchill’s involvement with the United Kingdom’s development into a nuclear power.
The book traces the origin of Churchill’s awareness that a nuclear device might be possible to the work of his friend H. G. Wells.
A socialist of the turn of the century, Wells expected nuclear weapons to drive humanity into a rejection of political ideas that
he considered dangerous, and he included the concept of nuclear weapons in a novel appearing just before the outbreak of the First
World War. According to Farmelo, Churchill’s more dour ideas about human nature largely prevented him from embracing such
utopianism. During the interwar period, Churchill’s prolific historical writing and journalistic punditry included early
predictions of nuclear bombs. More generally, Churchill proved an early clarion of the menace posed by Adolf Hitler, as well as an
advocate of defense-related science. Out of power, Churchill was seen as in search of “a new hobby horse to ride back into the
spotlight” (p. 82).
With respect to science and technology, Churchill’s years as prime minister during World War II displayed his shortcomings. In the
words of British scientist Henry Tizard, Churchill “‘had neither a great influence on science and engineering, nor indeed has he
displayed any real interest in science.... [He] was always pressing for the wrong developments against the advice of most
scientists concerned,’” although he “‘was enthusiastic about everything that in his opinion could help to win the war’” (p. 444).
Churchill’s major failing was that he was focused on the impact that science could have, and yet he botched his biggest
opportunity—fostering a more equal collaboration with the United States on atomic research during World War II—to make a positive
difference.
Farmelo attributes much of this mistake to Churchill’s early hesitation to share scientific knowledge with the Americans “‘unless
we can get something very definite in return’” and to an inability to appreciate that the British lead in atomic research was more
fleeting than he imagined (p. 152). Urgent wartime duties while the country faced Nazi bombing attacks also contributed to
Churchill being “most of the time ... no more than a bystander” regarding atomic research (p. 222). Farmelo is careful to note the
nature of Churchill’s other responsibilities, and provides context about significant events affecting the atomic issue and the
perspectives of people making policy decisions. Nonetheless, once the US atomic project gathered steam, Farmelo notes, US decision
makers consciously excluded the British from real partnership. Churchill, Farmelo states, seems to have deliberately culled
references to strained wartime Anglo‑American relations from his memoirs.
By necessity, the book traces nuclear activity in the United States and Britain, under Clement Atlee’s government, from 1945 to
1951. Somewhat parallel to President Franklin Roosevelt’s decision not to inform Vice President Harry Truman about the US atomic
bomb project, Farmelo maintains, Atlee hid Britain’s nuclear weapons program from Churchill, as well as from the country at large
and from most of Parliament. Churchill, although angered at having been excluded from this knowledge, antagonized his second
cabinet during the 1950s when he worked without their knowledge toward a far more powerful thermonuclear weapon.
An important factor, too, was Churchill’s heavy reliance, throughout much of his political and journalistic career, on Frederick
Lindemann for scientific advice. Farmelo aptly notes that “in science, authority comes from its communities, not from
individuals,” and “Churchill made a serious error in putting so much weight on the opinion of one scientist, whose weaknesses
were well known to his peers” (p. 453). Farmelo adds that despite being a figure to early and publicly predict nuclear weapons,
Churchill almost never referred to his early prognostications during the last fifteen years of his political career. Likewise, he
rarely seemed to utilize the kind of awareness that these early statements might have foreshadowed.
One of several strengths of Churchill’s Bomb is its accessibility. The confluence of policy and technology can be daunting, but
Farmelo’s writing is crisp. In many places, as with one passage explaining the redesign of the American plutonium bomb, he tackles
potentially obscure scientific or technological issues. He does this effectively, using the trail of new scientific discoveries to
help illuminate the ways in which resulting technologies worked. The book subtly balances this with information that alerts the
reader to the fact that history and science are not linear and that scientific discoveries did not form an obvious trail at the
time. Churchill’s Bomb is detailed and engaging, and the effect is to make the reader feel informed and interested rather than
lost. Shortcomings in the work are few, although one is tempted to disagree with Farmelo’s characterization that “Britain was well
placed to fight” World War II (p. 111), in view of the country’s hard‑pressed position for much of the war and the serious
strategic weaknesses that Farmelo shows contributed to its falling behind in nuclear development.
In sum, Farmelo’s Churchill’s Bomb is a fine work, well presented, cogent, and informative. It is accessible to broad audiences,
and it deserves the attention of scholars of military history and the history of science and technology.
Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=42972
Citation: Nicholas Sambaluk. Review of Farmelo, Graham, Churchill's Bomb: How the United States Overtook Britain in the First
Nuclear Arms Race. H-War, H-Net Reviews. July, 2015.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=42972
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Read more or reply Tiegs on Asbach and Schröder, 'The Ashgate Research
Companion to the Thirty Years' War' [review]
by System Administrator
Olaf Asbach, Peter Schröder, eds. The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years' War. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2014. xiv + 347 pp. $149.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-4094-0629-7; $149.95 (e-book), ISBN 978-1-4094-0630-3.
Reviewed by Robert Tiegs (Louisiana State University)
Published on H-War (July, 2015)
Commissioned by Margaret Sankey
The Thirty Years’ War continues to capture and demand a significant amount of scholarly attention. Numerous well-known
interpretations of history hinge on this convoluted, confusing, and utterly destructive episode of European history. Was it the
last of the wars of religion? Was it a religious war at all? Did the equally complicated Peace of Westphalia which ended the
struggle usher in a new form of international diplomacy.[1] The complexity of the event means that it is difficult to treat in its
entirety while simultaneously allowing for a multitude of competing and sometimes contradictory interpretations. The ambitious
Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years’ War is an attempt to take stock of the current state of scholarship, with
contributions from a multitude of scholars treating a mix of both traditional and underexplored aspects of the conflict.
The stated goal of the work is to provide an authoritative overview of research for scholars and graduate students. An
introduction and twenty-five chapters comprise the work, with sections focusing on the Holy Roman Empire before the war, the aims
and goals of various combatants, the stages and theaters of war, religion and politics, the experiences and material conditions of
war, and the broader geographic and lasting impacts of the war and the Peace of Westphalia. Although most scholars could find
something in this lengthy work pertaining to their own research, in general it will be most useful for historians specializing in
warfare in the early modern period. While the majority of the contributions are well written, are well organized, and make
innovative claims, the detail of the discussion is often myopic, which many readers may find obstructive.
Before examining the strengths of the work, of which there are many, it is probably useful to begin with a discussion of the
weaknesses. The biggest issue is an embarrassing editorial mistake regarding the sectioning of the work. In the introduction, the
editors note that the book is divided into six different themes. However, in the table of contents and in the actual work there
are only five sections listed. The chapters detailing the experience and material conditions and experience of the war (chaps.
19-21) were clearly meant to be a distinct section on their own as indicated in the introduction and several of the contributors’
remarks, but it is not clear from the layout of the book. Whether this was the publisher’s or the editors’ oversight is unclear,
but careless editing issues like this recur throughout the work. Chapter 3, which focuses on the role of the Holy Roman Empire,
provides another good example, as it is divided and subdivided into so many segments that the overall argument and connections are
obscured because of the confusing organization. A more thorough and consistent focus on these issues would have been beneficial.
Despite the editorial issues, there are a lot of admirable and recommendable features worth highlighting. The most notable
contribution of the work is historiographical, as readers are introduced and confronted with competing interpretations and themes
that run throughout different aspects of the conflict. The biggest historiographical debate that struck me is the idea of a
“failed settlement” and the notion of the inevitability of the war. Two different chapters (15 and 22) discussing the Peace of
Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Prague (1635) specifically use the term “failed settlement” to discuss the success of these two
peace accords. Interestingly, these two chapters call into question the paradigm of a “failed settlement” yet both still invoke
it. As Martin Espenhorst (née Peters) remarks in his chapter on the Peace of Prague, there were two thousand “intergovernmental”
peace agreements between 1450 and 1789, none of which led to a lasting peace (p. 294). As numerous other chapters detail, such as
Joachim Whaley’s contribution on imperial politics, there were concerted attempts to maintain peace and avoid conflict. The
“failed settlement” paradigm makes the march toward war seem inexorable and unstoppable. Given that this work details one of the
most destructive wars in European history, it is refreshing that so many of the contributions focus on attempts to maintain the
peace.
Another interesting theme that cuts across several chapters is the role that propaganda played in the conflict. Several
contributors suggest the importance of propaganda, but often only in passing. For instance, Pärtel Piirimäe’s work on Sweden notes
that Gustav Adolphus portrayed two different, and seemingly contradictory, interpretations of his state’s role in the Thirty Years’
War. Internationally, Sweden and Adolphus were portrayed as biblical warriors with a godly mission to save the Protestant cause,
while domestically the king and his supporters focused on the political rationale behind the war, downplaying religious
dimensions. Similarly, in his work on the first phase of the war (1618-29), Ronald G. Asch mentions how the Holy Roman Emperor
Ferdinand II sought to portray the early fighting in secular terms, as a struggle between a ruler and his unruly subjects in order
to allay the fears of moderate Protestants in the empire and hopefully avoid future conflicts. The attentive reader will be able
to follow threads such as this one through the various chapters of the work.
There are numerous excellent contributions in this research companion, but a few stand out for comment. In general the most
profound chapters are those with the most basic arguments. For example, Paul Douglas Lockhart’s chapter, which notes that it “may
appear curious to the modern students of the seventeenth century that Denmark was once of pivotal importance in European
international politics,” is one of the best written and clearly argued chapters (p. 65). Sigrun Haude’s piece, “The Experience of
War,” is likewise an excellent addition. She demonstrates how fear permeated society, as people felt dislocated and uncertain,
struggling with the vicissitudes of warfare. Her examination of a prioress’ diary of the war is one of the most memorable parts of
the work. In actuality, all three chapters in part 5, on the experience and material conduct of the war, are exemplary; John
Theibault’s remark that “it proved easier for war to feed itself than to be sated” provides an apt summary of this section (p.
256).
Overall the Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years’ War is an ambitious work, treating numerous facets of the Thirty Years’
War in a detailed and interesting fashion. The work will be of use to early modernist scholars and students alike. In spite of
some editorial issues, the various contributions demonstrate the importance of the war and point to how the interpretations have
splintered into a historiography that continues to flourish. Simultaneously, this work demonstrates that sometimes the most
profound interpretations are often the most straightforward.
Note
[1]. See my previous review of Westphalia: The Last Christian Peace, by Derek
Croxton, H-War, H-Net Reviews (June 2014).
Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=43244
Citation: Robert Tiegs. Review of Asbach, Olaf; Schröder, Peter, eds., The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years' War.
H-War, H-Net Reviews. July, 2015.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=43244
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
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