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Specter will bog the committee down arguing about
Posse Comitatus rather than finding out who knew what and when.The thing the
elite fear the most is that concentrating on Atta will lead back to Ramzi
Youssef and Project Bojinka. So far rhey have been successful in keeping any
mention of Bojinka out of any investigations or reports. -
JR
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The Washington Times
www.washingtontimes.com
By Daniel Gallington
Published September 26, 2005
What will Arlen Specter, Pennsylvania Republican and chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, discover as he looks into covert military
intelligence program Able Danger, said to have discovered Mohamed Atta, by
name, and his al Qaeda cell working in the U.S. before the attacks of
September 11, 2001?
Here are some of the
senator's likely findings, including the "who knew what... and when" part:
Able Danger was a military intelligence
activity apparently looking at open-source, and other, yet unspecified,
information, including some that was "domestic" rather than foreign.
Able Danger was very similar to -- if not the
same as -- the "Total Information Awareness" or "TIA" program, the
ill-fated Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) study killed
off by Congress because of an avalanche of adverse publicity, much of it
uninformed.
The September 11 Commission
either knew, or should have known -- or didn't and could not have known --
about Able Danger's specific activities. From public accounts so far, this
seems to hinge on the response and objectivity of the commission senior
staff, who were briefed on Able Danger.
Mr.
Specter is also a past chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and
as such is uniquely qualified to take his inquiry as far as needed to
address these and other key issues. How might he proceed?
He would want to know, in detail, about the
"reporting of crimes" procedures in effect between the Defense Department
and the FBI -- and if both followed them, in letter and spirit. These
longstanding procedures would have been the vehicle for reporting -- to
the FBI -- any criminal activity allegedly discovered by Able Danger. As a
collateral matter, the procedures themselves should be reviewed for
currency.
He would want to know if the FBI
otherwise knew about Able Danger, as they perhaps should have -- if other
Defense and FBI agreements on intelligence operations and activities were
followed and if these agreements remain adequate.
He would want to know if Able Danger complied
with internal Defense Department regulations, insofar as it used "domestic
information." Important in this determination would be whether Able Danger
was technically an "intelligence activity" in the first place and if it
should, or perhaps should not, have been.
He
would want to know how effective Able Danger -- and TIA, for that matter
-- were or could have been to discover domestic terrorist plots and other
dangerous activity in the U.S. and who or what agencies should research
technologies and carry out discovery and prevention.
He would want to know if existing oversight
regimes -- including the internal executive department and congressional
review protocols -- for intelligence or law enforcement are adequate to
ensure Americans' privacy and civil liberties. And, what additional
oversight regimes would be needed for new information technologies, such
as were used in Able Danger.
Able Danger has
served as the basis for the latest flap surrounding the September 11
attacks. But there is a real possibility Mr. Specter's interest in it will
have some larger and longer-lasting effects on our nation's security. For
example, our ability to responsibly and effectively use all the
information our government has about the threat from terrorism, whether
"intelligence" or not, is essential.
This
remains vitally important today -- four years after September 11.
Despite last year's legislative and regulatory
reforms, we cannot seem to break down the barriers to sharing
intelligence, law enforcement and the other categories of information
relevant to terrorism threats. Even more fundamental, the roles and
missions of various departments and agencies have not yet changed to
reflect the new threat of domestic terrorism.
For example, and as ironic as it might now be,
DARPA could be exactly the right place for continued government research
on advanced, terrorism-related information technologies, including those
needed to protect the personal privacy of the innocent while allowing
access to data for legitimate security reasons. This is precisely because
DARPA is a pure research and development agency and has no law
enforcement, intelligence, regulatory or policy responsibilities -- nor
should it have.
Mr. Specter's interest in
reviewing Able Danger is very timely. It should cause a thoughtful
re-examination of defining, collecting and responsibly using the right and
best information no matter its category to protect us from another
terrorist attack.
Daniel Gallington, a national security and
privacy consultant, formerly was bipartisan general counsel for the Senate
Intelligence Committee, deputy counsel for intelligence policy at the
Justice Department and deputy assistant defense secretary for territorial
security.
Copyright © 2005 News World
Communications, Inc. All rights reserved.
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