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Subject: [PINR] 27 November 2006: Russia-China Security Cooperation
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27 November 2006
As Cuban leader Fidel Castro's birthday celebration draws near, PINR
encourages you to read the following recent brief:
"Intelligence Brief: Castro's Illness and the Health of Cuba's Government"
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=585
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Russia-China Security Cooperation
Drafted By: Dr. Marcel de Haas
http://www.pinr.com
Russia and China have joined together in a strategic partnership aimed at
countering the U.S. and Western "monopoly in world affairs," as was made clear
in a joint statement released by the Chinese and Russian presidents in July
2005. The long standing border disputes between the two countries were settled
in agreements in 2005, and joint military exercises were carried out in the
same year. Furthermore, Russia, in addition to its arms exports, has been
increasing its oil and gas commitments to China. Clearly, the recent
comprehensive improvement of bilateral relations between China and Russia is a
remarkable development. What is the meaning of this military and security
related cooperation, and is the Sino-Russian military liaison likely to expand?
Should this rapprochement be considered as a structural shift of power with the
goal of repelling Western influence from Central Asia and the adjacent areas?
Russian-Chinese Military Maneuvers
In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed
forces carried out joint military exercises. China took the lead in proposing
the size, participating type of forces and content of the maneuvers. Allegedly,
China also took care of most of the costs of the exercises. The formal
objectives of the mission were to strengthen the capability of joint operations
and the exchange of experience; to establish methods of organizing cooperation
in the fight against international terrorism, separatism and extremism; and to
enhance mutual combat readiness against newly developing threats. [See: "The
Significance of Sino-Russian Military Exercises"]
The exercises comprised "ingredients" such as the use of strategic long
range bombers, neutralization of anti-aircraft defenses, command posts and
airbases, gaining air superiority, enforcing a maritime blockade and the
control of maritime territory. Terrorist movements, however, do not posses
conventional land, sea or air forces, nor do they deploy their military power
in a symmetrical way. Therefore, the objectives of the joint exercises had
little to do with combating terrorism; instead, they were aimed at conventional
warfare, employing all military services except for nuclear forces. The actual
objective of the maneuvers was likely to display to the Western world that
Russia and China consider themselves to be in control of the Asia-Pacific
region and that outside powers will be denied the right to interfere in their
sphere of influence.
From a military-operational point of view, Russia as well as China gained
from the experience of the bilateral exercises. The Chinese armed forces are --
as a consequence of China's increasing political and economic power -- in a
stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practicing command
and control procedures but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying
out an airborne assault, will strengthen the capabilities of the Chinese
forces. If Russia considers that China might turn into a threat in the long
run, then these exercises have also been worthwhile for the Russian general
staff by providing it insight into how the Chinese armed forces operate and
what their current capabilities are.
Arms Sales
The demonstration of weapon systems at the 2005 Sino-Russian exercises
might have been meant to promote Russian arms sales to observers of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (S.C.O.). India, for instance, comprises some
40 percent of Russia's arms exports and Iran is considered to be an important
growth market for the Russian arms market. Currently, some 45 percent of
Russia's arms exports go to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon
systems to China -- including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers --
amounting to an average of US$2 billion annually. China has been the largest
consumer of Russian military equipment for a number of years. Russia's arms
trade to China is an important factor in the cooperation between the two
countries.
Nevertheless, Russia seems to be well aware that China would like to
obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of
deteriorating relations, Beijing might use against Russia. For that reason,
Russia is reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products.
Moreover, there are indications that China is steadily acquiring enough
knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. Subsequently, in the
coming years China will buy fewer arms from Russia, which will diminish the
value of this cornerstone of their bilateral relationship.
Energy Policy
In August 2005, during a visit to Beijing, Russian President Vladimir
Putin stressed economic ties and especially the work of Russian energy
companies in China, bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to
third countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China.
Furthermore, in November 2005 Russia and China agreed to double oil exports to
China and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a
gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China's Far East.
China, however, also focuses on Kazakhstan in its need for energy. In
December 2005, the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline between the two countries was
opened. In due course, this Sino-Kazakh pipeline will be enlarged from 1,000 to
3,000 kilometers (621 to 1,864 miles) and will eventually provide China with
approximately 15 percent of its crude oil needs. By establishing energy ties
with Kazakhstan, it is clear that China wants to avoid energy dependency on
Russia.
Another argument is that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through
China instead of through Russia, China's influence over Kazakhstan and Central
Asia will increase at the expense of Russia's position. Thus, Russia's energy
power tool -- as used successfully against Ukraine -- seems to be threatened by
China's energy strategy. Although cooperating with China in energy, however,
Kazakhstan has a considerable Russian minority and therefore will be unlikely
to follow an anti-Russian political course.
The Demographics Factor
In December 2005, Russia's interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliev, stated
that illegal immigration is creating a threat to national security in the
Russian Far East. Although Nurgaliev did not mention the word "Chinese," and in
spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, a
continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants is taking place in this region.
Russia has a long border with China, some 4,300 kilometers (2,672 miles), and
is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers may vary but sources mention
a flood of thousands of Chinese entering Russia, up to allegedly 600,000 per
year.
It is not inconceivable that this flood is more than a coincidence; in
fact, it might well be a planned policy directed from Beijing. Possibly, China
is carrying out a policy of "Finlandization" in order to gradually increase its
influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy
might be to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from densely populated
areas in China proper, and also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in
this area, which is rich in energy resources.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Russian-Chinese military exercises of 2005 should not only be
considered from a Sino-Russian bilateral point of view, but also as an activity
of the S.C.O., as was frequently stated by Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov. Not only did the Russian and Chinese ministers of defense observe the
maneuvers, but also present were representatives from the S.C.O.
Formed in 1996 as the "Shanghai Five" -- comprising Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan -- in 2001, together with admitting
Uzbekistan, the S.C.O. was formalized as an international organization. Until
2005, the S.C.O. mainly dealt with regional security -- in particular against
the three "evils" of terrorism, separatism and extremism -- as well as with
economic cooperation. However, at its summit of July 2005 in Astana, the S.C.O.
proclaimed a radical change of course. The governments of the Central Asian
member states -- faced with the Western-supported regime changes in Ukraine and
Georgia, as well as with Western criticism of the Uzbek government's repression
of the unrest in Andijan -- increasingly saw their existence threatened, which
forced them to choose an alliance with Russia and China and diminishing the
(economically favorable) relationship with the West. [See: "Intelligence Brief:
Russia in the S.C.O."]
At the summit, this led to a final statement of the S.C.O. members in
which Washington's unipolar and dominating policies as well as foreign military
deployment in Central Asia were condemned and the withdrawal of Western
military troops was encouraged. This Declaration of the Heads of Member States
revealed a watershed in the S.C.O.'s range of policy from regional
anti-terrorist activities to claiming an important position in the
international arena in external security policy.
In addition to the S.C.O.'s change of course, there was another
significant development at the 2005 summit. In addition to Mongolia, in July
2005 Iran, Pakistan and India joined the S.C.O. as observers. By admitting
these three states as observers, the S.C.O. now encompasses nearly half of the
world's population. Furthermore, in addition to Russia and China, India and
Pakistan bring together four nuclear powers, whereas Iran possibly has the
ambition to become one. In addition to this, the S.C.O. Shanghai summit of June
2006 -- which was dominated by energy deals, especially by China --
demonstrated that energy resources (Russia, Kazakhstan and Iran) are also a
crucial focal point for its members and observers. Comprising a considerable
territory in and around Central Asia, a large part of the world population,
energy resources and nuclear arms, the S.C.O. has a formidable political,
economic and military potential.
For Russia, the S.C.O. apparently acts as a means to bring together
different policy objectives. Not only China, but India and Iran as well have a
special relationship with Russia. All three states are important actors in
Russia's arms exports. In addition to this, China and India are gaining a
closer relationship with Russia in the field of joint, bilateral military
exercises. Therefore, the fact that India and Iran recently joined China in its
cooperation with Russia within the S.C.O. could prove that the S.C.O. serves as
a platform for Russia's security policy.
It is evident that the S.C.O. is gaining power, in particular since the
Astana summit of 2005. It is likely that this development of the S.C.O. will
continue in the coming years. Russia will use this organization to reduce
Western and U.S. influence in Central Asia which was accomplished in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. In such a way, the S.C.O. will represent
to Russia a vital instrument to achieve geopolitical objectives.
In envisaging the future position of the S.C.O., it is important to note
that cooperation among its members and observers is essentially based upon a
negative strategic objective: to counter U.S. and Western influence. To a large
extent, common, positive targets are absent. For example, China is seeking
markets and energy resources; Russia is eager to regain its leadership status
within the C.I.S. as well as that of a superpower in the international arena;
and the Central Asian regimes consider the S.C.O. as their guarantee for
political survival.
Moreover, India and Pakistan are probably showing the West that they
follow their own independent course and Iran's objective might be found in
anti-Americanism. This mixture of possibly divergent objectives -- for
instance, Iran's support of radical Islamists which are a threat to the Central
Asian states -- demonstrates that they do not necessarily have much in common.
It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the eventually deviating objectives of
the S.C.O. member states and observers will cause a split in the organization,
which would paralyze its activities.
Outlook on Russia-China Relations
In the coming years, Russia is likely to strengthen its ties with China.
These two states are seeking a closer relationship not only in the field of
security, but also in areas such as military cooperation, energy, the arms
trade and foreign policy. Russia has more than once stated that closer
relations with China is a geopolitical objective in order to strengthen
Russia's global position. Nonetheless, this close relationship with China could
very well turn out to be for the short term.
In its Far East, Russia is increasingly confronted with illegal
immigration from China. Furthermore, Russia possesses energy resources that
China desperately needs. China is "using" Russia for its military technology
and energy resources. When China reaches its current drive for independence in
military technology and will have created alternative ways of gaining energy --
for instance through Kazakhstan -- China may reduce ties with Russia. Moreover,
China will continue to use its neighbors, such as Russia, the Central Asian
states and other partners within the S.C.O., to strengthen its global position.
If so required, China will not hesitate to use its power against one of its
former partners, as is demonstrated by China's efforts to divert energy routes
away from Russia.
Russia is well aware that China's growing economic and military
importance could develop into a threat. An indication of Russia's concern
toward China could be in Moscow's alleged creation of a second joint military
grouping of defense forces and internal and security troops. In contrast with
the areas of Chechnya and Dagestan, in Russia's Far East there is no threat of
Islamic extremism and the formation of a joint military command could only be
related to a potential threat from China. In due course, the so far hidden fear
of China could cause Russia to draw back from China and to seek an
intensification of political and economic ties with the West, even if this
abandonment from China would mean that Russia has to accept Western influence
in its backyard of the former Soviet Union.
The West will probably have to cope with increasing ties between Russia
and China and subsequent policies contrary to Western activities in the Far
East and the Pacific. To a certain extent, the West itself is the reason for
this rapprochement between Russia and China. All current Russian major security
documents clearly demonstrate disappointment in the West for leaving Russia out
of Western security policy. The climax of this mistrust has been N.A.T.O.'s war
in Kosovo. Although Russian-Western relations since then have improved, the
feelings of mistrust and disregard are still evident in parts of Russia's
security elite and thus have resulted in closer ties with China.
China's emerging economic and military power will have to be taken into
account. China will become a regional and possibly global power with capacities
and policies that may counter Western influence not only in the Far East, but
elsewhere. Western security policy should be aware of this development. If
China indeed achieves such a superpower position, the West and Russia may find
common ground to seek closer cooperation.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Marcel de Haas
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