Begin forwarded message:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: March 16, 2007 6:20:22 PM PDT
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Homeland Security's Man in Charge of Targeting
"Radicalized" US CITIZENS
Charles E. Allen's name does not appear on the White House list of
nominations, nor is his confirmation status noted. Richard Ben-
Veniste, attorney and a former 9/11 Commissioner, submitted written
testimony October 19, 2005 to the U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence which stated that the
Senate should have confirmed Allen.
"Under [Chertoff's] proposed reorganization, below the level of the
secretary, no official invested with department-wide intelligence
responsibilities would be accountable to Congress."
<http://homeland.house.gov/files/TestimonyBen-Veniste.pdf>
---------------------------
"We're concerned that Charlie Allen could become the next J. Edgar
Hoover."
--Tim Sparapani, ACLU
---------------------------
Interview with Allen in the Federal Register, http://
www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2075300
"My deputy assistant secretary for intelligence [Jack Tomarchio]
has formed a group of analysts led by a very senior intelligence
officer. Not only are they looking at what’s available in the
intelligence files, they’re talking to state and local levels,
because they have ideas on this.
"We’re also collaborating with the director of science and
technology, Jay Cohen. They’re looking at the phenomenon from a
social behavior point of view. More importantly, our group is
working with [Assistant Policy Secretary] Stewart Baker’s office,
and Assistant Secretary [for Strategic Plans] Randy Beardsworth has
a working group across DHS that’s looking at the whole issue of
radicalization. So we’re early into this but we already have some
ideas.
"Whether it’s animal rights people, or environmental extremists, or
Islamic extremists willing to commit violence, we have a real
responsibility to Secretary Chertoff, the community and [director
of national intelligence] Ambassador [John] Negroponte to help in
any way we can."
--------------------------
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070314/pl_nm/security_usa_islamists_dc
Charles Allen, the chief homeland security intelligence officer,
told the same panel that extremists in the United States had been
involved mainly in "aspirational plotting hatched largely by
isolated actors who lack the will or the capability to carry out
large scale attacks."
"Plots involving home-grown extremists in the U.K. and western
Europe have been linked to al Qaeda and other terrorist networks.
We have yet to find such deep linkages in the United States," he
added. Allen's remarks suggested there was no evidence of an
active al Qaeda role in the recruitment, training or activities of
home-grown U.S. extremists.
U.S. officials view the militant group led by Osama bin Laden as
the leading threat to the United States.
President George W. Bush has justified his domestic spying program
by emphasizing the need to track al Qaeda members and other
Islamist militants through telephone and e-mail contacts with
people in the United States.
Officials said the Department of Homeland Security had assigned 30
analysts to study the phenomenon of radicalization in the United
States, with a major initial focus on New York, New Jersey and
California.
"We'd like to develop a warning capability on radicalization,"
Allen said. "Radicalization will eventually spawn operational
attacks on the homeland, if we do not gain deeper insights into the
phenomenon and actively work to deter it."
-------------
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/biography_0132.shtm
Charles E. Allen
Mr. Charles Allen is the Chief Intelligence Officer for the
Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis reporting directly
to Secretary Chertoff. In this role, he is responsible for
coordinating with the Intelligence Community and providing guidance
on Homeland Security specific issues.
Prior to joining the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Allen
served as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Collection since June 1998. In this capacity, he was responsible
for Intelligence Community collection and requirements management
and reported to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)
for Community Management. Mr. Allen also chaired the National
Intelligence Collection Board, which ensured that collection was
integrated and coordinated across the Intelligence Community.
A native of North Carolina, Mr. Allen served in the CIA since 1958,
holding a variety of positions of increasing responsibility both in
analytic and managerial capacities. From 1974-1977, he served
overseas in an intelligence liaison capacity and from 1977-1980
held management positions in the Directorate of Intelligence. From
1980 to November 1982 [under President Reagan], he served as a
program manager of a major classified project, reporting to DDCI's
Carlucci, Inman, and McMahon, respectively.
In December 1982, Mr. Allen was detailed to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, where he held a senior
position in strategic mobilization planning. In 1985, Director
Casey asked Mr. Allen to return to CIA in the capacity of a
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Counterterrorism. In
February 1986, he also was appointed Chief of Intelligence in CIA's
newly established Counterterrorist Center. As NIO for
Counterterrorism, he represented the DCI in a number of interagency
committees, including the chairing of the Interagency Intelligence
committee on Terrorism, and serving as a member of the
Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the National
Security Council’s Terrorist Incident Working Group. Following this
assignment, Mr. Allen served as the NIO for Warning from 1988 to
1994. In this capacity, he was the principal adviser to the DCI on
national-level warning intelligence and chaired the Intelligence
Community's Warning Committee.
Mr. Allen was awarded the National Intelligence Medal for
Achievement in 1983 by DCI Casey and the President's Award for
Distinguished Federal Civilian Service in 1986 by President Reagan.
In 1991, he was presented the CIA Commendation Medal for provision
of warning intelligence in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In October
2005, CIA Director Goss awarded Mr. Allen the Distinguished
Intelligence Medal, the CIA’s highest and most coveted award. In
addition, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Negroponte awarded Mr. Allen the National Intelligence
Distinguished Service Medal in October 2005.
Mr. Allen completed a Bachelor’s degree as well as graduate studies
from the University of North Carolina. He is a Distinguished
Graduate of the U.S. Air Force Air War College.
-------------------
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Charles_Allen
Served as Assistant Director of Central Intelligence [ADCI] for
Collection, June 1998 until June 2005. In that capacity, he was in
charge of coordinating all the community spy systems and chaired
the National Intelligence Collection Board, which ensures that
collection is integrated and coordinated across the intelligence
community.
"Appointed as Assistant Director of Central Intelligence (ADCI) for
Collection, coordinating the entire intelligence community
intelligence collection system, was Charles Allen, a thirty year
veteran operations officer. He will oversee the decisions of the
various committees deciding the targets of national systems. He
allegedly was chosen on the basis of his reputation for holding
contrarian views and willingness to challenge the system." [5]
Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Agency (1999) [6]
C.I.A. Inspector General's Report on 9/11 Intelligence Failures
In August 2005 the New York Times reported that supporters of
former C.I.A. Director George Tenet were critical of the CIA
Inspector General's report on intelligences failures before
September 11 for having failed to interview Allen, who was
assistant director of central intelligence for collection.
"In 1998, after Al Qaeda's bombing of two American embassies in
East Africa, it was Mr. Allen whom Mr. Tenet assigned to organize
the agency's efforts against the terrorist network, according to
testimony Mr. Tenet gave last year. He said that at the advice of
Mr. Allen, he created a special unit with officers from the C.I.A.,
the eavesdropping National Security Agency and the satellite photo
agency to meet daily and focus on Al Qaeda's leaders and
headquarters in Afghanistan," the article stated. [7]
Gulf War: Bombing of Amiriyah Shelter
Allen supported the selection of bomb targets during the the first
Gulf War. He coordinated intelligence with Colonel John Warden, who
headed the Air Force's planning cell known as "Checkmate." On
February 10, 1991 Allen presented his estimate to Col. Warden that
Public Shelter Number 25 in the Southwestern Baghdad suburb of
Amiriyah had become an alternative command post and showed no sign
of being used as a civilian bomb shelter.
Satellite photos and electronic intercepts which Allen thought
indicated this alternative use were regarded as circumstantial and
unconvincing to Brigadier General Buster Glosson, who had primary
responsibility for targeting. Glosson's comment was that the
assessment wasn't "worth a shit." A human source in Iraq, who had
previously proven accurate warned the CIA that Iraqi intelligence
had begun operating from the shelter. On February 11, Shelter
Number 25 was added to the Air Force's attack plan. At 4:30 am the
morning of February 13, two F-117 stealth bombers each dropped a
2,000 pound, laser-guided, GBU-27 munition on the shelter. The
first cut through ten feet of reinforced concrete before a time-
delayed fuze exploded. Minutes later the second bomb followed the
path cut by the first bomb. [Crusade: The Untold Story of the
Persian Gulf War, 1993, p. 284-285 ]
In the shelter at the time of the bombing were hundreds of Iraqi
civilians. More than 400 people, mostly women and children were
killed. Men and boys over the age of 15 had left the shelter to
give the women and children some privacy. Jeremy Bowen, a BBC
correspondent, was one of the first television reporters on the
scene. Bowen was given access to the site and did not find evidence
of military use. [ Report aired BBC 1, February 14, 1991 ]
Iran Contra
From Nomination of Robert M. Gates of Virginia, to be Director of
Central Intelligence (Senate: November 5, 1991), Congressional
Record: Extract:
"On September 9, 1986, a senior CIA analyst, Charles Allen, wrote a
memo on the arms sales to Iran, a copy of which went to Mr. Gates.
He also claims to have talked to Mr. Gates regarding shipments of
arms to Iran. Mr. Gates cannot recall the conversation or receiving
the memo." Re Iran/Contra scandal.
"A number of outspoken analysts bitterly criticized [Allen] for
bending his views to political expediency during the Iran
initiative. Allen, they said, took advantage of his access to Casey
to promote a political line -- that an opening could be made to
Iranian moderates -- that could not be supported by the information
they had gathered on Iran's internal politics. Allen played the
White House game, these critics claimed, by using contrived
information provided by CIA consultant George Cave to support the
Iran program. 'Charlie Allen's briefing of the NSC was based on
disinformation,' a senior CIA analyst explained."
[Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA, Mark Perry, 1992, p. 215.]
Reprimand By William Webster
Director of Central Intelligence William Webster formally
reprimanded Allen for failing to comply with the DCI's request for
full cooperation in the agency's internal Iran-Contra scandal
investigation. After failing to have the reprimand lifted through
the regular appeal process, Allen retained future DCI James Woolsey
as an attorney and was successful in applying pressure to have the
reprimand lifted.
Mark Perry observes "Ironically, Allen's attack on Webster was as
unjustified as Webster's reprimand." The reprimand stemmed from a
set of missing papers found in Allen's office containing
information on the arms-for-hostages deal. Allen claimed they had
been inadvertently overlooked in a messy office. Supporters of
Allen pointed out that Webster reprimanded the one person in the
CIA who had brought his suspicions of a funds diversion to Robert
Gates. Others asserted that Allen simply did not respect Webster.
[Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA, Mark Perry, 1992, p. 216.]
Continuity of Government
From 1980 to November 1982, Allen was detailed to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, where he was deputy director of a CONTINUITY
OF GOVERNMENT (COG) planning project.
A colleague quoted Allen as saying during a COG meeting, "Our job
is to throw the Constitution out the window."
His assignment to the COG project brought him into contact with
Oliver North, who was delegated to monitor COG's findings by
National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane.
[Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA, Mark Perry, 1992, p. 215.]
The Yom Kippur War
A Government Executive article recounting Allen's history at the
CIA noted:
"Allen hasn't always been right. He has been catastrophically
wrong. In 1973, he reviewed intelligence showing Egypt and Syria
running military exercises along the Israeli border and decided it
was a bluff. He wrote as much in the President's Daily Briefing
that went to Dick Nixon. Soon afterward, the two countries invaded
Israel, launching the Yom Kippur War."
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