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The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence  
(Hardcover)
by Richard J. Aldrich (Author) "Wing Commander George Keat of the RAF  
encountered Soviets forces for the first time in Austria on 1 October  
1945, Germany and Austria had been..." (more)
Key Phrases: atomic intelligence, astern bloc, human espionage,  
Chiefs of Staff, State Department, Special Branch (more...)
        
    

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Editorial Reviews
Amazon.com
America and Britain have long enjoyed what leaders in both countries  
have deemed a "special relationship." Their closeness has long been  
cemented, Richard Aldrich writes, by shared intelligence--"the hidden  
hand" of his title, even if their intelligence communities have  
sometimes been at odds and worked to different purposes. In the  
postwar era, writes University of Nottingham professor of politics  
Aldrich, American intelligence was aided immeasurably by Britain,  
which had had considerable experience in keeping tabs on Russian  
agents for decades, thanks to the long-played "great game" in Central  
Asia. One successful joint enterprise took place in Iran, threatened  
by Soviet invasion after World War II: even with a few missteps,  
joint American-British efforts led to victory in a battle largely  
fought through propaganda, even if that battle gave America strategic  
advantage in the Persian Gulf region at Britain's expense. Other  
joint efforts were less successful, including the cynical abandonment  
of the Hungarian rebels of 1956, and relations between the two powers  
were often strained by competing interests, such as those made  
evident by the Suez crisis. Despite errors of judgment, spy scandals,  
interagency and international competition, and other blights on the  
record, Aldrich observes that "Cold War intelligence was neither  
fruitless nor a zero-sum game, and its most substantial benefits  
might be measured through inaction"--that is, the fact that the war  
stayed for the most part cold. Aldrich considers the whole range of  
operations in this detailed account, which will be of considerable  
interest to students of cold war history. --Gregory McNamee

 From Publishers Weekly
We do not yet know the full story of the Cold War, writes Aldrich  
near the beginning of this impressive study of Anglo-American secret  
intelligence. Indeed, we may never know. Nevertheless, Aldrich, co- 
editor of the journal Intelligence and National Security, gives it  
his best shot. Beginning in 1941 with the Nazi invasion of the  
U.S.S.R., and concluding in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis, he  
details an astonishing range of covert activities by British and  
American intelligence units. Some of these, like the British effort  
to break the German Enigma code, are now well-known; others have  
remained largely obscure, for example, Operation Unthinkable,  
Churchill's appropriately named plan to attack the U.S.S.R.  
immediately after WWII or the British parachuting of agents into the  
Ukraine, where nationalist guerrillas fought against the Soviets well  
into the 1950s. Such revelations can be found on almost every page.  
Aldrich builds a convincing case that much of the Cold War was fought  
behind the scenes, manipulated by the hidden hand of spies,  
counterspies and secret analysts. Much of the important history of  
the Cold War, Aldrich says, remains locked away in the vaults of the  
CIA, MI6 and KGB. And even when information is released, the sheer  
volume precludes comprehensive analysis Aldrich notes that the U.S.  
National Security Agency alone now produces more documents in a  
single day than anyone could read in a lifetime. Despite these  
obstacles, Aldrich succeeds in throwing open the door on the grim  
secrets of recent history. Though the book's academic tone and sheer  
size may overwhelm some readers, those who persist will dramatically  
expand their understanding of the Cold War. 32 b&w photos not seen by  
PW.
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

See all Editorial Reviews
Product Details

     * Hardcover: 733 pages
     * Publisher: Overlook Hardcover (May 9, 2002)
     * Language: English
     * ISBN-10: 1585672742
     * ISBN-13: 978-1585672745
     * Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 5.9 x 2 inches
     * Shipping Weight: 2.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
     * Average Customer Review: based on 1 review. (Write a review.)
     * Amazon.com Sales Rank: #1,018,374 in Books (See Bestsellers in  
Books)

recent reviews submitted by a UK reader, July 2, 2002
Reviewer: A reader
Max Hastings in The Sunday Telegraph `Books of the Year' 2 December  
2001 >

The Hidden Hand by Richard Aldrich (John Murray) is as good an  
account of Cold War Intelligence between 1945 and 1962 as we are  
likely to get for some time.

George Walden in The Evening Standard 23 July 2001 >

 From riveting case-histories of individual operations to the furious  
intrigues of the transatlantic intelligence community , from the  
unsung role of the low-level agent to the evolution of electronic  
espionage - everything is here ... Aldrich has a gift for conveying a  
sense of living history, combing colourful detail of this or that  
episode with the grand strategies that drove the intelligence men.

Cal McCrystal in The Financial Times 1 July 2001 >

What makes Aldrich's book so delightful is its abundance of  
marvellous anecdote ... Miles Copeland, the CIA's new station chief  
in Cairo at the time of the Suez crisis, had little time for US  
ambassadors and was a bit of a cowboy. As station chief in Syria in  
1950 Copeland was blamed for a series of army coups that "eventually  
led to an increasingly pro-Soviet dictatorship". He was moved to  
Cairo after a wild party during which guns were fired through the  
ceiling. Indeed, an Aldrich sub-theme is the extent to which British  
and American secret agents frequently unnerved their own governments  
more than the regimes they were supposed to monitor subvert or  
liberate. 

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