http://www.statesman.com/opinion/content/editorial/stories/insight/06/01/0601morris.html
    Seen, unseen  For filmmaker Errol Morris, the Abu Ghraib photos   concealed 
as much as they revealed,   and helped cover up the larger truth.  By Jody 
Seaborn
AMERICAN-STATESMAN STAFF
Sunday, June 01, 2008 
   
  Last summer, documentary filmmaker Errol Morris began writing 
  Zoom, a blog about photography for The New York Times. 
   
  In his blog, Morris examines how photographs, 
  of both the still and moving variety,
   "attract false beliefs — as fly-paper attracts flies." 
   
  We're often fooled by photographs, Morris has written, 
  "because photography can make us
   think we know more than we really know." 
   
  The themes that Morris explores in Zoom 
  — that it is necessary to understand what a photograph 
  doesn't show us to understand what it does 
  — are at the heart of his latest film, 
  "Standard Operating Procedure," which opens Friday in Austin. 
   
  Like "The Thin Blue Line," Morris' superlative 
  1988 documentary that helped overturn the wrongful conviction 
  of Randall Adams for the murder of a Dallas police officer, 
  "Standard Operating Procedure" is an investigative work. 
   
  It seeks to determine whether the abuses of Iraqi prisoners 
  at Abu Ghraib were merely the work of a few "bad apples," 
  as the military and the Bush administration publicly maintained, 
  or the result of policies sanctioned and encouraged 
  by civilian and military leaders. 
  For two years, Morris interviewed soldiers, interrogators 
  and investigators, and examined letters, depositions, memos, 
  and military and government reports to find the larger truth 
  behind the infamous photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib. 
   
  As he writes in his director's statement for the film, 
  "The story of Abu Ghraib
   is still shrouded in moral ambiguity,
   but it is clear what happened there." 
   
  And what happened, Morris says, is that the seven military police 
  soldiers convicted of abuses at Abu Ghraib 
  — Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick, Sgt. Javal Davis, 
  Cpl. Charles Graner, Spc. Sabrina Harman, 
  Spc. Megan Ambuhl, Spc. Jeremy Sivits and Pfc. Lynndie England 
  — were doing what they thought their superiors wanted done. 
   
  Their job was to "soften up" prisoners for interrogation. 
  Morris doesn't exonerate these soldiers, 
  but he gives their actions context. 
   
  What do the Abu Ghraib photographs tell us? 
  What do they not tell us? Morris has said that they serve 
  as both exposé and cover-up. That is, the photographs 
  limited the very scandal they helped uncover. 
   
  While they offer a nightmarish look at something that had 
  gone seriously wrong inside Iraq, something deeply at odds 
  with our ideas of justice, they also misled us into thinking 
  that what we saw was all there was. 
   
  A few of the more disturbing photographs — some of which 
  were staged for the camera — appear to document 
  an abuse far worse than it physically was. 
   
  Their power, Morris says, comes not from what they detail 
  but from what they suggest. One such photo is the iconic image 
  of the Iraqi whom the soldiers nicknamed Gilligan, 
  who stands hooded on a cardboard box 
  with his arms outstretched under a makeshift poncho 
  while wires dangle from his fingers
   (he was told that he would be electrocuted if he fell from the box). 
   
  Gilligan's ordeal with the wires lasted 10, maybe 15 minutes 
  and was relatively tame by Abu Ghraib standards. 
  He later became one of the soldiers' favorite prisoners after he, 
  like most Abu Ghraib detainees, was cleared 
  of any involvement in insurgent attacks. 
   
  "He was just a funny, funny guy," 
  Harman told Morris. 
  Other photographs, meanwhile, distract from a deeper, 
  more serious crime. The same night the Gilligan pictures 
  were taken, Harman and Graner photographed themselves 
  — smiling, thumbs up — next to the bruised body 
  of Manadel al-Jamadi, a suspected insurgent 
  whose death during a CIA interrogation session 
  would later be classified a homicide by military investigators. 
   
  Harman's commanding officer had told her that al-Jamadi 
  had died of a heart attack, and she took a later set of photos 
  to document the lie. But the photographs of Graner and Harman, 
  especially the picture of Harman, are better known, and they 
  almost force al-Jamadi, and thus the circumstances of his death, 
  from the scene. 
  In investigating Abu Ghraib, Morris collected more material 
  than one movie can possibly hold. An excellent companion book, 
  also titled "Standard Operating Procedure" and written 
  by New Yorker staff writer Philip Gourevitch, uses the information 
  that Morris gathered to further explore the story of Abu Ghraib. 
   
  "There was no excuse" for Abu Ghraib, Gourevitch writes, 
  "and there was nothing to show for it either, 
  no great score of useful intelligence, 
  no ends to justify the means. 
  Nobody has ever even bothered to pretend otherwise. 
  The horror ... was entirely gratuitous." 
  I spoke recently with Morris about his film 
  and the Abu Ghraib photographs. 
  A condensed and edited version of our conversation follows. 
   
  
  Austin American-Statesman:
  You're intrigued by how photos without context 
  paint a false picture of events.
   'Do they provide evidence,' you've written, 
  'and if so, evidence of what?' 
  Looking at the Abu Ghraib photos, 
  how would you answer these questions? 
   
  Errol Morris: 
  I often think about photographs as revealing and concealing 
  at the same time. Of course, without these photographs, 
  we would know nothing about Abu Ghraib. It's like someone pulled 
  back a stage curtain and gave us a glimpse into this bizarre reality. 
   
  But did we know what we were looking at? 
  Did we take a further step and try to investigate and figure out 
  whether what we imagined about the photographs, 
  what we believed about the photographs, 
  what we thought about the photographs, 
  was actually what the photographs were about? 
   
  
  Some of the pictures document an abuse under way 
  — photos of detainees who are handcuffed to their bunks 
  or their cell bars with panties on their heads, for example 
  — but the more famous photographs — the hooded Iraqi 
  on a box, the Iraqi on a leash — are posed. 
  Does that make them worse? Why do these photos 
  resonate more deeply with us than the more 'vérité' ones? 
   
  I even divide the photographs into three categories: one, vérité, 
  people just taking pictures. Then, they put Americans in the picture 
  — servicemen maybe smiling, thumbs up, whatever, 
  with an Iraqi prisoner in the frame. And then, of course, 
  the third category, which is what you're talking about,
   is photographs that seem to be tableaux-evolved. 
   
  Someone constructed a scene so that a picture could be taken. 
  And I think we feel it in the picture. 
  I think that's what makes the picture so deeply disturbing. ... 
  One of the surprising things about mucking around with this story 
  for two years is having Brent Pack (a military forensic investigator 
  whose job was to analyze the Abu Ghraib photographs)
   tell me that the picture of Gilligan 
  is S.O.P.: standard operating procedure. 
   
  
  The photo of Abu Ghraib. 
  The photo of Abu Ghraib: standard operating procedure. 
  Of course, then the question is, what is the line of demarcation? 
  You're talking about a war where humiliation, degradation 
  — sexual humiliation and degradation — is part of it. 
   
  It's such a crazy story, people stripping — you know, 
  I can tell you one thing I never do in interviews 
  is I never try to strip people. I never put sacks on their heads. 
  I just try talking to them. I find this to be a very effective method 
  for finding things out. Where this crazy stuff came from, well, 
  ... this wasn't invented by Graner and Frederick 
  and Lynndie England and Sabrina Harman. 
  This was part of the war effort. 
  It's the essence of the war effort. 
   
  
  Harman seems to have the idea that at some point 
  she's going to need her photos to report — and that's a word 
  she uses in her letters home, 'report' — these abuses. 
  Where did she think she might go with these photos? 
   
  I don't know. But if not for her photos, 
  we would not know about the death of al-Jamadi. 
  Now maybe she didn't turn the photos over to "60 Minutes II" and 
  The New Yorker (both of which broke the story of Abu Ghraib). 
  She imagined herself doing it. 
  She wanted to show that the military, in her words to Kelly, 
  in that letter right after the photographs of al-Jamadi, 
  that the military is nothing but lies. 
  You know, she went home on leave immediately after 
  (the al-Jamadi pictures were taken) and she tried to show 
  the photos to a CNN reporter that she met in a bar 
  and the CNN reporter wasn't interested. 
  
   
  She writes these letters to Kelly, a woman she describes 
  as her 'wife.' She's a lesbian in the military. 
  Does that fact affect the way Harman was treated? 
   
  I think it saved her. By the way, when American men use 
  American women to degrade Iraqi men, they're degrading 
  American women at the same time. 
  There's something so twisted and sick about it. 
  And Sabrina escaped this in part. 
  She, of course, was not part of that infamous love triangle 
  between Lynndie and Megan and Graner. 
  She was off to the side. So in part, yes, I think she was 
  removed from a certain kind of sexual tension. ... 
  One photograph — I'm just writing an essay for Zoom on this; 
  it's about how Sabrina was implicated in al-Jamadi's death. 
  The picture of her smiling with her thumbs-up 
  over the corpse of al-Jamadi. 
   
  Of course, she had nothing to do with his death. 
  She wanted to be a forensic photographer. 
  And most of the pictures she took that night were forensic pictures. 
  You can't describe them any other way. 
  Detailed pictures of the injuries that al-Jamadi received. 
  She's actually capturing evidence. 
  It's an act of civil disobedience in the military 
  to show that she had been lied to by her commanding officer
   who told her that this was a man who had died of a heart attack. 
   
  The guy who killed al-Jamadi, the CIA officer, 
  never gets prosecuted or reprimanded. There's a cover-up 
  where they take the body out on a gurney with an IV. 
  The people involved in the cover-up never get prosecuted. 
  Sabrina gets sent to jail for a year for taking a photograph. 
  
   
  The photo of al-Jamadi documents a homicide. 
  But when people look at that photo, they see Sabrina 
  leaning over the body, smiling, thumbs-up, 
  and that's what we focus on. She glues us to the frame. 
   
  All of Abu Ghraib disappears, Sabrina disappears, everything 
  disappears except for the smile. We've lost the context for everything. 
  
  And we've lost what lies outside the frame. 
  That's correct. We've also lost a little bit about what lies inside the 
frame. 
  
  What lies inside the frame? 
  The body of someone that someone else has killed, not her. 
  But we don't know that. 
  We interpret the picture itself incorrectly. 
   
  And yes, at the same time, we do not see all of that 
  unrecorded world — the before, the after, the top, the bottom, 
  all of those things that are not included in the picture at all. 
  But even in the picture, we are mistaken about what we are seeing. 
  We're mistaken about the emotions we think she's feeling. 
  We're mistaken about her relationship to the body
   — namely, our belief that she's monstrous because 
  of the smile and must have been implicated in this man's death. 
   
  Photographs can be an instrument of error.
  I think they're wonderful. Where would I be without photography? 
  But it doesn't mean that we shouldn't think critically about images. ... 
  You look at the photographs — 270 photographs put into evidence 
  — and you think, oh, Abu Ghraib is a cell block with these MPs. 
   
  It's a massive prison, with close to 10,000 prisoners by the end 
  of 2003, horribly undersupplied, horribly understaffed. 
  Soldiers horribly untrained. Criminal Iraqi police 
  — ex-members of the Fedayeen running around. 
  Food shortages. Rioting. Mortar attacks. You name it. 
  Bedlam. 
  I hope the movie gives you the feeling of, what in the hell 
  would I do if I found myself there. If I were in the Army in some 
  lowly boots-on-the-ground position where I had to see my way 
  ethically and morally through something that could only 
  be described as a nightmare, what in the hell would I do? 
   
  I hate hearing about various theories about the bad apples 
  because you can theorize endlessly about them. 
  I think that the important thing is first to look at them. 
  To say that Sabrina has no ethical concerns is just to ignore 
  what she's saying or to ignore her letters. All of these people 
  are wrestling with ethics in a place where their range of action 
  is severely circumscribed. It's not clear they can do anything. 
  They're in a war zone. 
  They're in the military. 
  They see their commanders doing stuff that's even worse. 
   
  
  The story of Abu Ghraib feels incomplete. 
  We have a few so-called bad apples who were punished, 
  but the officials responsible for the box where 
  these apples rotted remain unpunished. 
  It's an unsatisfying ending. 
  I don't know what the ending is yet. 
  The ending is yet to be written by America and by Americans. 
  I've been asked, I don't know how many times, 
  what about the smoking gun? Have you found the smoking gun? 
   
  
  What's the smoking gun supposed to be? 
   
  Well, I used to joke about it. I would say, 
  what do you think you're going to find? 
  Are you going to find the video conference call where 
  Donald Rumsfeld tells Chuck Graner: 
  "You ever think of piling them in a pyramid?" 
  I don't think that exists! 
  But I think there are hundreds of smoking guns that we've seen. 
  They're all around us. They're everywhere. How many torture memos 
  does an administration have to promulgate before you get the idea 
  that they're promulgating torture? 
  How much stuff do you need to see? 
   
  Every time that we somehow just leave things be and accept the fact 
  that lowly soldiers take the fall and the big shots run away 
  and never are confronted by what they've done, 
  I think we all lose, ultimately. It affects us all.
   And not for the good. 
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  512 - 445 -1702 
   
  
  About Abu Ghraib 
  A notorious prison before the war, Abu Ghraib was officially 
  a forward operating base for the U.S. military. It was in the heart 
  of the growing Sunni insurgency and was under frequent mortar attack. 
  Most of the Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib — thousands of them 
  — were housed in tents behind concertina wire on the prison grounds. 
  Several prisoners were killed by the ongoing mortar attacks. 
  It is a violation of U.S. military doctrine and the 
  Geneva Conventions to hold prisoners in a combat zone. 
   
  The members of the 372nd Military Police Company 
  who were punished for abuses at Abu Ghraib arrived 
  at the prison in early October 2003. They were combat MPs 
  meant to support front-line forces and had no training running a prison. 
   
  Their predecessors introduced members of the 372nd 
  to some of the methods used to facilitate interrogations 
  including sleep deprivation and sexual humiliation. 
  As Lynndie England says in 'Standard Operating Procedure,' '
  The example was already set' by the time the 372nd arrived at Abu Ghraib. 
  The photographed abuses mostly took place on one cell block, 
  Tier 1A, one of Abu Ghraib's 'hard sites.'
   It was there that 'high-value' prisoners were held
   under the authority of military intelligence officers. 
   
  The American presence at Abu Ghraib included not only 
  military personnel but also interrogators from the CIA 
  and other government agencies, as well as civilian contractors. 
  There were no formal, clear procedures in place defining 
  the proper treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib. '
   
  They couldn't say we broke the rules because there were no rules,' 
  Megan Ambuhl says in 'Standard Operating Procedure.' 
   
  Additional information 
  Errol Morris and Philip Gourevitch wrote about Abu Ghraib 
  in the March 24 issue of The New Yorker. Their article, titled 
  'Exposure,' is available online at NewYorker.com. 
   
  Zoom, Morris' blog for The New York Times 
  (morris.blogs.nytimes.com; also errolmorris 
  .com) explores photography's need for context. 
  His most recent essay examines the Abu Ghraib photo 
  of Sabrina Harman next to the body of Manadel al-Jamadi.
   
  Salon.com maintains an archive of 2
  79 photographs and 19 videos from Abu Ghraib. 
  A series of short articles explains the photos. 
  The site also provides links to Pentagon
  and independent investigations into Abu Ghraib. 
   
  Another documentary, 
  'Ghosts of Abu Ghraib,' 
  a 2007 film directed by Rory Kennedy, 
  is available on DVD. 
   
  
http://www.statesman.com/opinion/content/editorial/stories/insight/06/01/0601insight_abu_ghraib.html
  
              AMERICAN-STATESMAN ILLUSTRATION FROM ASSOCIATED PRESS PHOTO      
The power of some of the Abu Ghraib photographs, such as 
  the image of a hooded Iraqi prisoner, comes from their ambiguity,
   filmmaker Errol Morris says.
   
  They are disturbing, not for what they show us, 
  but for what we imagine they show.

   
  ===============



       

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