Yup, the cop install takes less than 5min and if the system is not impacted the message indicating the same is displayed and the installation ends. If the system is exposed, the cop file installation completes. No restarts/reboots needed. In summary, the following scenarios is where you will be impacted:
* The last upgrade is an RU (Any L2 upgrade after an RU will automatically resolve the issue) * OR a PCD Migration has been done Regards, Abhiram Kramadhati Technical Solutions Manager, CCBU CCIE Collaboration # 40065 From: cisco-voip <cisco-voip-boun...@puck.nether.net> on behalf of Brian Meade <bmead...@vt.edu> Date: Wednesday, 22 November 2017 at 8:40 PM To: "Ryan Ratliff (rratliff)" <rratl...@cisco.com> Cc: cisco-voip list <cisco-voip@puck.nether.net> Subject: Re: [cisco-voip] Cisco Voice Operating System-Based Products Unauthorized Access Vulnerability We've got a team doing some scripting to check the system-history.log. It looks like there is no harm to running the COP on a non-affected system as well so we may just push it in bulk. On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 9:01 AM, Ryan Ratliff (rratliff) <rratl...@cisco.com<mailto:rratl...@cisco.com>> wrote: I’d rather you take the approach of telling all of your customers to install the COP file rather than pen-testing on a live system :) If you want to see if they are exposed get the system-history.log and install.log and upload them to a TAC SR or manually inspect them to determine the timeline of install & upgrade types. All the info you need is in the advisory. PCD Migration -> exposed RU Upgrade -> exposed L2 Upgrade -> not exposed -Ryan On Nov 20, 2017, at 11:25 AM, Brian Meade <bmead...@vt.edu<mailto:bmead...@vt.edu>> wrote: Anyone got some ideas on trying to crack this UCOS password? Should help us out in scanning our customers to see if they are affected, but we wouldn't want this password to end up indexed by google and make the issue even worse. On Fri, Nov 17, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Anthony Holloway <avholloway+cisco-v...@gmail.com<mailto:avholloway+cisco-v...@gmail.com>> wrote: Bwahaha! I just logged in to your CUCM Tim. On a serious note, I think it’s interesting how this “flag” issue is such a big deal, when back in the old days of UCCX, Cisco was creating an intentional back-door in all installs, using the same username and password on all of them. For the curious, it was : Username: CRSAdministrator Password: NwY.t9g(f'L9[3C If you have access to a UCCX 7x or lower, try logging in to Windows with that account and report back if it worked. If it does work, check the MADM logs on the C: for the clear text AXL username and password, so you can compromise CUCM too! On Fri, Nov 17, 2017 at 1:46 PM Tim Frazee <tfra...@gmail.com<mailto:tfra...@gmail.com>> wrote: heads up https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20171115-vos _______________________________________________ cisco-voip mailing list cisco-voip@puck.nether.net<mailto:cisco-voip@puck.nether.net> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip _______________________________________________ cisco-voip mailing list cisco-voip@puck.nether.net<mailto:cisco-voip@puck.nether.net> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip _______________________________________________ cisco-voip mailing list cisco-voip@puck.nether.net<mailto:cisco-voip@puck.nether.net> https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-voip
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