We're not allowed to implement wireless, yet, but my rollout plan would be points 1 & 2. I don't think _I_ need to go the step further as you have, but as a minimum I definitely agree with 1 & 2.
Keith -----Original Message----- From: eric nguyen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: 23 January 2003 16:51 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Too much Security Overkill on wireless network??? [7:61685] Hi, I have assigned the task of setting up a wireless network for my company and I am wondering that I use too much "security" for the wireless. Currently, I am setting a test wireless network for about 5 users. Eventually, this network will have about 50 users. My set up is as follows: 1) The wireless network is sitting on the DMZ network. This DMZ network is hang off an interface of a pix firewall (Pix-525). Wireless users are required to use Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) in order to log onto the wireless DMZ network. 2) In order to access the company iternal network which hang off the "inside" interface of the pix firewall, wireless users must use Cisco VPN Client IPSec to establish a secure VPN tunnel between their device and the Pix firewall. 3) After succesfully establish the VPN tunnel between the wireless device and the Pix firewall, wireless can only access the company internal network applications via SSL, SSH, POP3s and IMAPs. I have a few users that tunnel X-application via SSH connections. Applications such as POP3, telnet and IMAP are not allowed from the DMZ network into the company internal network. So far the test is going well. However, my concern is that this will not scale well for a large number of wireless users. For example, let say for SSH connection, the traffic is "encrypted" by SSH. Below that, it is "encrypted" via IPSec. Finally, it is "encrypted" by PEAP. I've not done any analysis yet but it is possible that 50% of the traffic is just "overhead" traffic for encryption. Anyone has successfully implemented a "secure" wireless network on large scale? I would like to get your advise on this. I have to present a recommendation to my CTO in a next few days. By the way, my company did hire a CCIE security consultant to work with me on this project; however, this CCIE security is a "f_cking" moron. Not only he doesn't know anything about PEAP, but he even suggested that we use Cisco LEAP because LEAP is much more secure than PEAP. After he couldn't get PEAP to work, the SOB suggested that we switch to Cisco LEAP. When we don't want to use Cisco LEAP, he suggested that we just use "shared (aka STATIC WEP)" authentication because we are using IPSec and Secure applications to access the company internal network anyway. The problem with this idea is that once wireless users are on the dmz wireless network, they can surf the Internet without restrictions. I don't want strangers (if they get a hold of the STATIC WEP KEY) to use my company bandwith to use the Internet. I want PEAP because it is safe and secure. I am also testing EAP-TTLS but haven't had much luck with it. I am sure the CCIE security consultant that turned out to be a f_cking moron, pardon my language, is more of an exception rather than the rule. However, I am suprised that someone like that can pass the CCIE security lab. By the way, I checked with Cisco and he does have a CCIE Security certification #. Enough of me venting out my frustration. Please advise. Eric --------------------------------- Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now Message Posted at: http://www.groupstudy.com/form/read.php?f=7&i=61700&t=61685 -------------------------------------------------- FAQ, list archives, and subscription info: http://www.groupstudy.com/list/cisco.html Report misconduct and Nondisclosure violations to [EMAIL PROTECTED]