The referer-linked privacy leakage that I'm mostly concerned with is associated 
with embedded resources, not resources that a user clicks on to access. But I 
agree moving to SSL has many benefits.


> On Jun 12, 2015, at 11:38 PM, Andrew Anderson <and...@lirn.net> wrote:
> 
> I was not suggesting mixing HTTP/HTTPS resources, but rather wholesale 
> converting to SSL and taking advantage of the fact that vendors don’t seem to 
> care about privacy issues and do not support SSL today.   Thus when leaving 
> the secure site, the referring header will not be sent, thanks to RFC 2616 
> behavior.
> 
> Of course, SPDY^WHTTP/2.0 will make this moot, but perhaps someone can 
> convince the standards group that referring URLs are not a good idea to carry 
> forward in general.
> 
> -- 
> Andrew Anderson, Director of Development, Library and Information Resources 
> Network, Inc.
> http://www.lirn.net/ | http://www.twitter.com/LIRNnotes | 
> http://www.facebook.com/LIRNnotes
> 
> On Jun 12, 2015, at 18:23, Eric Hellman <e...@hellman.net> wrote:
> 
>> While going to SSL is a good thing to do, it's not a good idea to be loading 
>> non-secure resources into a secure web page, because then your page is no 
>> longer secure.
>> 
>> So for example, if you load the google analytics script via http from an 
>> https page, and MITM attacker could just insert evil code into the script. 
>> Or verizon could insert x-uidh headers into non-SSL cover image requests.
>> 
>> Eric
>> 
>>> On Jun 12, 2015, at 2:37 AM, Andrew Anderson <and...@lirn.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Or just SSL enable your library web site.  Few vendors support SSL today, 
>>> so crossing the HTTP/HTTPS barrier is supposed to automatically disable 
>>> referring URL passing.
>>> 
>>> http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec15.html#sec15.1.3
>>> 
>>> 15.1.3 Encoding Sensitive Information in URI's
>>> 
>>> Because the source of a link might be private information or might reveal 
>>> an otherwise private information source, it is strongly recommended that 
>>> the user be able to select whether or not the Referer field is sent. For 
>>> example, a browser client could have a toggle switch for browsing 
>>> openly/anonymously, which would respectively enable/disable the sending of 
>>> Referer and From information.
>>> 
>>> Clients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field in a (non-secure) HTTP 
>>> request if the referring page was transferred with a secure protocol.
>>> 
>>> Authors of services which use the HTTP protocol SHOULD NOT use GET based 
>>> forms for the submission of sensitive data, because this will cause this 
>>> data to be encoded in the Request-URI. Many existing servers, proxies, and 
>>> user agents will log the request URI in some place where it might be 
>>> visible to third parties. Servers can use POST-based form submission instead
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> Andrew Anderson, Director of Development, Library and Information Resources 
>>> Network, Inc.
>>> http://www.lirn.net/ | http://www.twitter.com/LIRNnotes | 
>>> http://www.facebook.com/LIRNnotes
>>> 
>>> On Jun 12, 2015, at 0:24, Conal Tuohy <conal.tu...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Assuming your library web server has a front-end proxy (I guess this is
>>>> pretty common) or at least runs inside Apache httpd or something, then
>>>> rather than use the HTML meta tag, it might be easier to set the "referer"
>>>> policy via the "Content-Security-Policy" HTTP header field.
>>>> 
>>>> https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/content-security-policy/#content-security-policy-header-field
>>>> 
>>>> e.g. in Apache httpd with mod_headers:
>>>> 
>>>> Header set Content-Security-Policy referrer 'no-referrer'
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 12 June 2015 at 13:55, Frumkin, Jeremy A - (frumkinj) <
>>>> frumk...@email.arizona.edu> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Eric -
>>>>> 
>>>>> Many thanks for raising awareness of this. It does feel like encouraging
>>>>> good practice re: referrer meta tag would be a good thing, but I would not
>>>>> know where to start to make something like this required practice. Did you
>>>>> have some thoughts on that?
>>>>> 
>>>>> — jaf
>>>>> 
>>>>> -----------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Jeremy Frumkin
>>>>> Associate Dean / Chief Technology Strategist
>>>>> University of Arizona Libraries
>>>>> 
>>>>> +1 520.626.7296
>>>>> j...@arizona.edu
>>>>> ——————————————————————————————
>>>>> "A person who never made a mistake never tried anything new." - Albert
>>>>> Einstein
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 6/11/15, 8:25 AM, "Eric Hellman" <e...@hellman.net> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> http://go-to-hellman.blogspot.com/2015/06/protect-reader-privacy-with-referrer.html
>>>>> <
>>>>> http://go-to-hellman.blogspot.com/2015/06/protect-reader-privacy-with-referrer.html
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I hope this is easy to deploy on library websites, because the privacy
>>>>> enhancement is significant.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I'd be very interested to know of sites that are using it; I know Thomas
>>>>> Dowling implemented a referrer policy on http://oatd.org/ <
>>>>> http://oatd.org/>
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Would it be a good idea to make it a required practice for libraries?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Eric Hellman
>>>>>> President, Gluejar.Inc.
>>>>>> Founder, Unglue.it https://unglue.it/
>>>>>> http://go-to-hellman.blogspot.com/
>>>>>> twitter: @gluejar
>>>>> 

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