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Package is "mbedtls.17013" Mon Oct 11 18:06:16 2021 rev:1 rq:923522 version:2.16.9 Changes: -------- New Changes file: --- /dev/null 2021-09-30 08:29:43.195243981 +0200 +++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Leap:15.2:Update/.mbedtls.17013.new.2443/mbedtls.changes 2021-10-11 18:06:17.309751619 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,1090 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Fri Oct 1 09:05:54 UTC 2021 - Pedro Monreal <pmonr...@suse.com> + +- Security fix: [bsc#1189589, CVE-2021-24119] + * Side-channel vulnerability in base64 PEM + * Guard against strong local side channel attack against base64 + tables by making access aceess to them use constant flow code. + * Add mbedtls-CVE-2021-24119.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Jan 27 15:04:49 UTC 2021 - Alexandros Toptsoglou <atoptsog...@suse.com> + +- Update to version 2.16.9: + * Reduce stack usage significantly during sliding window exponentiation. + * Remove the zeroization of a pointer variable in AES rounds. + It was valid but spurious and misleading since it looked like a mistaken + attempt to zeroize the pointed-to buffer. + * see https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.16.9 + +- Update to version 2.16.8 + * Support building on e2k (Elbrus) architecture: correctly enable -Wformat-signedness, + and fix the code that causes signed-one-bit-field and sign-compare warnings. + * see https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.16.8 + +- Update to version 2.16.7 + * Unify the example programs termination to call mbedtls_exit() + instead of using a return command. This has been done to + enable customization of the behavior in bare metal environments. + * Abort the ClientHello writing function as soon as some extension + doesn't fit into the record buffer. Previously, such extensions + were silently dropped. As a consequence, the TLS handshake now + fails when the output buffer is not large enough to hold the ClientHello. + * The ECP module, enabled by MBEDTLS_ECP_C, now depends on MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C, + MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C for some side-channel + coutermeasures. If side channels are not a concern, this dependency can be avoided + by enabling the new option MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG. + * see https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.16.7 + +- Update to 2.16.6 + * CVE-2020-10932: Fixed side channel in ECC code that allowed an adversary with + access to precise enough timing and memory access information (typically an + untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) to fully recover + an ECDSA private key (boo#1181468). + * Fix a potentially remotely exploitable buffer overread in a + DTLS client when parsing the Hello Verify Request message. + +Bugfix + * Fix compilation failure when both MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS and + MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL are enabled. + * Fix a function name in a debug message. Contributed by Ercan Ozturk in + #3013. + +- Cheanged License in changes file from Apache-2.0 to + Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later as the upstream package changed too + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Thu Apr 2 10:16:05 UTC 2020 - Martin Pluskal <mplus...@suse.com> + +- Update to version 2.16.5: + * Security improvements and bugfixes + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Nov 13 13:54:02 UTC 2019 - Martin Pluskal <mplus...@suse.com> + +- Update to version 2.16.3: + * Security improvements and bugfixes + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Sep 3 15:01:56 UTC 2019 - Martin Pluskal <mplus...@suse.com> + +- Update to version 2.16.2: + * Security improvements and bugfixes +- Use ninja to for build + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Mon Jan 7 15:18:11 UTC 2019 - Martin Pluskal <mplus...@suse.com> + +- Update to version 2.16.0: + Features + * Add a new config.h option of MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS that enables validation of parameters in the API. This allows detection of obvious misuses of the API, such as passing NULL pointers. The API of existing functions hasn't changed, but requirements on parameters have been made more explicit in the documentation. See the corresponding API documentation for each function to see for which parameter values it is defined. This feature is disabled by default. See its API documentation in config.h for additional steps you have to take when enabling it. +API Changes + * The following functions in the random generator modules have been deprecated and replaced as shown below. The new functions change the return type from void to int to allow returning error codes when using MBEDTLS_<MODULE>_ALT for the underlying AES or message digest primitive. Fixes #1798. mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() -> mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() + * Extend ECDH interface to enable alternative implementations. + * Deprecate error codes of the form MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH for ARIA, CAMELLIA and Blowfish. These error codes will be replaced by the more generic per-module error codes MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * Additional parameter validation checks have been added for the following modules - AES, ARIA, Blowfish, CAMELLIA, CCM, GCM, DHM, ECP, ECDSA, ECDH, ECJPAKE, SHA, Chacha20 and Poly1305, cipher, pk, RSA, and MPI. Where modules have had parameter validation added, existing parameter checks may have changed. Some modules, such as Chacha20 had existing parameter validation whereas other modules had little. This has now been changed so that the same level of validation is present in all modules, and that it is now optional with the MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS flag which by default is off. That means that checks which were previously present by default will no longer be. + New deprecations + * Deprecate mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() in favor of functions that can return an error code. + Bugfix + * Fix for Clang, which was reporting a warning for the bignum.c inline assembly for AMD64 targets creating string literals greater than those permitted by the ISO C99 standard. Found by Aaron Jones. Fixes #482. + * Fix runtime error in mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll() when run through qemu user emulation. Reported and fix suggested by randombit. Fixes #1212. + * Fix an unsafe bounds check when restoring an SSL session from a ticket. This could lead to a buffer overflow, but only in case ticket authentication was broken. Reported and fix suggested by Guido Vranken in #659. + * Add explicit integer to enumeration type casts to example program programs/pkey/gen_key which previously led to compilation failure on some toolchains. Reported by phoenixmcallister. Fixes #2170. + * Clarify documentation of mbedtls_ssl_set_own_cert() regarding the absence of check for certificate/key matching. Reported by Attila Molnar, #507. + * Fix double initialization of ECC hardware that made some accelerators hang. + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Dec 11 14:07:44 UTC 2018 - Pedro Monreal Gonzalez <pmonrealgonza...@suse.com> + +- Library package version bumped to libmbedtls12 + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Dec 11 13:48:05 UTC 2018 - Pedro Monreal Gonzalez <pmonrealgonza...@suse.com> + +- Update to version 2.14.1: [bsc#1118727, CVE-2018-19608] + Security + * Fix timing variations and memory access variations in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 + decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle + attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on + RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not + (EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham + (University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan), + Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom + (University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail + in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608 + * In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number + via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit + a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing + of the decryption and not its result could nonetheless decrypt RSA + plaintexts and forge RSA signatures. Other asymmetric algorithms may + have been similarly vulnerable. Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham, + Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom. + * Wipe sensitive buffers on the stack in the CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG + modules. + API Changes + * The new functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() and + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() are similar to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update() + and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() respectively, but the new functions + report errors whereas the old functions return void. We recommend that + applications use the new functions. + +- Version 2.14.0: + Security + * Fix overly strict DN comparison when looking for CRLs belonging to a + particular CA. This previously led to ignoring CRLs when the CRL's issuer + name and the CA's subject name differed in their string encoding (e.g., + one using PrintableString and the other UTF8String) or in the choice of + upper and lower case. Reported by Henrik Andersson of Bosch GmbH in issue + #1784. + * Fix a flawed bounds check in server PSK hint parsing. In case the + incoming message buffer was placed within the first 64KiB of address + space and a PSK-(EC)DHE ciphersuite was used, this allowed an attacker + to trigger a memory access up to 64KiB beyond the incoming message buffer, + potentially leading to an application crash or information disclosure. + * Fix mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() to use more rounds of probabilistic testing. The + previous settings for the number of rounds made it practical for an + adversary to construct non-primes that would be erroneously accepted as + primes with high probability. This does not have an impact on the + security of TLS, but can matter in other contexts with numbers chosen + potentially by an adversary that should be prime and can be validated. + For example, the number of rounds was enough to securely generate RSA key + pairs or Diffie-Hellman parameters, but was insufficient to validate + Diffie-Hellman parameters properly. + See "Prime and Prejudice" by by Martin R. Albrecht and Jake Massimo and + Kenneth G. Paterson and Juraj Somorovsky. + Features + * Add support for temporarily suspending expensive ECC computations after + some configurable amount of operations. This is intended to be used in + constrained, single-threaded systems where ECC is time consuming and can + block other operations until they complete. This is disabled by default, + but can be enabled by MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE at compile time and + configured by mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() at runtime. It applies to the new + xxx_restartable functions in ECP, ECDSA, PK and X.509 (CRL not supported + yet), and to existing functions in ECDH and SSL (currently only + implemented client-side, for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphersuites in TLS 1.2, + including client authentication). + * Add support for Arm CPU DSP extensions to accelerate asymmetric key + operations. On CPUs where the extensions are available, they can accelerate + MPI multiplications used in ECC and RSA cryptography. Contributed by + Aurelien Jarno. + * Extend RSASSA-PSS signature to allow a smaller salt size. Previously, PSS + signature always used a salt with the same length as the hash, and returned + an error if this was not possible. Now the salt size may be up to two bytes + shorter. This allows the library to support all hash and signature sizes + that comply with FIPS 186-4, including SHA-512 with a 1024-bit key. + * Add support for 128-bit keys in CTR_DRBG. Note that using keys shorter + than 256 bits limits the security of generated material to 128 bits. + API Changes + * Add a common error code of `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` for + a feature that is not supported by underlying alternative + implementations implementing cryptographic primitives. This is useful for + hardware accelerators that don't implement all options or features. + New deprecations + * All module specific errors following the form + MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE that indicate a feature is not + supported are deprecated and are now replaced by the new equivalent + platform error. + * All module specific generic hardware acceleration errors following the + form MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED that are deprecated and are replaced + by the equivalent plaform error. + * Deprecate the function mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() in favor of + mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows specifying the number of + Miller-Rabin rounds. + Bugfix + * Fix wrong order of freeing in programs/ssl/ssl_server2 example + application leading to a memory leak in case both + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE are set. + Fixes #2069. ++++ 893 more lines (skipped) ++++ between /dev/null ++++ and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Leap:15.2:Update/.mbedtls.17013.new.2443/mbedtls.changes New: ---- baselibs.conf mbedtls-CVE-2021-24119.patch mbedtls.changes mbedtls.spec v2.16.9.tar.gz ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Other differences: ------------------ ++++++ mbedtls.spec ++++++ # # spec file for package mbedtls # # Copyright (c) 2020 SUSE LLC # # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed # upon. The license for this file, and modifications and additions to the # file, is the same license as for the pristine package itself (unless the # license for the pristine package is not an Open Source License, in which # case the license is the MIT License). An "Open Source License" is a # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9) # published by the Open Source Initiative. # Please submit bugfixes or comments via https://bugs.opensuse.org/ # %define lib_tls libmbedtls12 %define lib_crypto libmbedcrypto3 %define lib_x509 libmbedx509-0 Name: mbedtls Version: 2.16.9 Release: 0 Summary: Libraries for crypto and SSL/TLS protocols License: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later Group: Development/Libraries/C and C++ URL: https://tls.mbed.org Source: https://github.com/ARMmbed/%{name}/archive/v%{version}.tar.gz Source99: baselibs.conf #PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bsc#1189589 CVE-2021-24119 Side-channel vulnerability in base64 PEM Patch0: mbedtls-CVE-2021-24119.patch BuildRequires: cmake BuildRequires: ninja BuildRequires: pkgconfig BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libpkcs11-helper-1) BuildRequires: pkgconfig(zlib) %description mbedtls implements the SSL3, TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 protocols. It supports a number of extensions such as SSL Session Tickets (RFC 5077), Server Name Indication (SNI) (RFC 6066), Truncated HMAC (RFC 6066), Max Fragment Length (RFC 6066), Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) and Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN). It understands the RSA, (EC)DH(E)-RSA, (EC)DH(E)-PSK and RSA-PSK key exchanges. %package -n %{lib_tls} Summary: Transport Layer Security protocol suite Group: System/Libraries %description -n %{lib_tls} mbedtls implements the SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 protocols. It supports a number of extensions such as SSL Session Tickets (RFC 5077), Server Name Indication (SNI) (RFC 6066), Truncated HMAC (RFC 6066), Max Fragment Length (RFC 6066), Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) and Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN). It understands the RSA, (EC)DH(E)-RSA, (EC)DH(E)-PSK and RSA-PSK key exchanges. %package -n %{lib_crypto} Summary: Cryptographic base library for mbedtls Group: System/Libraries %description -n %{lib_crypto} This subpackage of mbedtls contains a library that exposes cryptographic ciphers, hashes, algorithms and format support such as AES, MD5, SHA, Elliptic Curves, BigNum, PKCS, ASN.1, BASE64. %package -n %{lib_x509} Summary: Library to work with X.509 certificates Group: System/Libraries %description -n %{lib_x509} This subpackage of mbedtls contains a library that can read, verify and write X.509 certificates, read/write Certificate Signing Requests and read Certificate Revocation Lists. %package devel Summary: Development files for mbedtls, a SSL/TLS library Group: Development/Libraries/C and C++ Requires: %{lib_crypto} = %{version} Requires: %{lib_tls} = %{version} Requires: %{lib_x509} = %{version} %description devel This subpackage contains the development files for mbedtls, a suite of libraries for cryptographic functions and the SSL/TLS protocol suite. %prep %autosetup -p1 sed -i 's|//\(#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT\)|\1|' include/mbedtls/config.h sed -i 's|//\(#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C\)|\1|' include/mbedtls/config.h sed -i 's|//\(#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C\)|\1|' include/mbedtls/config.h sed -i 's|//\(#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD\)|\1|' include/mbedtls/config.h %build %define __builder ninja %cmake \ -DLINK_WITH_PTHREAD=ON \ -DUSE_PKCS11_HELPER_LIBRARY=ON \ -DENABLE_ZLIB_SUPPORT=ON \ -DINSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS=ON \ -DUSE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=ON \ -DUSE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY=OFF \ -DENABLE_PROGRAMS=OFF %cmake_build %install %cmake_install %check export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH:%{_builddir}/%{name}-%{version}/build/library %ctest %post -n %{lib_tls} -p /sbin/ldconfig %post -n %{lib_crypto} -p /sbin/ldconfig %post -n %{lib_x509} -p /sbin/ldconfig %postun -n %{lib_tls} -p /sbin/ldconfig %postun -n %{lib_crypto} -p /sbin/ldconfig %postun -n %{lib_x509} -p /sbin/ldconfig %files devel %license LICENSE %doc ChangeLog README.md %dir %{_includedir}/mbedtls %{_includedir}/mbedtls/*.h %{_libdir}/libmbedtls.so %{_libdir}/libmbedcrypto.so %{_libdir}/libmbedx509.so %files -n %{lib_tls} %license LICENSE %{_libdir}/libmbedtls.so.* %files -n %{lib_crypto} %license LICENSE %{_libdir}/libmbedcrypto.so.* %files -n %{lib_x509} %license LICENSE %{_libdir}/libmbedx509.so.* %changelog ++++++ baselibs.conf ++++++ libmbedtls12 libmbedx509-0 libmbedcrypto3 ++++++ mbedtls-CVE-2021-24119.patch ++++++ Index: mbedtls-2.16.9/library/base64.c =================================================================== --- mbedtls-2.16.9.orig/library/base64.c +++ mbedtls-2.16.9/library/base64.c @@ -97,6 +97,100 @@ static const unsigned char base64_dec_ma #define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ( (size_t) -1 ) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ /* + * Constant flow conditional assignment to unsigned char + */ +static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( unsigned char * dest, const unsigned char * const src, + unsigned char condition ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFF or 0 */ + unsigned char mask = ( condition | -condition ); + mask >>= 7; + mask = -mask; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + *dest = ( ( *src ) & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask ); +} + +/* + * Constant flow conditional assignment to uint_32 + */ +static void mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( uint32_t * dest, const uint32_t src, + uint32_t condition ) +{ + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + /* Generate bitmask from condition, mask will either be 0xFFFFFFFF or 0 */ + uint32_t mask = ( condition | -condition ); + mask >>= 31; + mask = -mask; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + *dest = ( src & mask ) | ( ( *dest ) & ~mask ); +} + +/* + * Constant flow check for equality + */ +static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_eq( size_t in_a, size_t in_b ) +{ + size_t difference = in_a ^ in_b; + + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, + * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + + difference |= -difference; + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif + + /* cope with the varying size of size_t per platform */ + difference >>= ( sizeof( difference ) * 8 - 1 ); + + return (unsigned char) ( 1 ^ difference ); +} + +/* + * Constant flow lookup into table. + */ +static unsigned char mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( const unsigned char * const table, + const size_t table_size, const size_t table_index ) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char result = 0; + + for( i = 0; i < table_size; ++i ) + { + mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uchar( &result, &table[i], mbedtls_base64_eq( i, table_index ) ); + } + + return result; +} + + +/* * Encode a buffer into base64 format */ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, @@ -136,10 +230,17 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char C2 = *src++; C3 = *src++; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C2 & 15) << 2) + (C3 >> 6)) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[C3 & 0x3F]; + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) + ( C3 >> 6 ) ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( C3 & 0x3F ) ); } if( i < slen ) @@ -147,11 +248,15 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode( unsigned char C1 = *src++; C2 = ( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) ? *src++ : 0; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(C1 >> 2) & 0x3F]; - *p++ = base64_enc_map[(((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) & 0x3F]; + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( C1 >> 2 ) & 0x3F ) ); + + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( ( C1 & 3 ) << 4 ) + ( C2 >> 4 ) ) & 0x3F ) ); if( ( i + 1 ) < slen ) - *p++ = base64_enc_map[((C2 & 15) << 2) & 0x3F]; + *p++ = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_enc_map, sizeof( base64_enc_map ), + ( ( ( C2 & 15 ) << 2 ) & 0x3F ) ); else *p++ = '='; *p++ = '='; @@ -172,6 +277,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char size_t i, n; uint32_t j, x; unsigned char *p; + unsigned char dec_map_lookup; /* First pass: check for validity and get output length */ for( i = n = j = 0; i < slen; i++ ) @@ -202,10 +308,12 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char if( src[i] == '=' && ++j > 2 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); - if( src[i] > 127 || base64_dec_map[src[i]] == 127 ) + dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), src[i] ); + + if( src[i] > 127 || dec_map_lookup == 127 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); - if( base64_dec_map[src[i]] < 64 && j != 0 ) + if( dec_map_lookup < 64 && j != 0 ) return( MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER ); n++; @@ -235,8 +343,10 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode( unsigned char if( *src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ' ) continue; - j -= ( base64_dec_map[*src] == 64 ); - x = ( x << 6 ) | ( base64_dec_map[*src] & 0x3F ); + dec_map_lookup = mbedtls_base64_table_lookup( base64_dec_map, sizeof( base64_dec_map ), *src ); + + mbedtls_base64_cond_assign_uint32( &j, j - 1, mbedtls_base64_eq( dec_map_lookup, 64 ) ); + x = ( x << 6 ) | ( dec_map_lookup & 0x3F ); if( ++n == 4 ) { Index: mbedtls-2.16.9/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data =================================================================== --- mbedtls-2.16.9.orig/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data +++ mbedtls-2.16.9/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.data @@ -151,6 +151,20 @@ base64_encode_hex:"0102030405060708":"AQ Base64 encode hex #4 base64_encode_hex:"01020304050607":"AQIDBAUGBw==":13:0 +# Rotate the bytes around so that they end up at each offset modulo 3 in +# successive test cases. +Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #0 +base64_encode_hex:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"AAECAwQFBgcICQoLDA0ODxAREhMUFRYXGBkaGxwdHh8gISIjJCUmJygpKissLS4vMDEyMzQ1Njc4OTo7PD0+P0BBQkNERUZHSElKS0xNTk9QUVJTVFVWV1hZWltcXV5fYGFiY2RlZmdoaWprbG1ub3BxcnN0dXZ3eHl6e3x9fn+AgYKDhIWGh4iJiouMjY6PkJGSk5SVlpeYmZqbnJ2en6ChoqOkpaanqKmqq6ytrq+wsbKztLW2t7i5uru8vb6/wMHCw8TFxsfIycrLzM3Oz9DR0tPU1dbX2Nna29zd3t/g4eLj5OXm5+jp6uvs7e7v8PHy8/T19vf4+fr7/P3+/w==":345:0 + +Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #1 +base64_encode_hex:"0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff00":"AQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESExQVFhcYGRobHB0eHyAhIiMkJSYnKCkqKywtLi8wMTIzNDU2Nzg5Ojs8PT4/QEFCQ0RFRkdISUpLTE1OT1BRUlNUVVZXWFlaW1xdXl9gYWJjZGVmZ2hpamtsbW5vcHFyc3R1dnd4eXp7fH1+f4CBgoOEhYaHiImKi4yNjo+QkZKTlJWWl5iZmpucnZ6foKGio6SlpqeoqaqrrK2ur7CxsrO0tba3uLm6u7y9vr/AwcLDxMXGx8jJysvMzc7P0NHS09TV1tfY2drb3N3e3+Dh4uPk5ebn6Onq6+zt7u/w8fLz9PX29/j5+vv8/f7/AA==":345:0 + +Base64 encode hex all valid input bytes #2 +base64_encode_hex:"02030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9fa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeafb0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbebfc0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecfd0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcdddedfe0e1e2e3e4e5e6e7e8e9eaebecedeeeff0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff0001":"AgMEBQYHCAkKCwwNDg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3ODk6Ozw9Pj9AQUJDREVGR0hJSktMTU5PUFFSU1RVVldYWVpbXF1eX2BhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3h5ent8fX5/gIGCg4SFhoeIiYqLjI2Oj5CRkpOUlZaXmJmam5ydnp+goaKjpKWmp6ipqqusra6vsLGys7S1tre4ubq7vL2+v8DBwsPExcbHyMnKy8zNzs/Q0dLT1NXW19jZ2tvc3d7f4OHi4+Tl5ufo6err7O3u7/Dx8vP09fb3+Pn6+/z9/v8AAQ==":345:0 + +Base64 encode all valid output characters at all offsets +base64_encode_hex:"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":261:0 + Base64 decode hex #1 base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBwgJ":"010203040506070809":9:0 @@ -166,6 +180,9 @@ base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBw==":"010203 Base64 decode hex #5 (buffer too small) base64_decode_hex:"AQIDBAUGBw==":"01020304050607":6:MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +Base64 decode all valid input characters at all offsets +base64_decode_hex:"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/+ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/Q":"00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7effe00108310518720928b30d38f41149351559761969b71d79f8218a39259a7a29aabb2dbafc31cb3d35db7e39ebbf3dfbff800420c41461c824a2cc34e3d04524d45565d865a6dc75e7e08628e49669e8a6aaecb6ebf0c72cf4d76df8e7aefcf7efd0":195:0 + Base64 Selftest depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST base64_selftest: Index: mbedtls-2.16.9/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function =================================================================== --- mbedtls-2.16.9.orig/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function +++ mbedtls-2.16.9/tests/suites/test_suite_base64.function @@ -13,13 +13,22 @@ void mbedtls_base64_encode( char * src_s { unsigned char src_str[1000]; unsigned char dst_str[1000]; - size_t len; + size_t len, src_len; memset(src_str, 0x00, 1000); memset(dst_str, 0x00, 1000); strncpy( (char *) src_str, src_string, sizeof(src_str) - 1 ); - TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( dst_str, dst_buf_size, &len, src_str, strlen( (char *) src_str ) ) == result ); + src_len = strlen( (char *) src_str ); + + TEST_CF_SECRET( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) ); + TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( dst_str, dst_buf_size, &len, src_str, src_len) == result ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src_str, sizeof( src_str ) ); + + /* dest_str will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering + CF failures by unmarking it. */ + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( dst_str, len ); + if( result == 0 ) { TEST_ASSERT( strcmp( (char *) dst_str, dst_string ) == 0 ); @@ -57,7 +66,14 @@ void base64_encode_hex( data_t * src, ch res = zero_alloc( dst_buf_size ); + TEST_CF_SECRET( src->x, src->len ); TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_base64_encode( res, dst_buf_size, &len, src->x, src->len ) == result ); + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( src->x, src->len ); + + /* res will have had tainted data copied to it, prevent the TEST_ASSERT below from triggering + CF failures by unmarking it. */ + TEST_CF_PUBLIC( res, len ); + if( result == 0 ) { TEST_ASSERT( len == strlen( dst ) );
