Script 'mail_helper' called by obssrc
Hello community,
here is the log from the commit of package python for openSUSE:Factory checked
in at 2022-11-12 17:40:03
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python.new.1597 (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "python"
Sat Nov 12 17:40:03 2022 rev:174 rq:1035107 version:2.7.18
Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/python/python-base.changes 2022-09-16
13:32:18.905263723 +0200
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.python.new.1597/python-base.changes
2022-11-12 17:40:04.597777750 +0100
@@ -1,0 +2,7 @@
+Wed Nov 9 18:31:23 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mc...@suse.com>
+
+- Add CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch to avoid
+ CVE-2022-45061 (bsc#1205244) allowing DoS by IDNA decoding
+ extremely long domain names.
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
python-doc.changes: same change
python.changes: same change
New:
----
CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Other differences:
------------------
++++++ python-base.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.e2aSHS/_old 2022-11-12 17:40:06.513789157 +0100
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.e2aSHS/_new 2022-11-12 17:40:06.517789181 +0100
@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@
# Coerce // to / in Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py
Patch71: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch
Patch72: bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch bsc#1205244
mc...@suse.com
+# Avoid DoS by decoding IDNA for too long domain names
+Patch73: CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch
# COMMON-PATCH-END
%define python_version %(echo %{tarversion} | head -c 3)
BuildRequires: automake
@@ -272,6 +275,7 @@
%patch70 -p1
%patch71 -p1
%patch72 -p1
+%patch73 -p1
# For patch 66
cp -v %{SOURCE66} Lib/test/recursion.tar
++++++ python-doc.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.e2aSHS/_old 2022-11-12 17:40:06.541789324 +0100
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.e2aSHS/_new 2022-11-12 17:40:06.545789348 +0100
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@
# Coerce // to / in Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py
Patch71: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch
Patch72: bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch bsc#1205244
mc...@suse.com
+# Avoid DoS by decoding IDNA for too long domain names
+Patch73: CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch
# COMMON-PATCH-END
Provides: pyth_doc = %{version}
Provides: pyth_ps = %{version}
@@ -209,6 +212,7 @@
%patch70 -p1
%patch71 -p1
%patch72 -p1
+%patch73 -p1
# For patch 66
cp -v %{SOURCE66} Lib/test/recursion.tar
++++++ python.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.e2aSHS/_old 2022-11-12 17:40:06.569789491 +0100
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.e2aSHS/_new 2022-11-12 17:40:06.573789514 +0100
@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@
# Coerce // to / in Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py
Patch71: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch
Patch72: bpo34990-2038-problem-compileall.patch
+# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch bsc#1205244
mc...@suse.com
+# Avoid DoS by decoding IDNA for too long domain names
+Patch73: CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch
# COMMON-PATCH-END
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: db-devel
@@ -325,6 +328,7 @@
%patch70 -p1
%patch71 -p1
%patch72 -p1
+%patch73 -p1
# For patch 66
cp -v %{SOURCE66} Lib/test/recursion.tar
++++++ CVE-2022-45061-DoS-by-IDNA-decode.patch ++++++
>From fa792ddee55dc02c6392842c8194a464339f6f1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-isling...@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 18:57:10 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding. (GH-99092)
(GH-99222)
There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
the behavior to linear.
(cherry picked from commit d315722564927c7202dd6e111dc79eaf14240b0d)
(cherry picked from commit a6f6c3a3d6f2b580f2d87885c9b8a9350ad7bf15)
Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot)
<31488909+miss-isling...@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <g...@krypto.org>
---
Lib/encodings/idna.py | 32
++++------
Lib/test/test_codecs.py | 6
+
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst | 6
+
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
create mode 100644
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
--- a/Lib/encodings/idna.py
+++ b/Lib/encodings/idna.py
@@ -39,23 +39,21 @@ def nameprep(label):
# Check bidi
RandAL = map(stringprep.in_table_d1, label)
- for c in RandAL:
- if c:
- # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
- # tests:
- # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
- # This is table C.8, which was already checked
- # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
- # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
- if filter(stringprep.in_table_d2, label):
- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
-
- # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
- # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
- # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
- # character of the string.
- if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
+ if any(RandAL):
+ # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
+ # tests:
+ # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
+ # This is table C.8, which was already checked
+ # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
+ # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
+ if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
+ # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
+ # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
+ # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
+ # character of the string.
+ if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
return label
--- a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
@@ -1318,6 +1318,12 @@ class IDNACodecTest(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(u"pyth\xf6n.org".encode("idna"), "xn--pythn-mua.org")
self.assertEqual(u"pyth\xf6n.org.".encode("idna"),
"xn--pythn-mua.org.")
+ def test_builtin_decode_length_limit(self):
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*1100).decode("idna")
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*70).decode("idna")
+
def test_stream(self):
import StringIO
r = codecs.getreader("idna")(StringIO.StringIO("abc"))
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+The IDNA codec decoder used on DNS hostnames by :mod:`socket` or :mod:`asyncio`
+related name resolution functions no longer involves a quadratic algorithm.
+This prevents a potential CPU denial of service if an out-of-spec excessive
+length hostname involving bidirectional characters were decoded. Some protocols
+such as :mod:`urllib` http ``3xx`` redirects potentially allow for an attacker
+to supply such a name.
