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Hello community,
here is the log from the commit of package frr for openSUSE:Factory checked in
at 2024-06-11 18:30:51
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/frr (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.frr.new.19518 (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "frr"
Tue Jun 11 18:30:51 2024 rev:32 rq:1179914 version:8.4
Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/frr/frr.changes 2024-04-29 09:08:48.911373704
+0200
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.frr.new.19518/frr.changes 2024-06-11
18:32:23.083648432 +0200
@@ -1,0 +2,17 @@
+Tue Jun 4 21:27:48 UTC 2024 - Marius Tomaschewski <m...@suse.com>
+
+- Apply upstream fix solving ospfd denial of service via get_edge()
+ function returning a NULL pointer (CVE-2024-34088,bsc#1223786,
+ gh#FRRouting/frr#16088).
+ [+ 0023-ospfd-protect-call-to-get_edge-in-ospf_te.c.patch]
+- Apply upstream fix solving ospfd buffer overflow and daemon crash
+ in ospf_te_parse_ext_link for OSPF LSA packets during an attempt
+ to read Segment Routing Adjacency SID subTLVs (CVE-2024-31951,
+ bsc#1222528,gh#FRRouting/frr#16088).
+ [+ 0022-ospfd-Correct-Opaque-LSA-Extended-parser.patch]
+- Apply upstream fix solving ospfd buffer overflow and daemon crash
+ in RI parsing with OSPF TE (CVE-2024-31950,bsc#1222526,
+ gh#FRRouting/frr#16088).
+ [+ 0021-ospfd-Solved-crash-in-RI-parsing-with-OSPF-TE.patch]
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
New:
----
0021-ospfd-Solved-crash-in-RI-parsing-with-OSPF-TE.patch
0022-ospfd-Correct-Opaque-LSA-Extended-parser.patch
0023-ospfd-protect-call-to-get_edge-in-ospf_te.c.patch
BETA DEBUG BEGIN:
New: gh#FRRouting/frr#16088).
[+ 0021-ospfd-Solved-crash-in-RI-parsing-with-OSPF-TE.patch]
New: bsc#1222528,gh#FRRouting/frr#16088).
[+ 0022-ospfd-Correct-Opaque-LSA-Extended-parser.patch]
- Apply upstream fix solving ospfd buffer overflow and daemon crash
New: gh#FRRouting/frr#16088).
[+ 0023-ospfd-protect-call-to-get_edge-in-ospf_te.c.patch]
- Apply upstream fix solving ospfd buffer overflow and daemon crash
BETA DEBUG END:
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Other differences:
------------------
++++++ frr.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.aOmhBM/_old 2024-06-11 18:32:24.571702845 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.aOmhBM/_new 2024-06-11 18:32:24.571702845 +0200
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@
Patch18: 0018-bgpd-Flowspec-overflow-issue.patch
Patch19:
0019-bgpd-fix-error-handling-when-receiving-BGP-Prefix-SID-attribute.patch
Patch20: 0020-ospfd-Solved-crash-in-OSPF-TE-parsing.patch
+Patch21: 0021-ospfd-Solved-crash-in-RI-parsing-with-OSPF-TE.patch
+Patch22: 0022-ospfd-Correct-Opaque-LSA-Extended-parser.patch
+Patch23: 0023-ospfd-protect-call-to-get_edge-in-ospf_te.c.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: bison >= 2.7
++++++ 0021-ospfd-Solved-crash-in-RI-parsing-with-OSPF-TE.patch ++++++
>From 298704f1e73221172432e2a4afd79086ffcd4cca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dug...@orange.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 16:28:23 +0200
Upstream: yes
References: CVE-2024-31950,bsc#1222526,gh#FRRouting/frr#16088
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] ospfd: Solved crash in RI parsing with OSPF TE
Iggy Frankovic discovered another ospfd crash when performing fuzzing of OSPF
LSA packets. The crash occurs in ospf_te_parse_ri() function when attemping to
read Segment Routing subTLVs. The original code doesn't check if the size of
the SR subTLVs have the correct length. In presence of erronous LSA, this will
cause a buffer overflow and ospfd crash.
This patch introduces new verification of the subTLVs size for Router
Information TLV.
Co-authored-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyf...@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dug...@orange.com>
(cherry picked from commit f69d1313b19047d3d83fc2b36a518355b861dfc4)
---
ospfd/ospf_te.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_te.c b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
index 45eb205759..885b915585 100644
--- a/ospfd/ospf_te.c
+++ b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
@@ -2483,6 +2483,9 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct
ospf_lsa *lsa)
switch (ntohs(tlvh->type)) {
case RI_SR_TLV_SR_ALGORITHM:
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) < 1 ||
+ TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) > ALGORITHM_COUNT)
+ break;
algo = (struct ri_sr_tlv_sr_algorithm *)tlvh;
for (int i = 0; i < ntohs(algo->header.length); i++) {
@@ -2507,6 +2510,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct
ospf_lsa *lsa)
break;
case RI_SR_TLV_SRGB_LABEL_RANGE:
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != RI_SR_TLV_LABEL_RANGE_SIZE)
+ break;
range = (struct ri_sr_tlv_sid_label_range *)tlvh;
size = GET_RANGE_SIZE(ntohl(range->size));
lower = GET_LABEL(ntohl(range->lower.value));
@@ -2524,6 +2529,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct
ospf_lsa *lsa)
break;
case RI_SR_TLV_SRLB_LABEL_RANGE:
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != RI_SR_TLV_LABEL_RANGE_SIZE)
+ break;
range = (struct ri_sr_tlv_sid_label_range *)tlvh;
size = GET_RANGE_SIZE(ntohl(range->size));
lower = GET_LABEL(ntohl(range->lower.value));
@@ -2541,6 +2548,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ri(struct ls_ted *ted, struct
ospf_lsa *lsa)
break;
case RI_SR_TLV_NODE_MSD:
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) < RI_SR_TLV_NODE_MSD_SIZE)
+ break;
msd = (struct ri_sr_tlv_node_msd *)tlvh;
if ((CHECK_FLAG(node->flags, LS_NODE_MSD))
&& (node->msd == msd->value))
--
2.35.3
++++++ 0022-ospfd-Correct-Opaque-LSA-Extended-parser.patch ++++++
>From 4e70b09f24b72fbb27ff5eda63393bfd2a72ef37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dug...@orange.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 12:57:11 +0200
Upstream: yes
References: CVE-2024-31951,bsc#1222528,gh#FRRouting/frr#16088
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] ospfd: Correct Opaque LSA Extended parser
Iggy Frankovic discovered another ospfd crash when performing fuzzing of OSPF
LSA packets. The crash occurs in ospf_te_parse_ext_link() function when
attemping to read Segment Routing Adjacency SID subTLVs. The original code
doesn't check if the size of the Extended Link TLVs and subTLVs have the correct
length. In presence of erronous LSA, this will cause a buffer overflow and ospfd
crashes.
This patch introduces new verification of the subTLVs size for Extended Link
TLVs and subTLVs. Similar check has been also introduced for the Extended
Prefix TLV.
Co-authored-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyf...@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dug...@orange.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5557a289acdaeec8cc63ffc97b5c2abf6dee7b3a)
---
ospfd/ospf_te.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_te.c b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
index 885b915585..23a1b181ec 100644
--- a/ospfd/ospf_te.c
+++ b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
@@ -2647,6 +2647,7 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_pref(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
struct ext_tlv_prefix *ext;
struct ext_subtlv_prefix_sid *pref_sid;
uint32_t label;
+ uint16_t len, size;
/* Get corresponding Subnet from Link State Data Base */
ext = (struct ext_tlv_prefix *)TLV_HDR_TOP(lsa->data);
@@ -2668,6 +2669,18 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_pref(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
ote_debug(" |- Process Extended Prefix LSA %pI4 for subnet %pFX",
&lsa->data->id, &pref);
+ /*
+ * Check Extended Prefix TLV size against LSA size
+ * as only one TLV is allowed per LSA
+ */
+ len = TLV_BODY_SIZE(&ext->header);
+ size = lsa->size - (OSPF_LSA_HEADER_SIZE + TLV_HDR_SIZE);
+ if (len != size || len <= 0) {
+ ote_debug(" |- Wrong TLV size: %u instead of %u",
+ (uint32_t)len, (uint32_t)size);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Initialize TLV browsing */
ls_pref = subnet->ls_pref;
pref_sid = (struct ext_subtlv_prefix_sid *)((char *)(ext) + TLV_HDR_SIZE
@@ -2778,8 +2791,20 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
ote_debug(" |- Process Extended Link LSA %pI4 for edge %pI4",
&lsa->data->id, &edge->attributes->standard.local);
- /* Initialize TLV browsing */
- len = TLV_BODY_SIZE(&ext->header) - EXT_TLV_LINK_SIZE;
+ /*
+ * Check Extended Link TLV size against LSA size
+ * as only one TLV is allowed per LSA
+ */
+ len = TLV_BODY_SIZE(&ext->header);
+ i = lsa->size - (OSPF_LSA_HEADER_SIZE + TLV_HDR_SIZE);
+ if (len != i || len <= 0) {
+ ote_debug(" |- Wrong TLV size: %u instead of %u",
+ (uint32_t)len, (uint32_t)i);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize subTLVs browsing */
+ len -= EXT_TLV_LINK_SIZE;
tlvh = (struct tlv_header *)((char *)(ext) + TLV_HDR_SIZE
+ EXT_TLV_LINK_SIZE);
for (; sum < len; tlvh = TLV_HDR_NEXT(tlvh)) {
@@ -2789,6 +2814,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
switch (ntohs(tlvh->type)) {
case EXT_SUBTLV_ADJ_SID:
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != EXT_SUBTLV_ADJ_SID_SIZE)
+ break;
adj = (struct ext_subtlv_adj_sid *)tlvh;
label = CHECK_FLAG(adj->flags,
EXT_SUBTLV_LINK_ADJ_SID_VFLG)
@@ -2815,6 +2842,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
break;
case EXT_SUBTLV_LAN_ADJ_SID:
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != EXT_SUBTLV_LAN_ADJ_SID_SIZE)
+ break;
ladj = (struct ext_subtlv_lan_adj_sid *)tlvh;
label = CHECK_FLAG(ladj->flags,
EXT_SUBTLV_LINK_ADJ_SID_VFLG)
@@ -2844,6 +2873,8 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
break;
case EXT_SUBTLV_RMT_ITF_ADDR:
+ if (TLV_BODY_SIZE(tlvh) != EXT_SUBTLV_RMT_ITF_ADDR_SIZE)
+ break;
rmt = (struct ext_subtlv_rmt_itf_addr *)tlvh;
if (CHECK_FLAG(atr->flags, LS_ATTR_NEIGH_ADDR)
&& IPV4_ADDR_SAME(&atr->standard.remote,
--
2.35.3
++++++ 0023-ospfd-protect-call-to-get_edge-in-ospf_te.c.patch ++++++
>From cef38442420aeac8e163f8aa55f1b985908f993c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dug...@orange.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2024 16:42:06 +0200
Upstream: yes
References: CVE-2024-34088,bsc#1223786,gh#FRRouting/frr#16088
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] ospfd: protect call to get_edge() in ospf_te.c
During fuzzing, Iggy Frankovic discovered that get_edge() function in ospf_te.c
could return null pointer, in particular when the link_id or advertised router
IP addresses are fuzzed. As the null pointer returned by get_edge() function is
not handlei by calling functions, this could cause ospfd crash.
This patch introduces new verification of returned pointer by get_edge()
function and stop the processing in case of null pointer. In addition, link ID
and advertiser router ID are validated before calling ls_find_edge_by_key() to
avoid the creation of a new edge with an invalid key.
CVE-2024-34088
Co-authored-by: Iggy Frankovic <iggyf...@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dug...@orange.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8c177d69e32b91b45bda5fc5da6511fa03dc11ca)
---
ospfd/ospf_te.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_te.c b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
index 23a1b181ec..d1f114e30a 100644
--- a/ospfd/ospf_te.c
+++ b/ospfd/ospf_te.c
@@ -1686,6 +1686,11 @@ static struct ls_edge *get_edge(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ls_node_id adv,
struct ls_edge *edge;
struct ls_attributes *attr;
+ /* Check that Link ID and Node ID are valid */
+ if (IPV4_NET0(link_id.s_addr) || IPV4_NET0(adv.id.ip.addr.s_addr) ||
+ adv.origin != OSPFv2)
+ return NULL;
+
/* Search Edge that corresponds to the Link ID */
key = ((uint64_t)ntohl(link_id.s_addr)) & 0xffffffff;
edge = ls_find_edge_by_key(ted, key);
@@ -1758,6 +1763,10 @@ static void ospf_te_update_link(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ls_vertex *vertex,
/* Get Corresponding Edge from Link State Data Base */
edge = get_edge(ted, vertex->node->adv, link_data);
+ if (!edge) {
+ ote_debug(" |- Found no edge from Link Data. Abort!");
+ return;
+ }
attr = edge->attributes;
/* re-attached edge to vertex if needed */
@@ -2276,11 +2285,11 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_te(struct ls_ted *ted, struct
ospf_lsa *lsa)
}
/* Get corresponding Edge from Link State Data Base */
- if (IPV4_NET0(attr.standard.local.s_addr) && !attr.standard.local_id) {
- ote_debug(" |- Found no TE Link local address/ID. Abort!");
+ edge = get_edge(ted, attr.adv, attr.standard.local);
+ if (!edge) {
+ ote_debug(" |- Found no edge from Link local add./ID. Abort!");
return -1;
}
- edge = get_edge(ted, attr.adv, attr.standard.local);
old = edge->attributes;
ote_debug(" |- Process Traffic Engineering LSA %pI4 for Edge %pI4",
@@ -2786,6 +2795,10 @@ static int ospf_te_parse_ext_link(struct ls_ted *ted,
struct ospf_lsa *lsa)
lnid.id.ip.area_id = lsa->area->area_id;
ext = (struct ext_tlv_link *)TLV_HDR_TOP(lsa->data);
edge = get_edge(ted, lnid, ext->link_data);
+ if (!edge) {
+ ote_debug(" |- Found no edge from Extended Link Data. Abort!");
+ return -1;
+ }
atr = edge->attributes;
ote_debug(" |- Process Extended Link LSA %pI4 for edge %pI4",
--
2.35.3
