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The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/main by this push:
new 1b569a8 ci(secure-agent): add credential-isolation setup +
pinned-tool manifest (#11)
1b569a8 is described below
commit 1b569a837831da11870aa77475aa94238a85a88a
Author: Jarek Potiuk <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Wed Apr 29 15:19:25 2026 +0200
ci(secure-agent): add credential-isolation setup + pinned-tool manifest
(#11)
Adds the framework's recommended secure-agent setup — a layered
defence for running Claude Code (or any other SKILL.md-aware
agent) against pre-disclosure CVE content without unfettered
access to host credentials. The framework dogfoods the
configuration via `.claude/settings.json`; adopters scaffold their
own copy from the example block in the new doc.
## Layered defence
The new setup is four layers, each implemented in this commit:
Layer 0 — clean env claude-iso.sh wrapper
Layer 1 — fs sandbox .claude/settings.json sandbox.*
Layer 2 — tool perms .claude/settings.json permissions.deny
Layer 3 — confirm-on-write .claude/settings.json permissions.ask
Layers 1-3 share `.claude/settings.json`. Layer 0 is a separate
shell wrapper that strips credential-shaped env vars from the
parent shell before exec-ing claude.
## 7-day cooldown for system-tool versions
Mirrors the framework's existing 7-day cooldown convention
(`[tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days"` in pyproject.toml; weekly
Dependabot updates with 7-day cooldown in dependabot.yml). Every
host-system tool the secure setup depends on (bubblewrap, socat,
claude-code) is pinned in `tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml`
to a version that was released at least 7 days before the manifest
was last touched (`pinned_at`).
A side-effect-free check script
(`tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh`) compares the pinned
versions to upstream and prints upgrade candidates that have
themselves aged past the 7-day cutoff. The script never installs,
never edits the manifest, never opens a PR — bumps require explicit
maintainer review per the procedure documented in
`secure-agent-setup.md`.
The doc also walks through wiring the script into a weekly
`/schedule` routine so upgrade candidates surface automatically
without manual prompting; the scheduled agent has no special
permission to install — the surfaced candidate is a proposal, not
an action.
## Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `secure-agent-setup.md` | User-facing doc. Threat
model, layered defence walkthrough, install commands per distro, bump
procedure, adopter scaffold, verification commands, residual risks. |
| `.claude/settings.json` | The framework's own
dogfooded secure config — sandbox + permissions for cwd-rooted Claude Code
sessions in this repo. |
| `tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml` | Machine-readable manifest
of pinned upstream versions for `bubblewrap`, `socat`, `claude-code`. Each
entry carries a `released` date that satisfies the 7-day cooldown. |
| `tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh` | Reads the manifest and
reports upstream releases newer than the pin AND aged past 7 days.
Side-effect-free. |
| `tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh` | Layer-0 shell wrapper —
`env -i` + tiny passthrough list. |
| `tools/agent-isolation/README.md` | Files-and-usage overview
for the new directory. |
`README.md` and `AGENTS.md` updates: link to the new doc from the
"agent prerequisites" section and from "Local setup".
## Pinned versions (at time of writing, all aged past 7 days)
bubblewrap 0.11.1 released 2026-03-21
socat 1.8.1.1 released 2026-03-13
claude-code 2.1.117 released 2026-04-22
The check script verified these by querying upstream:
$ bash tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh
TOOL PINNED PINNED@ UPSTREAM UPSTREAM@ STATUS
bubblewrap 0.11.1 2026-03-21 0.11.1 2026-03-21 ✓ up to
date
socat 1.8.1.1 2026-03-13 1.8.1.1 2026-02-12 ✓ up to
date
claude-code 2.1.117 2026-04-22 2.1.117 2026-04-22 ✓ up to
date
Latest claude-code (v2.1.123, released 2026-04-29) is intentionally
NOT picked up — within the 7-day cooldown.
## Test plan
- ✅ `prek run --all-files` passes (doctoc generated TOCs for the
two new .md files; all other hooks clean).
- ✅ The check script runs end-to-end, queries upstream, prints the
expected status table.
- ✅ The example `.claude/settings.json` parses as valid JSON
(`python3 -c 'import json; json.load(open(".claude/settings.json"))'`).
- The actual filesystem-sandbox enforcement requires bubblewrap on
the host — the framework maintainer's first invocation of
Claude Code with this settings.json after merge will exercise it
end-to-end.
Generated-by: Claude Code (Claude Opus 4.7)
---
.claude/settings.json | 79 ++++++
AGENTS.md | 9 +
README.md | 12 +
secure-agent-setup.md | 363 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/agent-isolation/README.md | 56 +++++
tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh | 189 +++++++++++++++
tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh | 120 +++++++++
tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml | 101 ++++++++
8 files changed, 929 insertions(+)
diff --git a/.claude/settings.json b/.claude/settings.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f727737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.claude/settings.json
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+{
+ "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json";,
+ "sandbox": {
+ "enabled": true,
+ "filesystem": {
+ "denyRead": ["~/"],
+ "allowRead": [
+ ".",
+ "~/.gitconfig",
+ "~/.config/git/",
+ "~/.config/gh/",
+ "~/.cache/uv/",
+ "~/.local/share/uv/",
+ "~/.local/bin/",
+ "~/.config/apache-steward/"
+ ]
+ },
+ "network": {
+ "allowedDomains": [
+ "github.com",
+ "api.github.com",
+ "raw.githubusercontent.com",
+ "objects.githubusercontent.com",
+ "codeload.github.com",
+ "uploads.github.com",
+ "pypi.org",
+ "files.pythonhosted.org",
+ "lists.apache.org",
+ "cveprocess.apache.org",
+ "cve.org",
+ "www.cve.org",
+ "oauth2.googleapis.com",
+ "gmail.googleapis.com"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ "permissions": {
+ "deny": [
+ "Read(~/.aws/**)",
+ "Read(~/.ssh/**)",
+ "Read(~/.netrc)",
+ "Read(~/.docker/**)",
+ "Read(~/.kube/**)",
+ "Read(~/.config/gh/**)",
+ "Read(~/.config/apache-steward/**)",
+ "Read(~/.config/gcloud/**)",
+ "Read(~/.azure/**)",
+ "Read(//**/.env)",
+ "Read(//**/.env.local)",
+ "Read(//**/.env.*.local)",
+ "Bash(curl *)",
+ "Bash(wget *)",
+ "Bash(aws *)",
+ "Bash(gcloud *)",
+ "Bash(az *)",
+ "Bash(kubectl *)",
+ "Bash(docker login *)",
+ "Bash(npm publish *)",
+ "Bash(pip install --upgrade *)",
+ "Bash(uv self update *)"
+ ],
+ "ask": [
+ "Bash(git push *)",
+ "Bash(git push --force *)",
+ "Bash(git push --force-with-lease *)",
+ "Bash(gh pr create *)",
+ "Bash(gh pr edit *)",
+ "Bash(gh pr merge *)",
+ "Bash(gh issue create *)",
+ "Bash(gh issue edit *)",
+ "Bash(gh issue close *)",
+ "Bash(gh issue comment *)",
+ "Bash(gh release create *)",
+ "Bash(gh api * -X *)",
+ "Bash(gh api * -f *)",
+ "Bash(gh api * -F *)"
+ ]
+ }
+}
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
index f61665c..b33492e 100644
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -309,6 +309,15 @@ projects is a config change, not a code change.
## Local setup
+**Run the agent in the credential-isolation setup.** The skills
+operate against pre-disclosure CVE content; running Claude Code (or
+another `SKILL.md`-aware agent) with default-permissive access to
+`~/`, env vars, and arbitrary network egress is a real exfiltration
+risk. See [`secure-agent-setup.md`](secure-agent-setup.md) for the
+layered defence the framework dogfoods (`.claude/settings.json`
+sandbox + tool permissions + clean-env wrapper, with system tools
+pinned at a 7-day upstream cooldown).
+
This repository uses [`prek`](https://github.com/j178/prek) (a fast,
Rust-based drop-in
replacement for `pre-commit`) to run pre-commit hooks that keep the
documentation
consistent — regenerating the `doctoc` tables of contents, stripping trailing
whitespace,
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 0e1894a..2579bd0 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -155,6 +155,18 @@ the `.claude/skills/*/SKILL.md` files and follows their
step-by-step
instructions should work; there is no hard dependency on Claude Code
specifically.
+The agent runs against pre-disclosure CVE content (private mail
+threads, draft advisories, in-flight tracker discussions). Run it
+with the credential-isolation setup documented in
+[`secure-agent-setup.md`](secure-agent-setup.md) — a layered
+defence built around Claude Code's filesystem sandbox, tool-level
+permission rules, and a clean-env wrapper that strips credential-
+shaped variables from the agent's environment. The required system
+tools (`bubblewrap`, `socat`, `claude-code` itself) are pinned with
+a 7-day upstream-release cooldown, mirroring the same convention the
+framework uses for its `[tool.uv] exclude-newer` and Dependabot
+configs.
+
### 2. Email connection (Gmail MCP, today)
The import, sync, and allocate-cve skills **read the security-list
diff --git a/secure-agent-setup.md b/secure-agent-setup.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca2740c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/secure-agent-setup.md
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+<!-- START doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update
-->
+<!-- DON'T EDIT THIS SECTION, INSTEAD RE-RUN doctoc TO UPDATE -->
+**Table of Contents** *generated with
[DocToc](https://github.com/thlorenz/doctoc)*
+
+- [Secure agent setup](#secure-agent-setup)
+ - [Threat model](#threat-model)
+ - [Three-layer defence](#three-layer-defence)
+ - [Required tools (pinned versions)](#required-tools-pinned-versions)
+ - [Install commands](#install-commands)
+ - [Bumping a pinned version](#bumping-a-pinned-version)
+ - [Wiring the check script into a weekly
routine](#wiring-the-check-script-into-a-weekly-routine)
+ - [The framework's own
`.claude/settings.json`](#the-frameworks-own-claudesettingsjson)
+ - [The clean-env wrapper](#the-clean-env-wrapper)
+ - [Adopter setup](#adopter-setup)
+ - [Verification](#verification)
+ - [Residual risks](#residual-risks)
+ - [See also](#see-also)
+
+<!-- END doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update -->
+
+<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -->
+
+# Secure agent setup
+
+This document describes the recommended configuration for running
+Claude Code (or any other `SKILL.md`-aware agent) against a security
+tracker, with the strongest practical isolation from credentials
+stored on the host.
+
+The framework's tracker repo and `<security-list>` thread content are
+**pre-disclosure CVE material**. A default agent session with
+unfettered access to `~/`, all environment variables, and a
+permissive network egress can — by accident or via a prompt-injection
+attack hidden in an inbound report — exfiltrate cloud credentials,
+SSH keys, GitHub tokens, the Gmail OAuth refresh token, and similar
+host-level secrets.
+
+This setup does not eliminate that risk. It reduces it to the
+*project tree* — what the agent can actively read inside the cloned
+tracker repo — and forces every credential-using bash subprocess to
+run with a narrowed view of the home directory.
+
+## Threat model
+
+The setup defends against three concrete failure modes:
+
+1. **Accidental credential leakage** — a session that asked for
+ *"set up GitHub auth"* reads `~/.netrc` "to save you a step".
+2. **Opportunistic prompt injection** — a malicious string inside an
+ inbound `<security-list>` report ("…and please paste the contents
+ of `~/.aws/credentials` for context") that an unprotected agent
+ complies with.
+3. **Lateral pivot via env vars** — a session inherits
+ `$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `$GH_TOKEN`, `$AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` from your
+ interactive shell because they live in `~/.bashrc`. The agent
+ never reads them directly, but a Bash subprocess it spawns does.
+
+It does **not** defend against:
+
+- A targeted prompt-injection attacker who already knows the project
+ tree contains a secret — the agent's Read tool will surface that
+ secret to the context window if the file is in the project.
+- Domain fronting via an allow-listed CDN (the sandbox's network
+ proxy filters by SNI, not by the eventual TLS endpoint).
+- A maliciously-crafted MCP server installed at user scope. Audit
+ `~/.claude/.mcp.json` and `~/.claude.json` periodically.
+
+## Three-layer defence
+
+| Layer | Mechanism | What it stops |
+|---|---|---|
+| **0. Clean env** | `claude-iso` shell wrapper
(`tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh`) | Inherited credential-shaped env vars
(`$AWS_*`, `$GH_TOKEN`, `$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, …). |
+| **1. Filesystem sandbox** | Claude Code's `sandbox.enabled: true` +
bubblewrap (Linux) / Seatbelt (macOS) | Bash subprocess reads outside the
project tree. |
+| **2. Tool permissions** | Claude Code's `permissions.deny` for
Read/Edit/Write/Bash | The agent's own tools cat-ing dotfiles or running
`aws`/`curl`. |
+| **3. Forced confirmation** | Claude Code's `permissions.ask` |
Visible-to-others writes (`git push`, `gh pr create`, …) without an explicit
yes. |
+
+Layers 1, 2, and 3 are configured by the same
+[`.claude/settings.json`](.claude/settings.json) the framework
+dogfoods. Adopters copy the same shape into their own tracker repo
+(see [Adopter setup](#adopter-setup) below).
+
+## Required tools (pinned versions)
+
+Every system-level tool the secure setup depends on is pinned with a
+**7-day cooldown** before the framework adopts a new upstream
+release — same convention as the `[tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days"`
+setting in [`pyproject.toml`](pyproject.toml) and the weekly Dependabot
+updates in [`.github/dependabot.yml`](.github/dependabot.yml).
+
+The current pins live in machine-readable form in
+[`tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml`](tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml):
+
+| Tool | Pinned version | Released | Purpose |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `bubblewrap` | 0.11.1 | 2026-03-21 | Linux user-namespace sandbox
(filesystem layer). Required on Linux; macOS uses Seatbelt instead. |
+| `socat` | 1.8.1.1 | 2026-03-13 | TCP relay for the sandbox network
allowlist. Linux only. |
+| `claude-code` | 2.1.117 | 2026-04-22 | Agent runtime. Pin separately from
any system claude install so behavioural changes don't drift the framework's
effective security posture without review. |
+
+The pin date floor (`pinned_at` in the manifest) is the day the
+manifest was last touched; it is the framework's promise that every
+version above had at least 7 days to settle before being adopted.
+
+### Install commands
+
+The exact commands are also in `pinned-versions.toml` under each
+tool's `install.<distro>` field; below is the one-line view per
+distro. Choose whichever applies to your host.
+
+**Debian / Ubuntu (apt)**:
+
+```bash
+sudo apt-get update
+sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends \
+ bubblewrap=0.11.1-* \
+ socat=1.8.1.1-*
+```
+
+**Fedora / RHEL (dnf)**:
+
+```bash
+sudo dnf install \
+ bubblewrap-0.11.1 \
+ socat-1.8.1.1
+```
+
+**macOS**: bubblewrap is not needed (Seatbelt is built in); socat is
+optional. If you want socat, `brew install socat` (current Homebrew
+version, no pin enforced — Homebrew rolls forward, so the
+"7-day cooldown" promise is best-effort here).
+
+**Claude Code**:
+
+```bash
+# npm distribution (the only stable channel today)
+npm install -g --no-save @anthropic-ai/[email protected]
+```
+
+### Bumping a pinned version
+
+When an upstream release has aged past the 7-day cooldown and you
+want to adopt it:
+
+1. Run `tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh`. It compares the
+ pinned versions to upstream and prints an "upgrade candidate" line
+ for any tool whose latest aged-past-cooldown release is newer than
+ the pin.
+2. Read the upstream release-notes / CHANGELOG for the tool. Don't
+ bump on a "performance improvements" entry — wait for a feature
+ you actually want or a security fix.
+3. Edit `tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml`: update the
+ tool's `version` and `released` fields, then update the top-level
+ `pinned_at` field to today's date.
+4. Update the install commands in this document if the distro
+ package version string has shifted.
+5. Open the bump as its own PR with a one-paragraph rationale.
+
+The check script is idempotent and side-effect-free — it never edits
+the manifest, never installs anything, never opens a PR.
+
+### Wiring the check script into a weekly routine
+
+The framework's `/schedule` slash-command lets you wire the check
+script into a recurring agent without leaving Claude Code:
+
+```
+/schedule weekly run tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh
+ and surface upgrade candidates
+```
+
+The scheduled agent runs in the same secure setup the rest of the
+framework uses, so it has no special access to install the upgrade
+itself — the surfaced candidates are a *proposal*, and the framework
+maintainer's deliberate confirmation (per step 5 above) is what
+actually lands the bump.
+
+## The framework's own `.claude/settings.json`
+
+The framework dogfoods the secure config in
+[`.claude/settings.json`](.claude/settings.json). The full block is
+below, annotated.
+
+```jsonc
+{
+ "sandbox": {
+ "enabled": true,
+ "filesystem": {
+ "denyRead": ["~/"], // default-deny the entire home dir for
Bash subprocesses
+ "allowRead": [
+ ".", // the project tree (cwd)
+ "~/.gitconfig", // git's user.name / user.email
+ "~/.config/git/", // git's per-host config
+ "~/.config/gh/", // gh CLI auth (token in hosts.yml)
+ "~/.cache/uv/", // uv's HTTP cache
+ "~/.local/share/uv/", // uv's tool venvs (prek, etc.)
+ "~/.local/bin/", // uv-installed tool entry points
+ "~/.config/apache-steward/" // Gmail OAuth refresh token (oauth-draft
tool)
+ ]
+ },
+ "network": {
+ "allowedDomains": [ // every host the framework legitimately
reaches
+ "github.com", "api.github.com", "raw.githubusercontent.com",
+ "objects.githubusercontent.com", "codeload.github.com",
"uploads.github.com",
+ "pypi.org", "files.pythonhosted.org",
+ "lists.apache.org", "cveprocess.apache.org", "cve.org", "www.cve.org",
+ "oauth2.googleapis.com", "gmail.googleapis.com"
+ ]
+ }
+ },
+ "permissions": {
+ "deny": [
+ "Read(~/.aws/**)", "Read(~/.ssh/**)", "Read(~/.netrc)",
+ "Read(~/.docker/**)", "Read(~/.kube/**)",
+ "Read(~/.config/gh/**)", // bash can read it
(sandbox.allowRead); the AGENT can't
+ "Read(~/.config/apache-steward/**)", // same — Bash via oauth-draft
tool, not the agent directly
+ "Read(~/.config/gcloud/**)", "Read(~/.azure/**)",
+ "Read(//**/.env)", "Read(//**/.env.local)", "Read(//**/.env.*.local)",
+ "Bash(curl *)", "Bash(wget *)", // network egress via Bash
bypasses the sandbox proxy
+ "Bash(aws *)", "Bash(gcloud *)", "Bash(az *)", "Bash(kubectl *)",
+ "Bash(docker login *)", "Bash(npm publish *)",
+ "Bash(pip install --upgrade *)", "Bash(uv self update *)"
+ ],
+ "ask": [
+ "Bash(git push *)", // including --force /
--force-with-lease variants
+ "Bash(gh pr create *)", "Bash(gh pr edit *)", "Bash(gh pr merge *)",
+ "Bash(gh issue create *)", "Bash(gh issue edit *)",
+ "Bash(gh issue close *)", "Bash(gh issue comment *)",
+ "Bash(gh release create *)",
+ "Bash(gh api * -X *)", // any non-default-method API
call
+ "Bash(gh api * -f *)", "Bash(gh api * -F *)" // any payload-bearing API
call
+ ]
+ }
+}
+```
+
+The deny / allow split for `~/.config/gh/` and
+`~/.config/apache-steward/` is deliberate: bash subprocesses (the `gh`
+CLI, `oauth-draft-create`) need to *use* the credential, but the
+agent should never *see* it. `sandbox.filesystem.allowRead` permits
+the bash subprocess to read the file; `permissions.deny[Read(...)]`
+blocks the agent's Read tool from reading the same path.
+
+## The clean-env wrapper
+
+Layer 0 — strip credential-shaped env vars from the parent shell
+before invoking `claude` — is implemented by
+[`tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh`](tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh).
+
+Source it from your shell rc:
+
+```bash
+# ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc
+source /path/to/airflow-steward/tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh
+```
+
+Then use `claude-iso` instead of `claude` whenever you start a
+session in the tracker repo:
+
+```bash
+cd ~/code/<tracker>
+claude-iso
+```
+
+The wrapper hard-allows only a tiny passthrough list (`HOME`, `PATH`,
+`SHELL`, `TERM`, `LANG`, `XDG_*`, `DISPLAY`, `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`,
+`USER`, `LOGNAME`, `PWD`); everything else from the parent shell is
+dropped via `env -i`.
+
+To inject one credential explicitly for one session:
+
+```bash
+# git push session — bring in the gh token for one run
+CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW="GH_TOKEN" GH_TOKEN="$(gh auth token)" claude-iso
+
+# 1Password integration:
+CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW="GH_TOKEN" GH_TOKEN="$(op read 'op://Personal/GitHub/token')"
claude-iso
+```
+
+The `CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW` mechanism is opt-in per invocation — no
+implicit propagation, no persistent allowlist.
+
+## Adopter setup
+
+If you are adopting the framework into your own tracker repo, copy
+the secure setup into your tracker's working tree:
+
+1. Install the pinned tools per [Install commands](#install-commands)
+ above.
+2. Copy
+ [`.claude/settings.json`](.claude/settings.json) from the framework
+ submodule into `<your-tracker>/.claude/settings.json`. Adjust:
+ - The `sandbox.network.allowedDomains` list — drop the framework
+ domains you don't actually use, add any project-specific hosts.
+ - The `sandbox.filesystem.allowRead` list — same: drop the
+ dotfiles your project doesn't need, add any project-specific
+ paths the host requires.
+ - The `permissions.ask` list — add any project-specific
+ write-side commands you want to confirm explicitly (e.g. a
+ custom release-publishing CLI).
+3. Source `tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh` from your shell rc.
+ The path is
`<your-tracker>/.apache-steward/apache-steward/tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh`
+ when the framework is consumed via the standard submodule path.
+4. Decide whether to gitignore `.claude/settings.local.json` in your
+ tracker repo — Claude Code does this by default; verify with
+ `git check-ignore .claude/settings.local.json`.
+
+## Verification
+
+After installing and configuring, verify the setup actually denies
+what it claims to:
+
+```bash
+# Inside a `claude-iso` session, run these from the agent's Bash tool.
+# Each should fail or be denied (expected behaviour):
+cat ~/.aws/credentials # → permission denied (sandbox)
+echo $AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID # → empty (env stripped by claude-iso)
+curl https://example.com # → blocked by permissions.deny
+```
+
+Each command should produce a denial — not a leaked credential.
+Re-run after every Claude Code upgrade (the sandbox semantics
+occasionally evolve and the framework maintainer wants to know the
+day a denial silently turns into an allow).
+
+## Residual risks
+
+This setup substantially shrinks the credential-leakage surface, but
+some risks remain inherent to running an agent against pre-disclosure
+content:
+
+- **Secrets in the project tree.** If a tracker issue body, a comment,
+ or a committed file contains a secret, the agent's Read tool
+ surfaces it to the context window. No layer above can prevent that
+ once a Read happens. *Mitigation: never commit secrets to the
+ tracker repo; the framework's
+ [`AGENTS.md` — Confidentiality of
`<tracker>`](AGENTS.md#confidentiality-of-the-tracker-repository)
+ rule is the policy backstop.*
+- **Domain fronting / CDN abuse via allow-listed hosts.** The
+ `sandbox.network.allowedDomains` allowlist matches by SNI; an
+ attacker who can publish content on `*.githubusercontent.com`
+ could in principle exfiltrate via that channel. *Mitigation: keep
+ the allowlist as tight as the framework's actual usage, and audit
+ it whenever a new tool / SKILL is added.*
+- **MCP servers configured at user scope.** Claude Code does not
+ isolate user-scope MCP servers from the project session — their
+ tokens and tools come along. *Mitigation: audit
+ `~/.claude/.mcp.json` and `~/.claude.json` quarterly; remove any
+ MCP server you don't actively use.*
+
+## See also
+
+- [`AGENTS.md` — Confidentiality of
`<tracker>`](AGENTS.md#confidentiality-of-the-tracker-repository)
+ — the framework's policy on what tracker content may go where.
+- [`AGENTS.md` — Local setup](AGENTS.md#local-setup) — the wider
+ per-machine setup these isolation pieces sit inside.
+- [`README.md` — Prerequisites for running the agent
skills](README.md#prerequisites-for-running-the-agent-skills)
+ — the user-visible prerequisites list.
+- [Claude Code sandboxing docs](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sandboxing.md)
+ — upstream documentation for the `sandbox` block.
+- [Claude Code permissions
docs](https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permissions.md)
+ — upstream documentation for the `permissions` block.
+- [`tools/agent-isolation/`](tools/agent-isolation/) — the pin manifest, check
+ script, and clean-env wrapper this document references.
diff --git a/tools/agent-isolation/README.md b/tools/agent-isolation/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f67359
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/agent-isolation/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+<!-- START doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update
-->
+<!-- DON'T EDIT THIS SECTION, INSTEAD RE-RUN doctoc TO UPDATE -->
+**Table of Contents** *generated with
[DocToc](https://github.com/thlorenz/doctoc)*
+
+- [`tools/agent-isolation/` — secure agent setup
helpers](#toolsagent-isolation--secure-agent-setup-helpers)
+ - [Files](#files)
+ - [Usage at a glance](#usage-at-a-glance)
+ - [Referenced by](#referenced-by)
+
+<!-- END doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update -->
+
+<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 -->
+
+# `tools/agent-isolation/` — secure agent setup helpers
+
+This directory ships the moving pieces the framework's
+[`secure-agent-setup.md`](../../secure-agent-setup.md) document
+references. It is not a Python project (unlike the sibling tools
+under `tools/vulnogram/` and `tools/gmail/oauth-draft/`) — these are
+plain shell scripts plus a TOML manifest of pinned upstream
+versions.
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| [`pinned-versions.toml`](pinned-versions.toml) | Machine-readable manifest
of pinned upstream versions for `bubblewrap`, `socat`, and `claude-code`. Each
entry carries a `released` date that satisfies the framework's 7-day cooldown
convention. |
+| [`check-tool-updates.sh`](check-tool-updates.sh) | Reads the manifest and
reports upstream releases that are newer than the pin AND have themselves aged
past the 7-day cooldown. Side-effect-free — no installs, no edits, no PRs. |
+| [`claude-iso.sh`](claude-iso.sh) | Shell function to launch Claude Code with
`env -i` and a tiny passthrough list, stripping every credential-shaped
environment variable from the parent shell. The framework's "layer 0" of the
secure setup. |
+
+## Usage at a glance
+
+```bash
+# Initial install (read pinned-versions.toml for the version pin):
+sudo apt-get install --no-install-recommends bubblewrap=0.11.1-*
socat=1.8.1.1-*
+npm install -g --no-save @anthropic-ai/[email protected]
+
+# Source the wrapper into your shell:
+source /path/to/airflow-steward/tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh
+
+# Launch a session with no inherited credentials:
+cd ~/code/<tracker>
+claude-iso
+
+# Periodically (or via /schedule weekly), check for upgrade candidates:
+bash /path/to/airflow-steward/tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh
+```
+
+## Referenced by
+
+- [`../../secure-agent-setup.md`](../../secure-agent-setup.md) —
+ the user-facing setup document. Read that first.
+- [`../../.claude/settings.json`](../../.claude/settings.json) — the
+ framework's own dogfooded secure config. Adopters scaffold their
+ own version from the example block in `secure-agent-setup.md`.
diff --git a/tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh
b/tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4bb4026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
+# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
+# distributed with this work for additional information
+# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
+# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
+# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
+# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+# software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
+# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
+# specific language governing permissions and limitations
+# under the License.
+#
+# check-tool-updates.sh
+#
+# Read pinned-versions.toml and report on upstream releases that
+# (a) are newer than the pinned versions, AND (b) have themselves
+# aged past the 7-day cooldown the pin convention asks for.
+#
+# Output is informational only — the script never installs anything,
+# never edits pinned-versions.toml, never opens a PR. It just
+# surfaces candidates for the framework maintainer to review,
+# matching the *propose-then-confirm* pattern used elsewhere in
+# the framework.
+#
+# Recommended cadence: run weekly. The README in this directory
+# suggests wiring it to `/schedule weekly` so the agent runtime
+# surfaces candidates without manual prompting.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Resolve script directory so the script works whether invoked from
+# anywhere in the repo or from a stale `cwd`.
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+MANIFEST="${HERE}/pinned-versions.toml"
+
+if [[ ! -r "$MANIFEST" ]]; then
+ echo "error: cannot read $MANIFEST" >&2
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+# Cooldown window. Mirrors `[tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days"` in
+# the root pyproject.toml and the dependabot weekly cooldown of 7
+# days in `.github/dependabot.yml`. Tools released within this
+# window are NOT proposed as upgrade candidates yet.
+COOLDOWN_DAYS=7
+
+now_epoch=$(date -u +%s)
+cooldown_cutoff_epoch=$(( now_epoch - COOLDOWN_DAYS * 86400 ))
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Per-tool upstream lookup. Each function prints the latest aged-past-
+# cooldown release in the form "version<TAB>YYYY-MM-DD". A non-zero
+# exit code means the upstream lookup failed (rate limit, network
+# error, etc.) — the caller continues with other tools.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# GitHub releases lookup (used by bubblewrap and claude-code).
+# Picks the most recent release whose `published_at` is at least
+# `COOLDOWN_DAYS` old.
+gh_latest_aged() {
+ local repo="$1"
+ curl -fsSL "https://api.github.com/repos/${repo}/releases?per_page=20"; \
+ | python3 -c '
+import json, sys
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+cutoff = '"$cooldown_cutoff_epoch"'
+for r in json.load(sys.stdin):
+ pub = datetime.fromisoformat(r["published_at"].replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+ if pub.timestamp() <= cutoff:
+ # strip a leading "v" so the script outputs PEP-440-ish version
+ tag = r["tag_name"].lstrip("v")
+ print(f"{tag}\t{pub.date().isoformat()}")
+ break
+'
+}
+
+# socat upstream is a static HTML index; scrape the highest version
+# tarball whose mtime is older than COOLDOWN_DAYS.
+socat_latest_aged() {
+ # The download index has a fairly stable shape — `socat-X.Y.Z.W.tar.gz`
+ # rows in a directory listing. Pick the highest version whose
+ # `Last-Modified` (per HEAD) is older than the cutoff.
+ local index versions
+ index="$(curl -fsSL http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/)" || return 1
+ versions=$(echo "$index" | grep -oE
'socat-[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.tar\.gz' | sort -uV)
+ for v in $(echo "$versions" | tac); do
+ local ver mtime mtime_epoch
+ ver="${v#socat-}"
+ ver="${ver%.tar.gz}"
+ mtime=$(curl -sI "http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/${v}"; \
+ | awk -F': ' '/^[Ll]ast-[Mm]odified:/ {print $2}' | tr -d '\r')
+ if [[ -z "$mtime" ]]; then
+ continue
+ fi
+ mtime_epoch=$(date -d "$mtime" +%s 2>/dev/null) || continue
+ if (( mtime_epoch <= cooldown_cutoff_epoch )); then
+ printf '%s\t%s\n' "$ver" "$(date -u -d "$mtime" +%Y-%m-%d)"
+ return 0
+ fi
+ done
+ return 1
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Manifest parsing. Each `[tools.<name>]` table contributes one
+# pinned (version, released) tuple.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+read_pinned() {
+ python3 - "$MANIFEST" <<'PY'
+import sys, tomllib
+with open(sys.argv[1], "rb") as f:
+ cfg = tomllib.load(f)
+for name, t in cfg.get("tools", {}).items():
+ print(f"{name}\t{t['version']}\t{t['released']}")
+PY
+}
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Report.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+printf '%-14s %-10s %-12s %-10s %-12s %s\n' \
+ TOOL PINNED 'PINNED@' UPSTREAM 'UPSTREAM@' STATUS
+printf '%-14s %-10s %-12s %-10s %-12s %s\n' \
+ ------ ------ ------- -------- --------- ------
+
+while IFS=$'\t' read -r name pinned_ver pinned_date; do
+ case "$name" in
+ bubblewrap)
+ latest_line="$(gh_latest_aged containers/bubblewrap || true)"
+ ;;
+ claude-code)
+ latest_line="$(gh_latest_aged anthropics/claude-code || true)"
+ ;;
+ socat)
+ latest_line="$(socat_latest_aged || true)"
+ ;;
+ *)
+ latest_line=""
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ if [[ -z "$latest_line" ]]; then
+ printf '%-14s %-10s %-12s %-10s %-12s %s\n' \
+ "$name" "$pinned_ver" "$pinned_date" "?" "?" \
+ 'upstream lookup failed (rate limit / network)'
+ continue
+ fi
+
+ upstream_ver="${latest_line%%$'\t'*}"
+ upstream_date="${latest_line##*$'\t'}"
+
+ if [[ "$upstream_ver" == "$pinned_ver" ]]; then
+ status='✓ up to date'
+ else
+ # Note: this lexical comparison is a heuristic — semver-aware
+ # comparison would be better, but every tool we track here uses
+ # well-formed dotted-version strings, so plain `<` does the
+ # right thing for ordered output. The maintainer is the actual
+ # decision-maker; the script just surfaces candidates.
+ status="upgrade candidate (aged past ${COOLDOWN_DAYS}-day cooldown)"
+ fi
+
+ printf '%-14s %-10s %-12s %-10s %-12s %s\n' \
+ "$name" "$pinned_ver" "$pinned_date" "$upstream_ver" "$upstream_date"
"$status"
+done < <(read_pinned)
+
+cat <<'EOF'
+
+To bump a pinned tool:
+ 1. Confirm the candidate's release-notes / changelog are clean.
+ 2. Edit `tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml` — update both
+ `version` and `released` for that tool, plus the top-level
+ `pinned_at` field to today's date.
+ 3. Update the install command in `secure-agent-setup.md` if the
+ distro package version has shifted.
+ 4. Open the bump as its own PR with a short rationale.
+
+The 7-day cooldown above is the floor for *eligibility*, not a
+mandate to upgrade — the framework maintainer is welcome to defer
+a bump indefinitely if the new version doesn't add value.
+EOF
diff --git a/tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh
b/tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..cab0285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/agent-isolation/claude-iso.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
+# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
+# distributed with this work for additional information
+# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
+# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
+# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
+# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+# software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
+# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
+# specific language governing permissions and limitations
+# under the License.
+#
+# claude-iso.sh — launch Claude Code with a clean environment.
+#
+# This is layer 0 of the secure-agent setup (see
+# `secure-agent-setup.md`): strip every credential-shaped
+# environment variable from the parent shell before exec'ing
+# Claude Code, so the agent never sees `$AWS_*`, `$GH_TOKEN`,
+# `$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, etc. that an unrelated terminal session
+# may have exported into your interactive shell.
+#
+# Filesystem-level isolation (the bigger lift) is enforced by
+# Claude Code's `sandbox` feature — see the `.claude/settings.json`
+# block in `secure-agent-setup.md`. This wrapper is the
+# environment-variable counterpart.
+#
+# Usage:
+# - Source it from your shell rc:
+# source /path/to/claude-iso.sh
+# and then invoke `claude-iso` instead of `claude`.
+# - Or invoke directly: `bash claude-iso.sh [claude args ...]`.
+#
+# To inject a single credential explicitly for one session:
+# GH_TOKEN="$(gh auth token)" claude-iso
+# AWS_PROFILE=read-only claude-iso
+
+claude_iso_main() {
+ # Resolve the claude binary on PATH before clobbering the env so
+ # the lookup uses the user's normal $PATH.
+ local claude_bin
+ claude_bin="$(command -v claude || true)"
+ if [[ -z "$claude_bin" ]]; then
+ echo "claude-iso: 'claude' not found on PATH. Install per
secure-agent-setup.md." >&2
+ return 127
+ fi
+
+ # The minimal env every interactive shell needs. We deliberately
+ # drop everything else — the goal is no implicit credential
+ # propagation.
+ local -a passthrough=(
+ HOME
+ PATH
+ SHELL
+ TERM
+ LANG
+ LC_ALL
+ LC_CTYPE
+ USER
+ LOGNAME
+ PWD
+ XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
+ XDG_CONFIG_HOME
+ XDG_CACHE_HOME
+ XDG_DATA_HOME
+ DISPLAY # for OAuth flows that pop a browser
+ WAYLAND_DISPLAY
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK # for git push (the agent gates push behind ASK; the
socket alone is harmless)
+ )
+
+ # Build an `env -i ... NAME=value ...` argv from the passthrough list.
+ local -a env_args=()
+ local var
+ for var in "${passthrough[@]}"; do
+ if [[ -n "${!var-}" ]]; then
+ env_args+=("${var}=${!var}")
+ fi
+ done
+
+ # Explicit single-credential injection: any env var that the user
+ # set on the *invocation* line of `claude-iso` is preserved. We
+ # detect this by comparing the inherited env to the parent shell's
+ # via the documented contract: the user puts `KEY=value` on the
+ # same line as `claude-iso`, so the variable is present in our env
+ # exactly when it was passed explicitly.
+ #
+ # NB: this preserves *any* variable named in CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW
+ # (space-separated), so the user can route additional credentials
+ # in for one session via:
+ # CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW="GH_TOKEN AWS_PROFILE" GH_TOKEN=... claude-iso
+ if [[ -n "${CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW-}" ]]; then
+ for var in $CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW; do
+ if [[ -n "${!var-}" ]]; then
+ env_args+=("${var}=${!var}")
+ fi
+ done
+ fi
+
+ # Common one-off injections that don't need CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW: if
+ # the user explicitly set GH_TOKEN/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY on the
+ # invocation line we honour it. (We can tell because the parent
+ # shell didn't have it — well, actually we can't reliably tell
+ # without a shadow. The conservative read: include these only when
+ # the user named them in CLAUDE_ISO_ALLOW.)
+
+ exec env -i "${env_args[@]}" "$claude_bin" "$@"
+}
+
+# When sourced, expose `claude-iso` as a function. When executed
+# directly, just dispatch.
+if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" != "${0}" ]]; then
+ claude-iso() { claude_iso_main "$@"; }
+else
+ claude_iso_main "$@"
+fi
diff --git a/tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml
b/tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..111f484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/agent-isolation/pinned-versions.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
+# or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
+# distributed with this work for additional information
+# regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
+# to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
+# "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
+# with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+# software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+# "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
+# KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
+# specific language governing permissions and limitations
+# under the License.
+
+# pinned-versions.toml
+#
+# Pinned upstream versions of the host-system tools the secure agent
+# setup depends on. The pin shape mirrors the framework's other 7-day
+# cooldown convention (see `[tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days"` in
+# the root pyproject.toml and the per-package override for `uv`):
+# every entry below names a version that was released **at least
+# 7 days ago at the time the entry was last touched**, so an upstream
+# retag / withdrawal / fix-forward has had a week to settle before
+# adopters install it.
+#
+# Adopters consume this file by:
+# 1. Reading the versions in `secure-agent-setup.md` and installing
+# them on the host (the doc has the install commands per distro).
+# 2. Running `tools/agent-isolation/check-tool-updates.sh` weekly
+# (or via `/schedule`) to surface upstream releases that have
+# themselves aged past the 7-day cooldown — those are candidates
+# for the next intentional bump.
+#
+# To bump a tool: only when the new upstream version was released at
+# least 7 days ago, AND the framework maintainer wants to upgrade.
+# Update the `version` and `released` fields together, then bump the
+# `pinned_at` field below to today.
+
+# When this file was last touched. The check script uses this as the
+# minimum age the entries below claim to satisfy.
+pinned_at = "2026-04-29"
+
+[tools.bubblewrap]
+version = "0.11.1"
+released = "2026-03-21"
+purpose = """
+Linux user-namespace sandbox. The strongest layer of credential
+isolation: enforces the `denyRead` / `allowRead` filesystem rules
+in `.claude/settings.json` for every Bash subprocess Claude Code
+spawns. Required for the `sandbox.enabled: true` setting to
+actually mean anything on Linux; macOS uses native Seatbelt
+instead and does not need bubblewrap.
+"""
+docs = "https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap";
+upstream_releases =
"https://api.github.com/repos/containers/bubblewrap/releases";
+# Install commands per distro (use the package manager's syntax for
+# requesting a specific version where supported). See
+# `secure-agent-setup.md` for adopter-facing install steps.
+install.apt = "apt-get install --no-install-recommends bubblewrap=0.11.1-*"
+install.dnf = "dnf install bubblewrap-0.11.1"
+install.brew = "# macOS does not need bubblewrap; it uses Seatbelt."
+install.from_source =
"https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/releases/tag/v0.11.1";
+
+[tools.socat]
+version = "1.8.1.1"
+released = "2026-03-13"
+purpose = """
+TCP relay used by Claude Code's sandbox network proxy to enforce
+the `sandbox.network.allowedDomains` allowlist. Without socat the
+sandboxed session has no network at all (which is sometimes a
+fine outcome). Linux only; macOS does not need it.
+"""
+docs = "http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/";
+upstream_releases = "http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/";
+install.apt = "apt-get install --no-install-recommends socat=1.8.1.1-*"
+install.dnf = "dnf install socat-1.8.1.1"
+install.from_source =
"http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/socat-1.8.1.1.tar.gz";
+
+[tools.claude-code]
+version = "2.1.117"
+released = "2026-04-22"
+purpose = """
+The agent runtime itself. Pinning matters because the
+permission-rule semantics, the sandbox flags, and the
+prompt-injection mitigations evolve between releases — a
+silent autoupdate to a release with a different default would
+change the framework's effective security posture without a
+review pass. The framework maintainer bumps this in lockstep
+with reviewing release-notes for behavioural changes that
+affect the secure setup.
+"""
+docs = "https://code.claude.com/docs/";
+upstream_releases =
"https://api.github.com/repos/anthropics/claude-code/releases";
+# Claude Code is distributed via npm; use `--no-save` so the global
+# install doesn't drift the local lockfile of any project the user
+# installs from.
+install.npm = "npm install -g --no-save @anthropic-ai/[email protected]"
+install.brew = "# brew tap anthropics/claude-code; brew install
[email protected] (when available)"
