oscerd commented on code in PR #27945:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27945#discussion_r4311319323
##########
components/camel-netty-http/src/main/java/org/apache/camel/component/netty/http/handlers/HttpServerChannelHandler.java:
##########
@@ -218,7 +218,11 @@ protected void channelRead0(ChannelHandlerContext ctx,
Object msg) throws Except
}
private String extractTarget(URI uri) {
- String target = uri.getPath();
+ // resolve any . and .. segments first, so the security constraint is
evaluated against the
+ // effective resolved resource path and not the raw request path.
Without this a request such
+ // as /foo/../admin/x (or its percent-encoded /foo/%2e%2e/admin/x
form) is matched against the
+ // inclusions in its unresolved form and can evade a constraint that
guards /admin/* (CAMEL-25705)
+ String target = removeDotSegments(uri.getPath());
Review Comment:
You're both right — resolving only the ACL target left the consumer dispatch
(`HttpServerMultiplexChannelHandler.getHandler` on the raw `request.uri()`) and
the route (`CamelHttpPath` from `getRawPath`) on the raw path, so the
constraint and the route could still disagree. It even opened a reverse case:
`/foo/admin/../public/x` resolved to the excluded `/public/x`, while the raw
form matched the `/admin/*` inclusion.
Changed direction to option (a): when a `securityConstraint` is configured,
a request whose path carries `.`/`..` segments (including the `%2e` form) is
now rejected with **HTTP 400** up front — before the route runs — so the
constraint, dispatch and the route all act on the same dot-segment-free path.
This matches Spring's `StrictHttpFirewall`, and a well-behaved client
normalizes dot-segments before sending. `extractTarget` is back to the raw
path; `removeDotSegments` is now only used to detect the segments.
_Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_
##########
components/camel-netty-http/src/main/java/org/apache/camel/component/netty/http/handlers/HttpServerChannelHandler.java:
##########
@@ -218,7 +218,11 @@ protected void channelRead0(ChannelHandlerContext ctx,
Object msg) throws Except
}
private String extractTarget(URI uri) {
- String target = uri.getPath();
+ // resolve any . and .. segments first, so the security constraint is
evaluated against the
+ // effective resolved resource path and not the raw request path.
Without this a request such
Review Comment:
You're both right — resolving only the ACL target left the consumer dispatch
(`HttpServerMultiplexChannelHandler.getHandler` on the raw `request.uri()`) and
the route (`CamelHttpPath` from `getRawPath`) on the raw path, so the
constraint and the route could still disagree. It even opened a reverse case:
`/foo/admin/../public/x` resolved to the excluded `/public/x`, while the raw
form matched the `/admin/*` inclusion.
Changed direction to option (a): when a `securityConstraint` is configured,
a request whose path carries `.`/`..` segments (including the `%2e` form) is
now rejected with **HTTP 400** up front — before the route runs — so the
constraint, dispatch and the route all act on the same dot-segment-free path.
This matches Spring's `StrictHttpFirewall`, and a well-behaved client
normalizes dot-segments before sending. `extractTarget` is back to the raw
path; `removeDotSegments` is now only used to detect the segments.
_Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_
##########
components/camel-netty-http/src/test/java/org/apache/camel/component/netty/http/NettyHttpBasicAuthConstraintDotSegmentTest.java:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+package org.apache.camel.component.netty.http;
+
+import org.apache.camel.BindToRegistry;
+import org.apache.camel.CamelExecutionException;
+import org.apache.camel.builder.RouteBuilder;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+
+import static org.apache.camel.test.junit6.TestSupport.assertIsInstanceOf;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
+
+/**
+ * A request containing . or .. segments is routed to the consumer without
resolving those segments, so the security
+ * constraint has to be evaluated against the effective resolved path.
Otherwise a request such as /foo/../admin/x (or
+ * its percent-encoded /foo/%2e%2e/admin/x form) reaches the route while
skipping the constraint that guards /admin/*.
+ */
+class NettyHttpBasicAuthConstraintDotSegmentTest extends BaseNettyTestSupport {
+
+ @Override
+ public void doPreSetup() {
+ System.setProperty("java.security.auth.login.config",
"src/test/resources/myjaas.config");
+ }
+
+ @Override
+ public void doPostTearDown() {
+ System.clearProperty("java.security.auth.login.config");
+ }
+
+ @BindToRegistry("mySecurityConfig")
+ public NettyHttpSecurityConfiguration loadSecConf() {
+ NettyHttpSecurityConfiguration security = new
NettyHttpSecurityConfiguration();
+ security.setRealm("karaf");
+ SecurityAuthenticator auth = new JAASSecurityAuthenticator();
+ auth.setName("karaf");
+ security.setSecurityAuthenticator(auth);
+
+ // a specific inclusion, not a catch-all: only /admin/* below the
endpoint path is restricted
+ SecurityConstraintMapping matcher = new SecurityConstraintMapping();
+ matcher.addInclusion("/admin/*");
+ security.setSecurityConstraint(matcher);
+
+ return security;
+ }
+
+ @Test
+ void plainPathIsChallenged() {
+ assertChallenged("netty-http:http://localhost:{{port}}/foo/admin/x";);
+ }
+
+ @Test
+ void literalDotSegmentIsChallenged() {
+ // without resolving the .. the constraint target is /../admin/x,
which matches no inclusion
+
assertChallenged("netty-http:http://localhost:{{port}}/foo/../admin/x";);
Review Comment:
Addressed. The end-to-end test now configures `/admin/*` (inclusion) +
`/public/*` (exclusion) and asserts **400** for: the leading `..`
(`/foo/../admin/x`), the encoded `/foo/%2e%2e/admin/x`, an in-context traversal
(`/foo/x/../admin/y`, which stays under `/foo`), and the reverse case
(`/foo/admin/../public/x`). It keeps two controls: a restricted path → 401 and
the excluded path → 200. So the coverage no longer relies on the out-of-context
coincidence.
_Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_
##########
components/camel-netty-http/src/test/java/org/apache/camel/component/netty/http/NettyHttpBasicAuthConstraintDotSegmentTest.java:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+package org.apache.camel.component.netty.http;
+
+import org.apache.camel.BindToRegistry;
+import org.apache.camel.CamelExecutionException;
+import org.apache.camel.builder.RouteBuilder;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+
+import static org.apache.camel.test.junit6.TestSupport.assertIsInstanceOf;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
+
+/**
+ * A request containing . or .. segments is routed to the consumer without
resolving those segments, so the security
+ * constraint has to be evaluated against the effective resolved path.
Otherwise a request such as /foo/../admin/x (or
+ * its percent-encoded /foo/%2e%2e/admin/x form) reaches the route while
skipping the constraint that guards /admin/*.
+ */
+class NettyHttpBasicAuthConstraintDotSegmentTest extends BaseNettyTestSupport {
+
+ @Override
+ public void doPreSetup() {
+ System.setProperty("java.security.auth.login.config",
"src/test/resources/myjaas.config");
+ }
+
+ @Override
+ public void doPostTearDown() {
+ System.clearProperty("java.security.auth.login.config");
+ }
+
+ @BindToRegistry("mySecurityConfig")
+ public NettyHttpSecurityConfiguration loadSecConf() {
+ NettyHttpSecurityConfiguration security = new
NettyHttpSecurityConfiguration();
+ security.setRealm("karaf");
+ SecurityAuthenticator auth = new JAASSecurityAuthenticator();
+ auth.setName("karaf");
+ security.setSecurityAuthenticator(auth);
+
+ // a specific inclusion, not a catch-all: only /admin/* below the
endpoint path is restricted
+ SecurityConstraintMapping matcher = new SecurityConstraintMapping();
+ matcher.addInclusion("/admin/*");
+ security.setSecurityConstraint(matcher);
+
+ return security;
+ }
+
+ @Test
+ void plainPathIsChallenged() {
+ assertChallenged("netty-http:http://localhost:{{port}}/foo/admin/x";);
+ }
+
+ @Test
+ void literalDotSegmentIsChallenged() {
+ // without resolving the .. the constraint target is /../admin/x,
which matches no inclusion
+
assertChallenged("netty-http:http://localhost:{{port}}/foo/../admin/x";);
Review Comment:
Addressed. The end-to-end test now configures `/admin/*` (inclusion) +
`/public/*` (exclusion) and asserts **400** for: the leading `..`
(`/foo/../admin/x`), the encoded `/foo/%2e%2e/admin/x`, an in-context traversal
(`/foo/x/../admin/y`, which stays under `/foo`), and the reverse case
(`/foo/admin/../public/x`). It keeps two controls: a restricted path → 401 and
the excluded path → 200. So the coverage no longer relies on the out-of-context
coincidence.
_Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_
##########
docs/user-manual/modules/ROOT/pages/camel-4x-upgrade-guide-4_24.adoc:
##########
@@ -523,6 +523,21 @@ registered.
To restore the previous behaviour, set `webhookSecretTokenEnabled=false`: the
webhook is then registered without a
secret token, and webhook requests are not verified.
+=== camel-netty-http - the security constraint resolves dot-segments in the
request path
+
+A `netty-http` consumer configured with a `securityConstraint` now resolves
`.` and `..` segments in the request path
+(including their percent-encoded `%2e` form) before the path is matched
against the configured inclusions and exclusions,
+following the `remove_dot_segments` algorithm of RFC 3986. The constraint is
therefore evaluated against the effective
+resolved path, which is the same resource the request is routed to. Excess
`..` segments cannot climb above the root.
Review Comment:
Fixed. The guide entry is rewritten for the new behavior — a request path
with dot-segments is rejected with 400 when a `securityConstraint` is
configured — and the "same resource the request is routed to" claim is removed,
since the route receives the raw path.
_Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_
##########
docs/user-manual/modules/ROOT/pages/camel-4x-upgrade-guide-4_24.adoc:
##########
@@ -523,6 +523,21 @@ registered.
To restore the previous behaviour, set `webhookSecretTokenEnabled=false`: the
webhook is then registered without a
secret token, and webhook requests are not verified.
+=== camel-netty-http - the security constraint resolves dot-segments in the
request path
+
+A `netty-http` consumer configured with a `securityConstraint` now resolves
`.` and `..` segments in the request path
+(including their percent-encoded `%2e` form) before the path is matched
against the configured inclusions and exclusions,
+following the `remove_dot_segments` algorithm of RFC 3986. The constraint is
therefore evaluated against the effective
+resolved path, which is the same resource the request is routed to. Excess
`..` segments cannot climb above the root.
Review Comment:
Fixed. The guide entry is rewritten for the new behavior — a request path
with dot-segments is rejected with 400 when a `securityConstraint` is
configured — and the "same resource the request is routed to" claim is removed,
since the route receives the raw path.
_Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_
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