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David Allsopp edited comment on CASSANDRA-2274 at 11/11/11 3:59 PM: -------------------------------------------------------------------- Just a thought - I don't know what the overhead is with encryption enabled, but if this is a major issue, then presumably encryption could be enabled with a cypher suite that doesn't actually _encrypt_, thus providing just data _integrity_ (MD5/SHA checksum) or even a 'null' encryption algorithm? I assume (!) that this would provide authentication via the certificates, without the encryption overhead. Listing the supported suites using SSLContext.getServerSocketFactory().getSupportedCipherSuites() includes SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 and SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA - which are suites used for integrity only (checksum). See also http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4785 was (Author: dallsopp): Just a thought - I don't know what the overhead is with encryption enabled, but if this is a major issue, then presumably encryption could be enabled with a cypher suite that doesn't actually _encrypt_, thus providing just data _integrity_ (MD5/SHA checksum) or even a 'null' encryption algorithm? I assume (!) that this would provide authentication via the certificates, without the encryption overhead. Listing the supported suites using SSLContext.getServerSocketFactory().getSupportedCipherSuites() includes SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 and SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA - which are suites used for integrity only (checksum). > Restrict Cassandra cluster node joins to a list of named hosts > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > Key: CASSANDRA-2274 > URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CASSANDRA-2274 > Project: Cassandra > Issue Type: Improvement > Components: Core > Affects Versions: 0.7.2 > Environment: All > Reporter: Andrew Schiefelbein > > Because firewalls and employees are not infallible it would be nice to > restrict the ability of any node to join a cluster to a list of named hosts > in the configuration so that someone would be unable to start a node and > replicate all the data locally. I understand that in order to do this the > person must know the seed servers and the cluster name and to extract the > data they will need a userid and password but another level of security would > be to force them to execute any brute force attack from a locked down server > instead of replicating all the data locally. -- This message is automatically generated by JIRA. If you think it was sent incorrectly, please contact your JIRA administrators: https://issues.apache.org/jira/secure/ContactAdministrators!default.jspa For more information on JIRA, see: http://www.atlassian.com/software/jira