YLChen-007 opened a new issue, #13311:
URL: https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/issues/13311

   ### Advisory Details
   
   **Title**: Apache CloudStack `ApiServlet` logs duplicate sensitive query 
parameter values in plaintext before authentication
   
   **Description**:
   
   ### Summary
   
   Apache CloudStack exposes a sensitive information disclosure issue in the 
`/client/api` request entrypoint. When a request contains duplicate query 
parameters, `com.cloud.api.ApiServlet` emits a WARN log stating that only the 
last value will be respected. For sensitive parameters such as `password`, the 
servlet formats the warning with `Arrays.toString(v)` and writes the raw values 
to the log before authentication, request verification, or command dispatch 
occurs. A remote caller can therefore cause plaintext credential material to be 
recorded in management logs even when the HTTP request itself fails with `401 
Unauthorized`.
   
   ### Details
   
   The issue is in `server/src/main/java/com/cloud/api/ApiServlet.java`. Inside 
`processRequestInContext`, CloudStack reads the servlet parameter map and 
immediately passes it to `checkSingleQueryParameterValue(reqParams)`. That 
helper logs duplicate values without masking sensitive keys.
   
   ```java
   private void checkSingleQueryParameterValue(Map<String, String[]> params) {
       params.forEach((k, v) -> {
           if (v.length > 1) {
               String message = String.format("Query parameter '%s' has 
multiple values %s. Only the last value will be respected." +
                   "It is advised to pass only a single parameter", k, 
Arrays.toString(v));
               LOGGER.warn(message);
           }
       });
   }
   ```
   
   The vulnerable control flow is:
   
   1. External caller reaches `/client/api` through Jetty.
   2. `ApiServlet.processRequestInContext(...)` calls `req.getParameterMap()`.
   3. `checkSingleQueryParameterValue(reqParams)` executes before 
`verifyRequest(...)`.
   4. `LOGGER.warn(...)` writes duplicate sensitive values in plaintext.
   5. Only after that does the request continue into UTF-8 fixup, 
authentication, and API dispatch.
   
   This is why the issue is reachable from an external network client without 
valid credentials. In the manual and automated verification environment, the 
request returned `401`, but the warning log still contained both password 
values.
   
   The servlet is the standard API front door defined in 
`client/src/main/webapp/WEB-INF/web.xml`:
   
   ```xml
   <servlet>
       <servlet-name>apiServlet</servlet-name>
       <servlet-class>com.cloud.api.ApiServlet</servlet-class>
       <load-on-startup>5</load-on-startup>
   </servlet>
   <servlet-mapping>
        <servlet-name>apiServlet</servlet-name>
        <url-pattern>/api/*</url-pattern>
   </servlet-mapping>
   ```
   
   ### PoC
   
   #### Prerequisites
   
   - A checkout of Apache CloudStack on the affected branch or release.
   - Java, Maven, and Python 3 installed locally.
   - Network access to fetch Maven dependencies.
   - The PoC uses a minimal Jetty harness because a full current-branch 
management-server E2E startup was not stable in this lab. The vulnerable code 
path itself is the real `ApiServlet` from the target project.
   
   #### Reproduction Steps
   
   1. Download the harness launcher from: 
[start_harness.sh](https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/3f72b3b782f801c962f85131131c33fc)
   2. Download the minimal servlet harness from: 
[ApiServletHarnessServer.java](https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/911719873d1971e07abaf1cd36e53878)
   3. Download the Log4j harness config from: 
[log4j2-harness.xml](https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/983e67bf057554fc92f87fc4a59c96d8)
   4. Download the automation wrapper from: 
[verification_test.py](https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/545bad01b0931a4434453e53180aaafe)
   5. Optionally download the control case from: 
[control-normal_behavior.py](https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/f1a14cba0f26748d94ad818570ec4ff4)
   6. Place the files in one working directory with 
`ApiServletHarnessServer.java` under `src/`.
   7. Start the PoC harness:
      `bash start_harness.sh --port 18085`
   8. In another terminal, send a duplicate sensitive parameter request:
      `curl -i 
'http://127.0.0.1:18085/client/api?command=listCapabilities&response=json&password=MANUAL_SECRET_ONE&password=MANUAL_SECRET_TWO'`
   9. Observe the harness console output. The request may return `401 
Unauthorized`, but the server log will contain both password values in the WARN 
line.
   10. For an automated check, run:
      `python3 verification_test.py`
   
   ### Log of Evidence
   
   Manual trigger evidence captured during verification:
   
   ```text
   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
   ...
   {"error":"stubbed after duplicate-parameter check"}
   
   WARN com.cloud.api.ApiServlet - Query parameter 'password' has multiple 
values [MANUAL_SECRET_ONE, MANUAL_SECRET_TWO]. Only the last value will be 
respected.It is advised to pass only a single parameter
   ```
   
   Automated verification evidence:
   
   ```text
   [MODE] Integration-Test
   [OBSERVED_WARNING] WARN com.cloud.api.ApiServlet - Query parameter 
'password' has multiple values [EXP_SECRET_ALPHA_8852, EXP_SECRET_BETA_8852]. 
Only the last value will be respected.It is advised to pass only a single 
parameter
   [OBSERVED_LEAK_ALPHA] True
   [OBSERVED_LEAK_BETA] True
   [CLASSIFICATION] DEFECT-CONFIRMED-WITH-LIMITATIONS
   ```
   
   Control evidence:
   
   ```text
   [MODE] Integration-Test Control
   [OBSERVED_WARNING] WARN com.cloud.api.ApiServlet - Query parameter 
'username' has multiple values [CONTROL_USER_ALPHA_8852, 
CONTROL_USER_BETA_8852]. Only the last value will be respected.It is advised to 
pass only a single parameter
   [OBSERVED_PASSWORD_SECRET] False
   [CONTROL] SUCCESS
   ```
   
   ### Impact
   
   This is an information disclosure vulnerability in the API control plane. 
Any actor who can send requests to `/client/api` can force plaintext sensitive 
values into management logs simply by repeating a sensitive parameter name. The 
immediate impact is credential leakage to anyone with access to local logs, 
centralized log collection, support bundles, or backups. Depending on the 
leaked parameter, this can expose administrator passwords, API secrets, session 
tokens, or other credentials that can later be reused against CloudStack.
   
   ### Affected products
   
   - **Ecosystem**: maven
   - **Package name**: org.apache.cloudstack:cloudstack
   - **Affected versions**: <= 4.22.1.0
   - **Patched versions**: <None>
   
   ### Severity
   
   - **Severity**: Medium
   - **Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
   
   ### Weaknesses
   
   - **CWE**: CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized 
Actor
   
   ### Occurrences
   
   | Permalink | Description |
   | :--- | :--- |
   | 
[https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/blob/348ce953a99246a756b527994f7745a7be038234/server/src/main/java/com/cloud/api/ApiServlet.java#L199-L204](https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/blob/348ce953a99246a756b527994f7745a7be038234/server/src/main/java/com/cloud/api/ApiServlet.java#L199-L204)
 | `checkSingleQueryParameterValue` formats duplicate query parameter values 
with `Arrays.toString(v)` and writes them directly with `LOGGER.warn(...)` 
without any sensitive-key masking. |
   | 
[https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/blob/348ce953a99246a756b527994f7745a7be038234/server/src/main/java/com/cloud/api/ApiServlet.java#L229-L230](https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/blob/348ce953a99246a756b527994f7745a7be038234/server/src/main/java/com/cloud/api/ApiServlet.java#L229-L230)
 | `processRequestInContext` invokes the duplicate-parameter warning path 
immediately after `req.getParameterMap()`, before authentication and request 
verification. |
   | 
[https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/blob/348ce953a99246a756b527994f7745a7be038234/client/src/main/webapp/WEB-INF/web.xml#L45-L60](https://github.com/apache/cloudstack/blob/348ce953a99246a756b527994f7745a7be038234/client/src/main/webapp/WEB-INF/web.xml#L45-L60)
 | The standard `/client/api` servlet mapping shows this vulnerable code is on 
the default external HTTP API path. |


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