jbonofre opened a new pull request, #3069: URL: https://github.com/apache/karaf/pull/3069
Follow-up to #3057 and #3063. The security model says to trust `manager` as much as `admin`, and lists a manager getting admin capabilities as hardening. But the vulnerability list also included "getting around an argument rule in the ACLs that Karaf ships, for example to change an ACL configuration without the `admin` role". Only a manager can try that example, since a viewer can't edit configurations, so the two items contradict each other. #3044 is such a case: a manager could point a new configuration's file at an ACL file or at `etc/users.properties`. A manager can already run code through the shipped ACLs, for example by installing a bundle over JMX (`install = manager` in `etc/jmx.acl.org.apache.karaf.bundle.cfg`) or by updating a bundle from a URL with `bundle:update`. Changing users or ACLs another way gives them nothing new. This PR: - **Roles and ACLs:** says that a manager can also change users and ACLs in other ways, for example by editing a configuration, not only run code. - **What we treat as a vulnerability:** an authenticated user running a command or MBean operation that the ACLs deny counts when Karaf skips the ACL check or doesn't apply a rule as written. - **What we treat as hardening:** a manager getting admin capabilities includes changing users or ACLs, and getting around an argument rule that a shipped ACL uses to reserve an operation to `admin`. The `systembundles` case stays a vulnerability. A viewer getting around a shipped argument rule is still a vulnerability, through the existing viewer item. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected]
