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The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/main by this push:
     new 3bf9ee3f65 docs: treat a manager getting around a shipped argument 
rule as hardening (#3069)
3bf9ee3f65 is described below

commit 3bf9ee3f65abf770e6248b0d6b21cbd7b21c5597
Author: JB Onofré <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Wed Nov 11 05:45:42 2026 +0000

    docs: treat a manager getting around a shipped argument rule as hardening 
(#3069)
    
    SECURITY.md says to trust a manager as much as an admin, and lists a
    manager getting admin capabilities as hardening. But the vulnerability
    list also included getting around an argument rule in a shipped ACL,
    "for example to change an ACL configuration without the admin role".
    Only a manager can try that example, since a viewer can't edit
    configurations, so the two items contradicted each other.
    
    A manager can already run code through the shipped ACLs (installing a
    bundle over JMX, or bundle:update from a URL), so changing users or ACLs
    another way gives them nothing new. List it as hardening, and limit the
    ACL vulnerability to Karaf skipping an ACL check or not applying a rule
    as written. A viewer getting around a shipped argument rule, and the
    systembundles checks, stay vulnerabilities.
---
 SECURITY.md | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 34facf13a5..0f052bd84c 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ Karaf authorizes users with their JAAS roles. The default 
roles mean:
 - `admin`: full control of Karaf. An admin can run code and operating system 
commands (for example with
   `shell:exec`), and read or write any file that the Karaf process can access.
 - `manager`: changes the runtime. A manager can manage bundles that aren't 
system bundles, and edit most
-  configurations. Karaf restricts the most direct ways to run code to `admin`, 
but a manager can still run code in
-  other ways, for example by installing or updating a bundle. Only give the 
`manager` role to users you trust as
-  much as admins.
+  configurations. Karaf restricts the most direct ways to run code or change 
users and ACLs to `admin`, but a manager
+  can still do these things in other ways, for example by installing or 
updating a bundle, or by editing a
+  configuration. Only give the `manager` role to users you trust as much as 
admins.
 - `viewer`: reads the state of Karaf, for example bundles, features, 
configurations and logs.
 - `systembundles`: needed to start, stop, update or uninstall system bundles, 
the bundles with a start level below
   `karaf.systemBundlesStartLevel` (50 by default, set in 
`etc/custom.properties`).
@@ -101,9 +101,8 @@ can add commands to the console, and the same rule applies 
to them. To restrict
 
 - A client that isn't authenticated runs a command, calls an MBean operation 
or reads data through the SSH, JMX or
   WebConsole endpoints. This includes flaws in the JAAS login modules that 
Karaf ships.
-- An authenticated user runs a command or MBean operation that the ACLs deny 
to their roles. This includes getting
-  around an argument rule in the ACLs that Karaf ships, for example to change 
an ACL configuration without the
-  `admin` role.
+- An authenticated user runs a command or MBean operation that the ACLs deny 
to their roles, because Karaf skips the
+  ACL check or doesn't apply a rule as it's written.
 - A user with only the `viewer` role (and `ssh`) installs or runs code, 
changes users, roles or ACLs, or gets the
   effect of an operation that the shipped ACLs reserve to `manager` or `admin` 
through a command or operation open
   to them. This covers the default installation (the features listed in 
`featuresBoot` in
@@ -115,8 +114,9 @@ can add commands to the console, and the same rule applies 
to them. To restrict
 
 These aren't vulnerabilities. We welcome reports and fix them as regular bugs:
 
-- A `manager` gets `admin` capabilities, such as running code, through the 
operations that `manager` is allowed to
-  use.
+- A `manager` gets `admin` capabilities through the operations that `manager` 
is allowed to use, for example running
+  code, changing users or ACLs, or getting around an argument rule that a 
shipped ACL uses to reserve an operation to
+  `admin`. The `systembundles` case above is still a vulnerability.
 - A user gets around an argument rule that you added to an ACL. An argument 
rule matches the text of each argument
   against a regular expression, and many commands accept the same resource in 
several forms (an id, a name, an alias
   or a pattern). Karaf doesn't guarantee that your rule covers all of them: 
test your rules, or use rules on the

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