Abhishekmishra2808 commented on code in PR #18902:
URL: https://github.com/apache/nuttx/pull/18902#discussion_r3283718686
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fs/inode/fs_inode.c:
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@@ -124,49 +189,48 @@ void inode_runlock(void)
* Name: inode_checkperm
*
* Description:
- * Validate that 'inode' can be opened with the access described by
- * 'oflags'. Two sequential checks are performed:
- *
- * 1. Operation-support check (all inode types, unconditional):
- * Verifies the driver exposes the read/write entry points required by
- * 'oflags'. Returns -ENXIO when ops are NULL and -EACCES when the
- * required entry point is absent. Pseudo-directory inodes
- * (INODE_IS_PSEUDODIR) are exempted from this step.
- *
- * 2. UNIX permission check (pseudo-filesystem inodes only):
- * Compares effective uid/gid against i_mode owner/group/other bits.
- * Mountpoint inodes and kernel threads are unconditionally exempted.
- * Requires CONFIG_PSEUDOFS_ATTRIBUTES and CONFIG_SCHED_USER_IDENTITY;
- * when either option is disabled this step is a no-op.
+ * Validate open access to 'inode' for 'oflags'. Checks driver operation
+ * support, then pseudo-filesystem mode bits when enabled. Mountpoints
+ * are exempt from mode checks.
*
* Input Parameters:
* inode - The inode to check
* oflags - Open flags (O_RDONLY / O_WRONLY / O_RDWR)
*
* Returned Value:
- * Zero (OK) on success. Negated errno on failure:
- * -ENXIO ops pointer is NULL
- * -EACCES required operation not supported, or permission denied
+ * Zero (OK) on success, or a negated errno on failure.
*
****************************************************************************/
int inode_checkperm(FAR struct inode *inode, int oflags)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_PSEUDOFS_ATTRIBUTES) && defined(CONFIG_SCHED_USER_IDENTITY)
- FAR struct tcb_s *rtcb;
- mode_t perm;
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
+ int amode = 0;
#endif
FAR const struct file_operations *ops;
- /* === Step 1: operation-support check === */
-
- /* Pseudo-directories carry no ops and are always accessible */
-
if (INODE_IS_PSEUDODIR(inode))
{
+#if defined(CONFIG_PSEUDOFS_ATTRIBUTES) && defined(CONFIG_SCHED_USER_IDENTITY)
+ if (INODE_IS_MOUNTPT(inode))
Review Comment:
would it make sense to keep `_inode_checkmode()` for the direct
pseudo-directory access path (`ls`/`opendir`) and use `inode_checkdirperm()`
mainly for the mutation paths (`mkdir`/`unlink`/`rename`)?
During testing, using `inode_checkdirperm()` directly for pseudo-directory
access seemed to change the behavior for mode `000` directories. :(
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