ThePassionate opened a new pull request, #21930:
URL: https://github.com/apache/nuttx/pull/21930

   ## Summary
   
   The software AES-CMAC computation through a composite cryptodev session is 
wrong for every message that carries data: the 16-byte NIST SP 800-38B / RFC 
4493 vector returns `f212d4c2154c8766de60c18c98fa0c93` instead of 
`070a16b46b4d4144f79bdd9dd04a287c`. The pre-existing `aescmac` test in 
nuttx-apps fails on its second case on unmodified master.
   
   Root cause, in `swcr_authenc()`:
   
   * A composite request without an explicit IV was assumed to carry the IV at 
the start of the source buffer, so `crd_skip` was advanced by `exf->blocksize` 
and `crd_len` was shortened by the same amount. The AES-CMAC cipher xform has 
no IV (`ivsize` 0) and a block size of 1, so a plain CMAC request got `skip = 
1, len = len - 1`.
   * The data loop then copies from `buf + i` and ignores `crd_skip` entirely, 
so the MAC is computed over the **first** `len - 1` bytes of the message 
instead of the full message.
   
   The empty-message case passes only by luck: the length becomes negative and 
the loop does not run at all.
   
   Fix: only apply the prepended-IV adjustment when the xform actually has an 
IV (`ivsize > 0`); leave skip and length untouched otherwise. One line, no 
behavior change for the xforms that do carry a prepended IV.
   
   ## Impact
   
   * `crypto/cryptosoft.c`, one line. No interface change.
   * Fixes every CMAC-via-composite-session computation of non-empty messages.
   * The GCM/GMAC/ChaCha20-Poly1305 composite paths are unchanged: they either 
use an explicit IV or have `ivsize > 0`, and the existing chachapoly test 
(explicit IV) passes unchanged.
   
   ## Testing
   
   Board sim:crypto (nuttx master 4bf334e4623). Before the fix, `aescmac` 
(nuttx-apps) stops at case 2 (the 16-byte vector) with the wrong digest above; 
after the fix all four NIST cases pass:
   
   ```
   nsh> aescmac
   aescbc test 0 ok      (0-byte message,  bb1d6929...)
   aescbc test 1 ok      (16-byte message, 070a16b4...  <- was f212d4c2...)
   aescbc test 2 ok      (20-byte message, d1d67b76...)
   aescbc test 3 ok      (64-byte message, 51f0bea7...)
   ```
   
   The wrong value is reproducible analytically: AES-CMAC over the first 15 
bytes of the 16-byte vector with the same key yields exactly `f212d4c2...`, 
confirming the one-byte truncation.
   
   Regression: aescbc, hmac (20 vectors), chacha20 and chachapoly pass 
unchanged. `tools/checkpatch.sh -c -u -m -g <base>..HEAD` passes.
   


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