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janhoy pushed a commit to branch Update-vex
in repository https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf/solr-site.git

commit c75f41bc1d45bf9704f3211cc22aaa33e47bb906
Author: Jan Høydahl <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Thu Apr 16 00:11:58 2026 +0200

    Update VEX file with false positives
---
 vex-input.json | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+)

diff --git a/vex-input.json b/vex-input.json
index 2a376ef98..3d0092fb2 100644
--- a/vex-input.json
+++ b/vex-input.json
@@ -495,5 +495,69 @@
       "state": "not_affected",
       "detail": "The only places we use json-path is for querying (via 
Calcite) and for transforming/indexing custom JSON. Since the advisory 
describes a problem that is limited to the current thread, and users that are 
allowed to query/transform/index are already trusted to cause load to some 
extent, this advisory does not appear to have impact on the way json-path is 
used in Solr."
     }
+  },
+  {
+    "ids": [
+      "CVE-2026-34480",
+      "CVE-2026-34478",
+      "CVE-2026-34477",
+      "CVE-2026-34479",
+      "CVE-2026-34481"
+    ],
+    "versions": "10.0.0",
+    "jars": [
+      "log4j-core-2.25.3.jar",
+      "log4j-1.2-api-2.25.3.jar",
+      "log4j-layout-template-json-2.25.3.jar"
+    ],
+    "analysis": {
+      "state": "not_affected",
+      "justification": "requires_configuration",
+      "detail": "All five CVEs require non-default Log4j layout or appender 
configurations that Solr does not use. CVE-2026-34480 affects XmlLayout (Solr 
uses PatternLayout). CVE-2026-34478 affects Rfc5424Layout with TCP/TLS syslog 
framing (Solr does not configure a SyslogAppender with TCP framing). 
CVE-2026-34477 is an incomplete fix for SSL hostname verification in 
SMTP/Socket/Syslog appenders — Solr does not configure these appenders with 
TLS. CVE-2026-34479 affects Log4j1XmlLayout in [...]
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "ids": [
+      "CVE-2026-33870",
+      "CVE-2026-33871"
+    ],
+    "versions": "10.0.0",
+    "jars": [
+      "netty-codec-http-4.2.6.Final.jar",
+      "netty-codec-http2-4.2.6.Final.jar"
+    ],
+    "analysis": {
+      "state": "not_affected",
+      "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path",
+      "detail": "CVE-2026-33870 is an HTTP/1.1 request smuggling vulnerability 
via malformed chunked transfer encoding extension values in Netty's server-side 
HTTP codec. CVE-2026-33871 is an HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frame flood DoS against a 
Netty HTTP/2 server. Both require Netty to be used as an HTTP server accepting 
connections from untrusted clients. In Solr, Netty is a transitive dependency 
(via ZooKeeper 3.9.x and optionally the OpenTelemetry OTLP exporter); it is 
used exclusively as a [...]
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "ids": [
+      "CVE-2025-48734"
+    ],
+    "versions": "10.0.0",
+    "jars": [
+      "commons-beanutils-1.9.4.jar"
+    ],
+    "analysis": {
+      "state": "not_affected",
+      "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path",
+      "detail": "CVE-2025-48734 allows an attacker to access the JVM 
ClassLoader (and potentially execute arbitrary code) by passing a property path 
containing 'declaredClass' to PropertyUtilsBean.getProperty() or 
getNestedProperty(). Exploitation requires an application to pass externally 
supplied property path strings to these BeanUtils methods. A search of the Solr 
codebase confirms that Solr does not call PropertyUtilsBean.getProperty(), 
BeanUtilsBean, or any Commons BeanUtils intros [...]
+    }
+  },
+  {
+    "ids": [
+      "GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq"
+    ],
+    "versions": "10.0.0",
+    "jars": [
+      "jackson-core-2.20.0.jar"
+    ],
+    "analysis": {
+      "state": "not_affected",
+      "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path",
+      "detail": "GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq is a DoS vulnerability in the 
non-blocking (async) JSON parser API of jackson-core 
(NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser), which bypasses the maxNumberLength 
constraint. Exploitation requires an application to use the async/non-blocking 
parser API (factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser()). Solr uses the standard 
synchronous Jackson parser to deserialize JSON from HTTP request bodies and 
internal data structures. Solr is built on Jetty with synchronous re [...]
+    }
   }
 ]

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