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commit 308396f69dde5af733a7a939243c1532138138d1
Author: Lukasz Lenart <[email protected]>
AuthorDate: Wed Jul 29 14:28:25 2026 +0200

    docs: add creating-security-bulletins skill and bulletin template
    
    Captures the editorial process for S2-XXX security bulletins, which has
    been implicit until now, as a companion to the existing
    triaging-security-reports skill. Triage establishes what is true; this
    covers what the published page is allowed to say.
    
    The load-bearing part is the disclosure budget. Earlier bulletins
    explained causes and mitigations in enough detail to build working
    exploits, and the project moved away from that; this writes the rule
    down and extends it past Problem to Backward compatibility and
    Workaround, which is where a carefully guarded advisory tends to leak.
    
    Also records conventions that were previously tacit:
    
    - Affected Software lists voted releases only, never a build that failed
      its test period, and never a range inferred from git tags
    - ratings match a definition on the Security Bulletins page, which is the
      only authority since the four-level naming postdates older advisories
    - workarounds are verified in source or not published, including the
      claim that none exists
    - behavioural claims are derived from the fix diff rather than its commit
      message, and the fix is confirmed merged before publication
    - who is *not* affected is stated explicitly, since scoping shrinks the
      population that has to act
    
    bulletin-template.md is the source of truth for page structure and
    carries the storage-format skeleton; the restricted wiki template becomes
    a rendered copy of it.
    
    Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
---
 .../skills/creating-security-bulletins/SKILL.md    | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++
 .../bulletin-template.md                           | 152 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 365 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.claude/skills/creating-security-bulletins/SKILL.md 
b/.claude/skills/creating-security-bulletins/SKILL.md
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+---
+name: creating-security-bulletins
+description: Use when drafting, updating, or reviewing an S2-XXX security 
bulletin on the Struts cwiki, when preparing bulletin text ahead of a CVE 
request, or when deciding how much detail about a fixed vulnerability is safe 
to publish.
+---
+
+# Creating Security Bulletins
+
+## Overview
+
+An S2-XXX bulletin exists to tell an operator **what to upgrade and why** — 
not to explain the defect. Every sentence that helps a defender must be weighed 
against how much it helps someone building an exploit.
+
+**Core principle:** every field is either traced to source you read this 
session, or a visible placeholder. Never a plausible guess.
+
+**Process authority:** [`SECURITY.md`](../../../SECURITY.md) governs 
disclosure. This skill governs *what the page says and how it is written*.
+
+**REQUIRED BACKGROUND:** the claims you put in a bulletin come from triage. 
Use `triaging-security-reports` to establish them before writing.
+
+## The Iron Rule
+
+```
+NO FIELD IN A BULLETIN WITHOUT A SOURCE YOU READ THIS SESSION,
+OR A VISIBLE PLACEHOLDER.
+```
+
+Applies to the severity rating, the affected versions, and above all the 
Workaround. "There is no workaround" is a factual claim about absence — the 
hardest kind to get right, and the most common thing to assert without checking.
+
+## Page structure
+
+Sections in order, matching the existing published bulletins:
+
+`Summary` (in an `excerpt` macro) → field table → `Problem` → `Solution` → 
`Backward compatibility` → `Workaround`
+
+Field table rows, in order:
+
+| Row | Content |
+|---|---|
+| Who should read this | Usually `All Struts 2 developers and users`; narrow 
it only when exposure is genuinely conditional |
+| Impact of vulnerability | A short impact phrase, not a paragraph — *Remote 
Code Execution*, *Denial of service*, *Disclosure of Data, Denial of Service, 
Server Side Request Forgery*. Hedging is accepted where warranted (*Possible 
Remote Code Execution vulnerability*) |
+| Maximum security rating | Low / Moderate / Important / Critical — see the 
rating scale below |
+| Recommendation | `Upgrade to Struts X.Y.Z at least`. Name **every** 
maintenance line that carries the fix (`Upgrade to Struts 6.8.0 or 7.1.1 at 
least`), and add the required action where upgrading alone is not enough (`… 
and use Action File Upload Interceptor`) |
+| Affected Software | Officially released versions only (see below); bullet 
one range per maintenance line, linking the EOL announcement for end-of-life 
ranges |
+| Reporters | Credit the reporter — they earned it, and it costs nothing. 
Include their organisation where they gave one (`Steven Seeley of Source 
Incite`); obfuscate any email (`pwntester at github dot com`) |
+| CVE Identifier | Placeholder until assigned (see below) |
+
+**Match the house voice — from the *recent* bulletins only.** Read the two or 
three most recently published ones before writing. They are far terser than a 
triage write-up: `Problem` is one to three sentences, and every affected 
feature is **linked to its page on struts.apache.org** so an operator can go 
straight to the documentation. Where a bulletin resembles an earlier one, the 
Summary says so and links it.
+
+**Do not take the older bulletins as a precedent for how much to disclose.** 
Earlier advisories explained causes and mitigations in far more detail, and 
that detail was used to build working exploits. The project deliberately 
stopped. An old bulletin naming the exact construct that triggers the flaw is 
evidence of the practice this skill exists to prevent, not licence to repeat it 
— mine them for structure and tone, never for depth.
+
+## Affected Software: released versions only
+
+**List only versions that passed a PMC release vote.** A build that was cut, 
failed its test period, and was superseded never reached users as a release — 
listing it implies an official artifact was vulnerable and drags a phantom 
version into every downstream CVE record and scanner database.
+
+Verify before writing. Do not infer the range from the tags in git: a tag 
exists for builds that were never voted through. Ask, or check the release 
announcements.
+
+**Deriving the lower bound** — one method, both bounds:
+
+1. Find when the vulnerable code entered, with `git log -S'<the vulnerable 
construct>' -- <path>`. Do not assume it arrived with the feature that made it 
reachable; a defect often predates the control that was supposed to bound it.
+2. Map that commit to the first *release* containing it.
+3. If step 2 can't be settled from what you have, write a visible placeholder 
naming what must be confirmed — never a guessed version number.
+
+## The rating scale is published — apply it, don't invent one
+
+The definitions live on **[Security 
Bulletins](https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=61758)**
 (page `61758`), and they answer one question: *how worried should I be about 
this vulnerability?*
+
+**That page is the only authority.** The four-level naming was introduced 
comparatively recently, so bulletins published before it use other wording and 
inconsistent capitalisation. Never infer the vocabulary or calibrate a rating 
from an older bulletin — match a definition on page `61758`, and take 
comparisons only from advisories published since the scale existed.
+
+| Rating | Applies when |
+|---|---|
+| **Critical** | A remote attacker can get Struts to execute arbitrary code — 
exploitable automatically, regardless of whether the developer followed the 
Security Guide |
+| **Important** | Compromise of the application's **data or availability**; 
also easy RCE that depends on the developer having mistreated user input |
+| **Moderate** | There is **significant mitigation**: the flaw does not affect 
likely configurations, or the configuration is not widely used, or the attacker 
must be authenticated |
+| **Low** | Everything else — believed **extremely hard to exploit**, or the 
exploit yields minimal consequences |
+
+Two traps in applying it:
+
+- **Low is not "narrow".** A flaw that is trivial to trigger and causes real 
damage is not Low merely because a setting gates it. Reserve Low for 
hard-to-exploit *or* minimal-consequence.
+- **The Moderate clause is "not widely used", not "opt-in".** A gate only 
mitigates if few deployments pass through it. S2-068 needed file upload enabled 
and was still rated **Important**, because file upload is ordinary. Ask how 
many real deployments the precondition actually excludes.
+- **Availability counts as Important.** Denial of service is not automatically 
a lesser class — S2-068 was disk exhaustion, rated Important. It drops to 
Moderate only where a mitigation clause genuinely applies.
+
+**Exploitation status belongs on the page, not in the rating.** The scale 
measures the flaw itself, so it has no slot for "a public reproduction already 
exists." When a defect was disclosed publicly before the fix shipped, or a 
working reproduction is already public, say so in plain words — downstream 
consumers are told by their own regulators to prioritise on real risk and 
active exploitation, not on a severity class alone. It costs nothing: the 
reproduction is already out.
+
+## CVE placeholder
+
+CVEs are requested **after** the fixed release is out and accepted. Until then 
the row carries a placeholder that cannot be mistaken for a real identifier:
+
+```
+CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (to be assigned before publication)
+```
+
+Never leave a cloned page's real CVE in place. Never invent a 
well-formed-looking number.
+
+One CVE per independently fixable issue — separate fixes get separate 
bulletins and separate CVEs, per [CNA rules 
4.1.10](https://www.cve.org/ResourcesSupport/AllResources/CNARules).
+
+## The disclosure budget
+
+**The budget covers every prose section — `Problem`, `Backward compatibility`, 
and `Workaround` alike.** `Problem` is the section authors guard; `Backward 
compatibility` is the one that leaks, because describing what changed about the 
fixed behaviour describes the defect. A note saying which inputs are handled 
differently now points straight at the code path that was rewritten. Apply the 
table below to all three sections, and write the BC note in terms of what an 
application might *obser [...]
+
+Write the shortest true description that lets an operator judge whether they 
are exposed. One to three sentences, as in the published bulletins.
+
+| Safe to publish | Never publish before the fix is out |
+|---|---|
+| Impact categories and consequence | Class, method, or field names |
+| The component in plain words, linked to its documentation | `file:line` 
references |
+| Whether a configured control fails to apply | Commit hashes, PR or Jira 
numbers |
+| That state is shared / input is unvalidated | The triggering request shape 
or payload |
+| Which released versions are affected | Reproduction steps, PoC, timing 
conditions |
+
+**Write for an operator, not a reviewer.** S2-068 describes an exploited 
disk-exhaustion bug in one sentence — *"If support for file upload is enabled, 
file leak in multipart request processing causes disk exhaustion."* That is the 
register: the feature, the failure, the consequence. Naming the class turns a 
bulletin into a starting point.
+
+## State who is *not* affected
+
+An operator's first question is "does this reach me?" Answer it on the page, 
or every reader has to assume it does.
+
+The house form is **one sentence, linked to the feature's documentation** — 
S2-067 does it in a single line:
+
+> **Note**: applications not using 
[FileUploadInterceptor](https://struts.apache.org/core-developers/file-upload-interceptor)
 are safe.
+
+or folded into the opening clause, as S2-068 does with *"If support for file 
upload is enabled, …"*. Say it whenever exposure is conditional — an optional 
plugin the application chooses to ship, a setting that must be switched on, an 
endpoint that must be mapped, or an unaffected sibling path that lets a reader 
stop reading. Add "earlier releases are not affected" when there is a clean 
prior baseline.
+
+Keep it at the level of a deployment decision ("uses the plugin", "exposes 
such an endpoint"), not a code path. Scoping *reduces* net disclosure: it 
shrinks the population that has to care, and it costs an attacker nothing they 
could not learn from the dependency list.
+
+## Fix provenance
+
+A bulletin promises a fixed release and describes post-fix behaviour as 
settled fact. Both claims rest on a specific change.
+
+**Record which commit or PR each behavioural claim rests on**, in the version 
comment or your notes — not on the page.
+
+**Confirm that change is merged into the release branch before publishing.** A 
patch under private review may be revised or dropped; a bulletin describing 
behaviour that never shipped is worse than a late bulletin. Bulletins are 
routinely drafted while the fix is still embargoed and unmerged — that is 
normal, and it is exactly why the merge state must be re-checked at publication 
time rather than at drafting time.
+
+**Derive BC notes from the fix diff, not from its commit message.** A commit 
summary that calls the behaviour unchanged can still carry an observable 
difference its author did not think worth mentioning. Read the diff.
+
+**`Backward compatibility` is also where a breaking upgrade is announced**, 
and the announcement has to be blunt. S2-067 told users the fix was *not* 
backward compatible, that they had to rewrite their actions onto a new 
mechanism, and that staying on the old one left them vulnerable. Where the fix 
is transparent, the house sentence is simply *"This change is backward 
compatible."*
+
+## Workaround: verify or say nothing
+
+Three valid outcomes, in order of preference:
+
+1. **A verified configuration or operational change.** Trace it in source and 
confirm it actually removes reachability. Give the change, not the mechanism. 
It need not be a Struts setting — S2-068 offers a sized or dedicated temp 
volume, and pointing at the relevant section of the Security Guide is a 
legitimate workaround in itself.
+2. **Upgrade only** — when you checked and found nothing.
+3. **Verified absence.** The house value is a bare `n/a` (S2-066, S2-067); 
spell it out when the reason is worth stating.
+
+Never ship a workaround you reasoned about but did not confirm. A wrong 
workaround leaves operators believing they are protected and discredits every 
other field on the page.
+
+**The tension to decide deliberately:** a workaround usually reveals which 
path is affected. That is often the right trade — it is why the bulletin exists 
— but it is a decision to make and surface, not one to make silently. Say which 
way you went and why.
+
+## Re-read the page immediately before you write to it
+
+Bulletins are drafted by more than one person, often within the same hour. 
Content you read earlier may have moved on — a backport range added, a 
placeholder resolved, a section rewritten.
+
+**Fetch the current version immediately before every write, and compare the 
returned version number against the one you read.** If it advanced, re-read, 
merge your change onto the newer content, and write that. Writing from a stale 
copy silently discards someone else's work with no warning and no conflict 
error.
+
+After writing, diff your new version against the one you meant to build on. 
The diff should show only your intended change. If it shows deletions you did 
not intend, restore from history and redo the edit on top.
+
+## Restrictions
+
+Bulletins stay restricted until the coordinated publication date.
+
+**Check restrictions before the edit and again after.** An API update should 
not disturb them, but "should not" is not verification, and an accidentally 
public pre-release bulletin is an unrecoverable disclosure.
+
+Expected on the Struts wiki: read and update limited to the author plus 
`struts-committers`.
+
+## Start from the template, never from a previous bulletin
+
+**[`bulletin-template.md`](bulletin-template.md)** — the field reference, 
per-section guidance, pre-publication checklist, and a storage-format skeleton 
ready to POST to the Confluence API. **It is the source of truth.**
+
+A rendered copy exists on the wiki as a restricted child of *Security 
Bulletins* for authors who prefer to copy a page; when the two disagree, fix 
the wiki page from the file. Whichever route you take, confirm the new page 
carries the same restrictions before typing anything into it, and give the 
`excerpt` macro a fresh `ac:macro-id` — a copied page inherits the template's, 
and two bulletins must not share one.
+
+**If you inherit a page cloned from a previous bulletin instead**, assume 
every field is inherited and wrong until you have replaced it. The residue that 
survives a careless edit:
+
+- The previous bulletin's real CVE identifier
+- Its affected versions, rating, and reporter credit
+- Its workaround — describing a mitigation for an unrelated defect
+- The `excerpt` macro's `ac:macro-id`, now **duplicated across two pages** — 
generate a fresh UUID
+
+Read the whole page and rewrite it; do not patch the fields you happen to 
notice.
+
+## Red Flags — STOP
+
+- About to write a Workaround you have not traced in source
+- About to write "no workaround exists" without having looked
+- Affected Software copied from a git tag list rather than confirmed releases
+- A CVE number on the page that you did not receive from the CVE assignment 
process
+- Naming a class, method, or file in `Problem` "because it's already public in 
the PR"
+- Copying the disclosure depth of an older bulletin — that depth is the reason 
this budget exists
+- Calibrating a rating against a bulletin published before the four-level 
scale existed
+- Guarding `Problem` carefully and then describing the fix's internals in 
`Backward compatibility`
+- Writing a BC note from the fix's commit message without reading the diff
+- Publishing while the fix is still unmerged, or without re-checking that it 
landed
+- No statement of who is *not* affected, when exposure depends on a plugin or 
an opt-in setting
+- Writing a page from content you read earlier in the session without 
re-fetching it first
+- Publishing without re-checking restrictions
+- A severity rating chosen by feel, or by reachability alone, without checking 
it against the published scale
+- Rating something Low because the feature is opt-in — opt-in is the 
definition of Moderate
+
+## Common Mistakes
+
+| Mistake | Reality |
+|---|---|
+| "The PR is public, so detail costs nothing" | A bulletin is indexed, 
permanent, and read by people who never see the PR. Aggregation is the harm. |
+| "An older bulletin explained the cause in detail" | Those explanations were 
used to build exploits. The practice was stopped deliberately — don't restore 
it. |
+| "An older bulletin rated something like this X" | The rating scale postdates 
it. Match a definition on page 61758 instead. |
+| "Listing the failed build is more honest" | It is less accurate. That build 
was never a release; listing it misdirects every downstream consumer. |
+| "Disabling the feature is an obvious workaround" | Obvious ≠ verified. 
Confirm the feature is genuinely on the only reachable path. |
+| "The rating is roughly right" | Ratings drive upgrade urgency. Read the 
published definitions and match one, don't approximate. |
+| "It needs an opt-in feature, so it's Low" | That is the Moderate mitigation 
clause. Low means hard to exploit or minimal consequence. |
+| "Restrictions were set when the page was created" | Verify after every edit. 
The cost of being wrong once is total. |
+| "I'll fill in the CVE later" | Only if the placeholder is unmistakable. A 
blank or a stale number ships as fact. |
+| "The BC note is just a compatibility courtesy" | It describes what the fix 
changed, which describes the defect. Same budget as `Problem`. |
+| "The commit message says behaviour is unchanged" | Commit summaries 
understate. Read the diff and decide for yourself. |
+| "Naming the plugin narrows it for an attacker too" | They can read your 
dependency list. Scoping spares every operator who isn't exposed. |
+| "The patch is reviewed, so the release will contain it" | Reviewed is not 
merged. Re-check at publication, not at drafting. |
+| "Copying the last bulletin is quicker than the template" | It is how another 
advisory's CVE ships on your page. Copy the template. |
+| "I read the page a few minutes ago" | Someone else may have written to it 
since. Re-fetch, then write. There is no conflict warning. |
diff --git a/.claude/skills/creating-security-bulletins/bulletin-template.md 
b/.claude/skills/creating-security-bulletins/bulletin-template.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..abb1efde5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.claude/skills/creating-security-bulletins/bulletin-template.md
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# Security Bulletin Template
+
+The canonical skeleton and per-field guidance for an S2-XXX security bulletin.
+Companion to [`SKILL.md`](SKILL.md), which covers *how* to establish the facts 
that
+go in these fields; this file covers *what the page contains*.
+
+A rendered copy lives on the Struts wiki as a restricted child of
+[Security 
Bulletins](https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=61758)
+for authors who prefer to copy a page. **This file is the source of truth** — 
when the
+two disagree, fix the wiki page from here.
+
+**Draft bulletins stay restricted** (read and update limited to the author plus
+`struts-committers`) until the coordinated publication date. Check 
restrictions before
+an edit and again after it: an accidentally public pre-release bulletin is an
+unrecoverable disclosure.
+
+## Fields
+
+| Row | What goes in it |
+|---|---|
+| Who should read this | Usually `All Struts 2 developers and users`. Narrow 
it only when exposure is genuinely conditional. |
+| Impact of vulnerability | A short impact phrase, not a paragraph — `Remote 
Code Execution`, `Denial of service`. Hedge where warranted (`Possible Remote 
Code Execution vulnerability`). |
+| Maximum security rating | `Low` / `Moderate` / `Important` / `Critical`, 
matching a definition on the [Security 
Bulletins](https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=61758)
 page. That page is the only authority — the four-level naming postdates many 
older bulletins, so never calibrate against one. |
+| Recommendation | `Upgrade to Struts X.Y.Z at least`. Name **every** 
maintenance line carrying the fix, and add the required action where upgrading 
alone is not enough. |
+| Affected Software | Officially released versions only. One bullet per 
maintenance line; link the EOL announcement for end-of-life ranges. |
+| Reporters | Credit the reporter. Include their organisation where they gave 
one; obfuscate any email address. |
+| CVE Identifier | `CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (to be assigned before publication)` until 
the real identifier arrives. One CVE per independently fixable issue. |
+
+### Affected Software
+
+List only versions that passed a PMC release vote. A build that was cut, 
failed its
+test period and was superseded never reached users — listing it implies an 
official
+artifact was vulnerable and drags a phantom version into every downstream CVE 
record
+and scanner database. Do not read the range off git tags; tags exist for 
builds that
+were never voted through.
+
+To find the lower bound: locate when the vulnerable construct entered with
+`git log -S`, then map that commit to the first release containing it. A 
defect often
+predates the control that was supposed to bound it, so do not assume it 
arrived with
+the feature that made it reachable. If the mapping cannot be settled, write a 
visible
+placeholder naming what must be confirmed — never a guessed version number.
+
+## Problem
+
+One to three sentences. Write for an operator, not a reviewer: the feature, the
+failure, the consequence.
+
+| Safe to publish | Never publish before the fix is out |
+|---|---|
+| Impact categories and consequence | Class, method, or field names |
+| The component in plain words, linked to its documentation | `file:line` 
references |
+| Whether a configured control fails to apply | Commit hashes, PR or Jira 
numbers |
+| That state is shared / input is unvalidated | The triggering request shape 
or payload |
+| Which released versions are affected | Reproduction steps, PoC, timing 
conditions |
+
+Older bulletins explained causes and mitigations in far more detail, and that 
detail
+was used to build working exploits. The project deliberately stopped. **Mine 
the
+archive for structure and tone, never for depth.**
+
+**Then say who is not affected.** An operator's first question is "does this 
reach
+me?" — answer it, or every reader must assume it does. One sentence, linked to 
the
+feature's documentation, either as a trailing note or folded into the opening 
clause.
+Name the optional plugin, the setting that must be switched on, the endpoint 
that must
+be mapped, or the unaffected sibling path. Add "earlier releases are not 
affected"
+where there is a clean prior baseline.
+
+Keep it at the level of a deployment decision, not a code path. Scoping 
*reduces* net
+disclosure: it shrinks the population that has to care, and costs an attacker 
nothing
+they could not read off a dependency list.
+
+## Solution
+
+`Upgrade to Struts X.Y.Z at least.` Repeat for each maintenance line, and link 
the
+migration guide where the fix requires one.
+
+## Backward compatibility
+
+**Subject to the same disclosure budget as Problem.** This is the section that 
leaks:
+describing what changed about the fixed behaviour describes the defect. Write 
it in
+terms of what an application might *observe*, never what the fix altered 
internally,
+and derive it from the fix diff rather than the commit message — a summary 
calling the
+behaviour unchanged can still carry an observable difference.
+
+It is also where a **breaking** upgrade is announced, and that announcement 
has to be
+blunt: what must be rewritten, and what staying put costs. Where the fix is
+transparent, the house sentence is simply `This change is backward compatible.`
+
+## Workaround
+
+Three valid outcomes, in order of preference:
+
+1. **A verified configuration or operational change** — traced in source and 
confirmed
+   to remove reachability. Give the change, not the mechanism. It need not be 
a Struts
+   setting; container and reverse-proxy limits count, as does pointing at the 
relevant
+   section of the Security Guide.
+2. **Upgrade only**, when you checked and found nothing.
+3. **Verified absence.** The house value is a bare `n/a`; spell it out when 
the reason
+   is worth stating.
+
+Never ship a workaround you reasoned about but did not confirm — it leaves 
operators
+believing they are protected and discredits every other field on the page. "No
+workaround exists" is a claim about absence and needs checking too.
+
+A workaround usually reveals which path is affected. That is often the right 
trade,
+but make it deliberately and record which way you went.
+
+## Before publishing
+
+- [ ] Every placeholder is replaced, and no guidance text survives on the page.
+- [ ] The CVE identifier is real, not the placeholder.
+- [ ] Affected Software lists voted releases only, and covers every 
maintenance line.
+- [ ] The rating matches a published definition rather than an approximation.
+- [ ] The workaround was verified in source, or its absence was.
+- [ ] Problem, Backward compatibility and Workaround name no class, file, 
commit, PR
+      or payload.
+- [ ] The fix is **merged** into the release branch — reviewed is not merged; 
re-check
+      now, not at drafting time.
+- [ ] The fixed release is out and accepted.
+- [ ] Restrictions are lifted only at the coordinated publication moment.
+
+## Storage-format skeleton
+
+Ready to POST to the Confluence API. Give the `excerpt` macro a **fresh**
+`ac:macro-id` each time — two bulletins must not share one.
+
+```xml
+<h2>Summary</h2>
+<ac:structured-macro ac:name="excerpt" ac:schema-version="1">
+  <ac:parameter ac:name="atlassian-macro-output-type">BLOCK</ac:parameter>
+  <ac:rich-text-body><p>ONE-LINE DESCRIPTION OF THE 
DEFECT</p></ac:rich-text-body>
+</ac:structured-macro>
+<p class="auto-cursor-target"><br/></p>
+<table class="wrapped"><colgroup><col/><col/></colgroup><tbody>
+  <tr><th><p>Who should read this</p></th><td><p>All Struts 2 developers and 
users</p></td></tr>
+  <tr><th><p>Impact of vulnerability</p></th><td><p>IMPACT PHRASE</p></td></tr>
+  <tr><th><p>Maximum security rating</p></th><td><p>Low | Moderate | Important 
| Critical</p></td></tr>
+  <tr><th><p>Recommendation</p></th><td><p>Upgrade to Struts X.Y.Z at 
least</p></td></tr>
+  <tr><th><p>Affected Software</p></th><td><ul style="list-style-type: 
square;">
+    <li>Struts A.B.C through Struts D.E.F</li></ul></td></tr>
+  <tr><th><p>Reporters</p></th><td><p>REPORTER</p></td></tr>
+  <tr><th><p>CVE Identifier</p></th><td><p>CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (to be assigned 
before publication)</p></td></tr>
+</tbody></table>
+<h2>Problem</h2>
+<p>WHAT THE DEFECT ALLOWS, IN OPERATOR TERMS.</p>
+<p>WHO IS NOT AFFECTED, AND WHY.</p>
+<h2>Solution</h2>
+<p>Upgrade to Struts X.Y.Z at least.</p>
+<h2>Backward compatibility</h2>
+<p>This change is backward compatible.</p>
+<h2>Workaround</h2>
+<p>WORKAROUND, OR A STATEMENT THAT NONE EXISTS.</p>
+```

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