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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13455162#comment-13455162
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Xianqing Yu commented on HADOOP-8803:
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Hi Todd,

Byte-range access control is mainly used for minimized the attacker's damage if 
one tasktracker is compromised. So if one user use DFSClient to read his or her 
file, that would be no different from current way. Byte-range access control 
would be used when tasktracker or task try to access HDFS. For instance, when 
JobClient do FileSplit, it would know that those bytes in HDFS should be used 
as input for this task, then it should make sure later this task process can 
only access those bytes. The similar story for tasktracker. So the goal is that 
minimized the hacker can get once the hacker compromise one machine.

Compatibility is a issue, but I minimized that by only use byte-level access 
control when it is necessary. Currently it is only used by task to access input 
file, and tasktracker to read job file, job configuration file, and Delegation 
Token. BTW, in my design, each task would use different HDFS Delegation Token, 
even for one job. So by stealing one Delegation Token, hacker can only read the 
input data which one task needed.
                
> Make Hadoop running more secure public cloud envrionment
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: HADOOP-8803
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803
>             Project: Hadoop Common
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: fs, ipc, security
>    Affects Versions: 0.20.204.0
>            Reporter: Xianqing Yu
>              Labels: hadoop
>   Original Estimate: 2m
>  Remaining Estimate: 2m
>
> I am a Ph.D student in North Carolina State University. I am modifying the 
> Hadoop's code (which including most parts of Hadoop, e.g. JobTracker, 
> TaskTracker, NameNode, DataNode) to achieve better security.
>  
> My major goal is that make Hadoop running more secure in the Cloud 
> environment, especially for public Cloud environment. In order to achieve 
> that, I redesign the currently security mechanism and achieve following 
> proprieties:
> 1. Bring byte-level access control to Hadoop HDFS. Based on 0.20.204, HDFS 
> access control is based on user or block granularity, e.g. HDFS Delegation 
> Token only check if the file can be accessed by certain user or not, Block 
> Token only proof which block or blocks can be accessed. I make Hadoop can do 
> byte-granularity access control, each access party, user or task process can 
> only access the bytes she or he least needed.
> 2. I assume that in the public Cloud environment, only Namenode, secondary 
> Namenode, JobTracker can be trusted. A large number of Datanode and 
> TaskTracker may be compromised due to some of them may be running under less 
> secure environment. So I re-design the secure mechanism to make the damage 
> the hacker can do to be minimized.
>  
> a. Re-design the Block Access Token to solve wildly shared-key problem of 
> HDFS. In original Block Access Token design, all HDFS (Namenode and Datanode) 
> share one master key to generate Block Access Token, if one DataNode is 
> compromised by hacker, the hacker can get the key and generate any  Block 
> Access Token he or she want.
>  
> b. Re-design the HDFS Delegation Token to do fine-grain access control for 
> TaskTracker and Map-Reduce Task process on HDFS. 
>  
> In the Hadoop 0.20.204, all TaskTrackers can use their kerberos credentials 
> to access any files for MapReduce on HDFS. So they have the same privilege as 
> JobTracker to do read or write tokens, copy job file, etc.. However, if one 
> of them is compromised, every critical thing in MapReduce directory (job 
> file, Delegation Token) is exposed to attacker. I solve the problem by making 
> JobTracker to decide which TaskTracker can access which file in MapReduce 
> Directory on HDFS.
>  
> For Task process, once it get HDFS Delegation Token, it can access everything 
> belong to this job or user on HDFS. By my design, it can only access the 
> bytes it needed from HDFS.
>  
> There are some other improvement in the security, such as TaskTracker can not 
> know some information like blockID from the Block Token (because it is 
> encrypted by my way), and HDFS can set up secure channel to send data as a 
> option.
>  
> By those features, Hadoop can run much securely under uncertain environment 
> such as Public Cloud. I already start to test my prototype. I want to know 
> that whether community is interesting about my work? Is that a value work to 
> contribute to production Hadoop?

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