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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13457534#comment-13457534
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Xianqing Yu commented on HADOOP-8803:
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Hi Luke,
Thank you for your comment.
To your first, fourth and fifth comments. My security assumption is that one or
some of tasktracker or datanode machines may be compromised by hacker. If HDFS
only use one key for all HDFS, even the block tokens are ephemeral and the key
only be used for a few minutes, as long as the hacker can get root privilege,
she or he always can get the new key from the namenode and generate arbitrary
Block Token to access other datanodes, in the end, the whole HDFS is exposed to
attacker. The reason datanode have to use unique key is that limiting the
hacker capabilities when she or he compromised one datanode. Using TLS is a
good way to provide network security. However, you have to assume that all
machines are secure or all machine are running under isolated network
environment no matter how many clusters are working together. Otherwise,
compromised of one machine almost means whole HDFS can be exposed to hacker
immediately. For HDFS, once its scale gets bigger and bigger, I feel it is
necessary to create certain level of isolation (without sacrifice too much
performance of course). Unique key for each datanode is first step for that.
But we have to find the best way to lower the overhead.
To your second comment, I am working on that test now. Would add more comments
when I am done.
To your Third comment, thanks for mentioning that, NameNode has to generate
token for each replica and that indeed degrade the performance. Another
possible way is that let Namenode to choose replica for the client, but
NameNode have to perform ChooseDatanode code. I can test how much of this
overhead and also check which way has lower overhead. (I am not sure how much
overhead it would introduce, will that impact performance once scale of cluster
get larger)
> Make Hadoop running more secure public cloud envrionment
> --------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HADOOP-8803
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-8803
> Project: Hadoop Common
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: fs, ipc, security
> Affects Versions: 0.20.204.0
> Reporter: Xianqing Yu
> Labels: hadoop
> Original Estimate: 2m
> Remaining Estimate: 2m
>
> I am a Ph.D student in North Carolina State University. I am modifying the
> Hadoop's code (which including most parts of Hadoop, e.g. JobTracker,
> TaskTracker, NameNode, DataNode) to achieve better security.
>
> My major goal is that make Hadoop running more secure in the Cloud
> environment, especially for public Cloud environment. In order to achieve
> that, I redesign the currently security mechanism and achieve following
> proprieties:
> 1. Bring byte-level access control to Hadoop HDFS. Based on 0.20.204, HDFS
> access control is based on user or block granularity, e.g. HDFS Delegation
> Token only check if the file can be accessed by certain user or not, Block
> Token only proof which block or blocks can be accessed. I make Hadoop can do
> byte-granularity access control, each access party, user or task process can
> only access the bytes she or he least needed.
> 2. I assume that in the public Cloud environment, only Namenode, secondary
> Namenode, JobTracker can be trusted. A large number of Datanode and
> TaskTracker may be compromised due to some of them may be running under less
> secure environment. So I re-design the secure mechanism to make the damage
> the hacker can do to be minimized.
>
> a. Re-design the Block Access Token to solve wildly shared-key problem of
> HDFS. In original Block Access Token design, all HDFS (Namenode and Datanode)
> share one master key to generate Block Access Token, if one DataNode is
> compromised by hacker, the hacker can get the key and generate any Block
> Access Token he or she want.
>
> b. Re-design the HDFS Delegation Token to do fine-grain access control for
> TaskTracker and Map-Reduce Task process on HDFS.
>
> In the Hadoop 0.20.204, all TaskTrackers can use their kerberos credentials
> to access any files for MapReduce on HDFS. So they have the same privilege as
> JobTracker to do read or write tokens, copy job file, etc.. However, if one
> of them is compromised, every critical thing in MapReduce directory (job
> file, Delegation Token) is exposed to attacker. I solve the problem by making
> JobTracker to decide which TaskTracker can access which file in MapReduce
> Directory on HDFS.
>
> For Task process, once it get HDFS Delegation Token, it can access everything
> belong to this job or user on HDFS. By my design, it can only access the
> bytes it needed from HDFS.
>
> There are some other improvement in the security, such as TaskTracker can not
> know some information like blockID from the Block Token (because it is
> encrypted by my way), and HDFS can set up secure channel to send data as a
> option.
>
> By those features, Hadoop can run much securely under uncertain environment
> such as Public Cloud. I already start to test my prototype. I want to know
> that whether community is interesting about my work? Is that a value work to
> contribute to production Hadoop?
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