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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-10150?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13970602#comment-13970602
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Steve Loughran commented on HADOOP-10150:
-----------------------------------------

I like the document on attack vectors, including that on hardware and 
networking.

If we're going down to that level, there's one more layer to consider: 
virtualized hadoop clusters.

# even don't swap Memory could be swapped out by the host OS
# pagefile secrets could be preserved after VM destruction
# disks may not be wiped

Fixes
# Don't give a transient cluster access to keys needed to decrypt persistent 
data other than that needed by specific jobs
# explore with your virtualization/cloud service provider what their VM and 
virtual disk security policies are: when do the virtual disks get wiped, and 
how rigorously.

Other things to worry about
# malicious DNs joining the cluster. Again, it's hard to block this in a cloud, 
as hostnames aren't known in advance (so you cant have them on the included 
host list). Fix: Use a VPN and not any datacentre-wide network.
# fundamental security holes in core dependency libraries (OS  & JVM layer). 
Keep your machines up to date, have mechanisms for renewing anbd revoking 
certificates,...

> Hadoop cryptographic file system
> --------------------------------
>
>                 Key: HADOOP-10150
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-10150
>             Project: Hadoop Common
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>          Components: security
>    Affects Versions: 3.0.0
>            Reporter: Yi Liu
>            Assignee: Yi Liu
>              Labels: rhino
>             Fix For: 3.0.0
>
>         Attachments: CryptographicFileSystem.patch, HADOOP cryptographic file 
> system-V2.docx, HADOOP cryptographic file system.pdf, 
> HDFSDataAtRestEncryptionAlternatives.pdf, 
> HDFSDataatRestEncryptionAttackVectors.pdf, 
> HDFSDataatRestEncryptionProposal.pdf, cfs.patch, extended information based 
> on INode feature.patch
>
>
> There is an increasing need for securing data when Hadoop customers use 
> various upper layer applications, such as Map-Reduce, Hive, Pig, HBase and so 
> on.
> HADOOP CFS (HADOOP Cryptographic File System) is used to secure data, based 
> on HADOOP “FilterFileSystem” decorating DFS or other file systems, and 
> transparent to upper layer applications. It’s configurable, scalable and fast.
> High level requirements:
> 1.    Transparent to and no modification required for upper layer 
> applications.
> 2.    “Seek”, “PositionedReadable” are supported for input stream of CFS if 
> the wrapped file system supports them.
> 3.    Very high performance for encryption and decryption, they will not 
> become bottleneck.
> 4.    Can decorate HDFS and all other file systems in Hadoop, and will not 
> modify existing structure of file system, such as namenode and datanode 
> structure if the wrapped file system is HDFS.
> 5.    Admin can configure encryption policies, such as which directory will 
> be encrypted.
> 6.    A robust key management framework.
> 7.    Support Pread and append operations if the wrapped file system supports 
> them.



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