It seems to me that a candidate's legal interest is in having the election called for by state law. State election governs the criteria for getting on the ballot and the timing of the election. If a candidate complies with those criteria, she has a legally protected interest in being on the ballot and having the election go forward as scheduled, no? There may be a dispute about the proper application of that state law, and there may be a dispute about whether federal law preempts that state law (as there is in CA right now), but those are precisely the questions to be decided in the course of the litigation. Put slightly differently, it seems to me that the question whether the scheduled election is "duly constituted" is one to be decided _after_ hearing from the plaintiffs, the secretary of state, and the candidates.
Suppose, for example, that the county clerk in Los Angeles County decided to postpone the election in that county because he couldn't get as many poll workers as he wanted. Wouldn't a candidate have a legally protected interest, based in state election law, to contest that decision in court? I don't know whether the candidate would win on the merits (although I would guess in those circumstances that she would, cf. the postponement of the NY primary on 9/11), but wouldn't she have a legally protected interest that would entitle her to litigate those merits? Why wouldn't that interest be enough to support Rule 19 status? And why shouldn't the court hear from the candidates before postponing an election? Taking it from a different perspective, suppose one of the candidates went into CA state court today seeking an injunction, based on state law, compelling the secretary of state to go forward on October 7. Under Martin v. Wilks, the Ninth Circuit's judgment would not bind the candidate. As a result, if the state court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit panel, it court could issue a competing injunction, right? Doesn't it make more sense to have Rule 19 block this possibility by requiring the candidates to be parties to the first action? Ed Hartnett Seton Hall ________________ But, what is the "interest" of the candidate? In a "generalized" holding of an election, or in the participation of a duly constituted election? I think the latter, and if so, it seems to me that the interest will not be impaired if the holding of an election is enjoined. Clearly, enjoining participation by a particular party raises a different set of issues; and even here, I'm doubtful that excepting the party whose participation is enjoined, other participants will be viewed as necessary parties to the action. M. O. C.
