Is there any interest in developing an explicit API for Serialization?:

  1. Use a public constructor signature with a single argument,
     ReadSerialParameters (read only, writable only by the
     serialization framework) to recreate objects, subclasses (when
     permitted) call this first from their own constructor, they have
     an identical constructor signature.  ReadSerialParameters that are
     null may contain a circular reference and will be available after
     construction, see #3 below.
  2. Use a factory method (defined by an interface) with one parameter,
     WriteSerialParameters (write only, readable only by the
     serialization framework), this method can be overridden by
     subclasses (when permitted)
  3. For circular links, a public method (defined by an interface) that
     accepts one argument, ReadSerialParameters, this method is called
     after the constructor completes, subclasses overriding this should
     call the superclass method.  If this method is not called, an
     implementation, if known to possibly contain circular links,
     should check it has been fully initialized in each object method
     called.
  4. Retains compatibility with current serialization stream format.
  5. Each serial field has a name, calling class and object reference,
     similar to explicitly declaring "private static final
     ObjectStreamField[] serialPersistentFields ".

Benefits:

  1. An object's internal form is not publicised.
  2. Each class in an object's heirarchy can use a static method to
     check invarients and throw an exception, prior to
     java.lang.Object's constructor being called, preventing
     construction and avoiding finalizer attacks.
  3. Final field friendly.
  4. Compatible with existing serial form.
  5. Flexible serial form evolution.
  6. All methods are public and explicitly defined.
  7. All class ProtectionDomain's exist in the current execution
     context, allowing an object to throw a SecurityException before
     construction.
  8. Less susceptible to deserialization attacks.

Problems:

  1. Implementations cannot be package private or private.  Implicit
     serialization publicises internal form, any thoughts?

Recommendations:

  1. Create a security check in the serialization framework for
     implicit serialization, allowing administrators to reduce their
     deserialization attack surface.
  2. For improved security, disallow classes implementing explicit
     serialization from having static state and static initializer
     blocks, only allow static methods, this would require complier and
     verifier changes.
  3. Alternative to #2, allow final static fields, but don't allow
     static initializer blocks or mutable static fields, similar to
     interfaces.

Penny for your thoughts?

Regards,

Peter Firmstone.

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