It sounds to me like  we need additional means to protect the file
permission without canocialization. I am looking forward to seeing the new
proposal with appropriate solution for problem Peter raised.

Thanks a lot!

2015-02-09 14:50 GMT+08:00 Wang Weijun <weijun.w...@oracle.com>:

>
> > On Feb 9, 2015, at 14:42, Peter Levart <peter.lev...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Max,
> >
> > Of course you are aware that by trusting the symlinks, you potentially
> give much more permission than you would hope to. Suppose that some code
> has permission to read and write into a particular directory (for temporary
> files). With this permission the code can actually read and/or write any
> file in the filesystem that OS grants access to the java process. Merely by
> creating a symlink in the read/write-able directory and accessing the file
> through it. That's why Apache HTTP Server by default disables
> "FollowSymLinks" option.
>
> Yes, we will be careful.
>
> In Java, a LinkPermission is needed to create a link. Of course, there
> might be other (existing) symlinks created by other non-Java processes. We
> will evaluate this possibility.
>
> Thanks
> Max
>
>

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