True, but quality security is about planning for the theoretical and not
just closing the barn door after the animals have left already.
I am sure there are quite a lot of things that the public doesn't know
about, kept secret by the shady people and organizations of the world
On 11/13/2016 06:26 PM, Nico Huber wrote:
On 14.11.2016 00:06, [email protected] wrote:
Shouldn't we be using sha256 or sha512? I am not a crypto expert but
AFIAK couldn't sha1 collisions could be easily generated with the type
of resources available to someone who would want to attack coreboot?
AFAIK, there is no known attack on SHA-1 yet that could break security
in this scenario (the attacker wouldn't only have to find any collision
but a collision for a given hash which takes a power of 2 in time).
Anyway, there is a patch on review, that makes use of SHA-384 and should
make the checksum generation trustworthy:
https://review.coreboot.org/#/c/15170/
On 11/06/2016 07:15 PM, Iru Cai wrote:
buildgcc can verify the SHA1 sum of the tarballs, and the checksum is
cloned from the git repository via HTTPS or SSH, so I think we don't need
to worry.
Alas, the current checksum is only verified for already downloaded
files.
Nico
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