Thanks Julius. Yes I was referring to Coreboot versions. I have cited 
you in the link below so that the Heads community can build upon your 
feedback.

https://github.com/osresearch/heads/pull/709#issuecomment-707101935

Thanks Tim also for your help.

Kind regards,
Thomas

On 10/12/20 9:14 PM, Julius Werner wrote:
>> Actually the behaviour you described in the 'third combination' I've been 
>> able to achieve by having a tiny RO_SECTION and a large RW_A and excluding 
>> the payload from being written to the RO_SECTION. It just felt a bit like 
>> cheating but I may invest more time into it to see if its usable.
> 
> Well yeah, you can leave out the payload and that may be the biggest
> part for you. But technically you could also leave out romstage and
> ramstage in that situation, and the build system currently doesn't yet
> offer an option to allow that.
> 
>> Ultimately the goal (at this time) is to have measured boot by expanding 
>> hashs into PCR's which can be verified by the end user using TOTP.
> 
> Note that measured boot is independent from verified boot. The main
> point of verified boot is to allow keeping a part of the flash
> writable so it can be updated but is still cryptographically verified.
> If you don't care about that, you can just write-protect your whole
> flash and only enable CONFIG_TPM_MEASURED_BOOT. (Or, you know, not
> write-protect anything, but then both measured and verified boot
> become somewhat pointless because your trust anchor is not secure.)
> 
>> Another question if I may, does the behaviour you described apply to 4.12 
>> also? I ask as there are a lot of boards that have a vboot-ro.fmd. Would 
>> these also fail for the reasons you have described or is there better 
>> support for this in 4.12 opposed to 4.11?
> 
> Are you talking about coreboot versions? Sorry, I don't follow the
> tags we cut super closely. The behavior I described has been pretty
> much unchanged since 2018, I think (so long before 4.12 or 4.11).
> 
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