Chairs, Per the earlier message on the individual -02 version, the draft now provides discussion and rationale of available tag lengths referencing John's paper for details. I think with these addressed the -02 version is ready for an adoption call. Thank you, Brian S.
On Tue, Apr 7, 2026 at 2:04 PM Michael Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > Thanks all for the reviews to date. The chairs would like the tag length > issue to be resolved one way or the other before we start a call for > adoption. Please tend to that and let the working group know the > resolution. > > > > Thanks, > > -- Mike & Ivo (writing as COSE chairs) > > > > *From:* Brian Sipos <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 31, 2026 5:41 AM > *To:* John Mattsson <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Russ Housley <[email protected]>; [email protected] > *Subject:* [COSE] Re: New Version Notification for > draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt > > > > John, > > The phrasing of the abstract with all of the expanded abbreviations can be > cleaned up to avoid confusion, I understand the misreading here. > > > > About the reuse and effective tag lengths, this is very valuable to know. > My use definitely involves key reuse similar to Russ' reference to IPsec. > Given fixed AES block size and that analysis it seems like that would > justify a 96-bit truncated tag both for parity with IPsec use and to allow > a more controlled, smaller q factor. > > > > Regarding your comment about "E_k(0^128) is not special" I don't > understand what is meant in terms of what would actually go into a specific > consideration. Could you propose some RFC-compatible text that you feel > would capture the consideration? > > > > For the other feedback, I have proposed updates [1]. If you can confirm > that these address your feedback that would be helpful. > > > > Thanks, > > Brian S. > > > > [1] > https://author-tools.ietf.org/diff?doc_1=draft-sipos-cose-cmac&url_2=https://briansipos.github.io/cose-cmac/draft-sipos-cose-cmac.txt&raw=1 > > > > On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 2:53 AM John Mattsson <[email protected]> > wrote: > > draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01: > > >This document registers code points for using the Advanced Encryption > Standard (AES) block cipher in Cipher-based Message Authentication Code > (CMAC) mode within CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) messages. > > > > Can a MAC algorithm really be used in these structures? RFC 9052 seems > quite clear: "MAC algorithms are used in the COSE_Mac and COSE_Mac0 > structures.". > > > > --- > > > > Russ Housley wrote: > > >Why do you think 64 bit authentication tags are desirable? I would be > much more comfortable with 96 bits. > > > > We should probably try to limit the number of options. The security > properties of CMAC/CBC-MAC/HMAC depends very much on if the key is reused > or not and if the tag is truncated or not. If you use a fresh key for each > MAC, CMAC is great. If you reuse the key, untruncated CMAC gives a false > sense of security and waste a lot of bytes. The narrow block size of AES is > a problem and severely limits the security of AES-CMAC in these scenarios. > > > > --- > > > > Regardless of the tag length, if key reuse is permitted, the security > properties under repeated use of the same MAC key need to be discussed. I > think the draft need to specify limits on the message length l, the number > of generation queries q, and the number of verification queries v. > > > > As long as l^2 <= q, my understanding is that the integrity advantage is ≈ > v / 2^t + q^2 / 2^128 and since a single successful full-tag forgery allows > an attacker to generate an unbounded number of additional forgeries, the > expected number of successful forgeries is ≈ v / 2^t + v * q^2 / 2^128. See > [1]. > > > > Truncated tags behave largely as expected: they provide approximately t > bits of integrity up to a certain bound on q. By contrast, the security of > untruncated tags degrade quickly and effectively provide 128-bit security > only for the first message. > > > > Do we need key reuse? Without key reuse, the security properties are > simple: a t-bit tag provides t bits of integrity. > > > > --- > > > > A security consideration missing from NIST SP 800-38B is that is that > E_k(0^128) is not special. Revealing any bits of any X, E_k(X) pair breaks > the security, see [1]. This should be explicitly stated in the security > considerations. > > > > Cheers, > > John Preuß Mattsson > > > > [1] Ericsson comments on 800-38B “The CMAC Mode for Authentication” > > https://emanjon.github.io/NIST-comments/2024%20-%20SP%20800-38B%20and%20800-38C.pdf > > > > *From: *Russ Housley <[email protected]> > *Date: *Monday, 23 March 2026 at 21:49 > *To: *Brian Sipos <[email protected]> > *Cc: *[email protected] <[email protected]> > *Subject: *[COSE] Re: New Version Notification for > draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt > > Brian: > > > > Why do you think 64 bit authentication tags are desirable? I would be > much more comfortable with 96 bits. > > > > Russ > > > > > > On Mar 23, 2026, at 10:47 AM, Brian Sipos <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > COSE WG, > > I have updated the individual draft referenced below based on the feedback > so far. For the explanatory updates I think the new text is more clear > about what is meant and about which sections some statements belong in. > Part of this update adds truncated MAC tags, as suggested, which align with > the strengths of existing registered MAC algorithms. > > > > With these changes, and from comments received so far, I think this draft > is ready for an adoption call. Thanks for the support so far! > > > > Brian S. > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: <[email protected]> > Date: Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 10:30 AM > Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt > To: Brian Sipos <[email protected]> > > > > A new version of Internet-Draft draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt has been > successfully submitted by Brian Sipos and posted to the > IETF repository. > > Name: draft-sipos-cose-cmac > Revision: 01 > Title: AES-CMAC for COSE > Date: 2026-03-23 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 7 > URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt > Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sipos-cose-cmac/ > HTML: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.html > HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sipos-cose-cmac > Diff: > https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01 > > Abstract: > > This document registers code points for using the Advanced Encryption > Standard (AES) block cipher in Cipher-based Message Authentication > Code (CMAC) mode within CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) > messages. Specifically, these uses are for computing authentication > tag values with no additional parameters. > > > > The IETF Secretariat > > _______________________________________________ > COSE mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > > > >
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