Chairs,
Per the earlier message on the individual -02 version, the draft now
provides discussion and rationale of available tag lengths referencing
John's paper for details.
I think with these addressed the -02 version is ready for an adoption call.
Thank you,
Brian S.

On Tue, Apr 7, 2026 at 2:04 PM Michael Jones <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Thanks all for the reviews to date.  The chairs would like the tag length
> issue to be resolved one way or the other before we start a call for
> adoption.  Please tend to that and let the working group know the
> resolution.
>
>
>
>                                                                 Thanks,
>
>                                 -- Mike & Ivo (writing as COSE chairs)
>
>
>
> *From:* Brian Sipos <[email protected]>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 31, 2026 5:41 AM
> *To:* John Mattsson <[email protected]>
> *Cc:* Russ Housley <[email protected]>; [email protected]
> *Subject:* [COSE] Re: New Version Notification for
> draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt
>
>
>
> John,
>
> The phrasing of the abstract with all of the expanded abbreviations can be
> cleaned up to avoid confusion, I understand the misreading here.
>
>
>
> About the reuse and effective tag lengths, this is very valuable to know.
> My use definitely involves key reuse similar to Russ' reference to IPsec.
> Given fixed AES block size and that analysis it seems like that would
> justify a 96-bit truncated tag both for parity with IPsec use and to allow
> a more controlled, smaller q factor.
>
>
>
> Regarding your comment about "E_k(0^128) is not special" I don't
> understand what is meant in terms of what would actually go into a specific
> consideration. Could you propose some RFC-compatible text that you feel
> would capture the consideration?
>
>
>
> For the other feedback, I have proposed updates [1]. If you can confirm
> that these address your feedback that would be helpful.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Brian S.
>
>
>
> [1]
> https://author-tools.ietf.org/diff?doc_1=draft-sipos-cose-cmac&url_2=https://briansipos.github.io/cose-cmac/draft-sipos-cose-cmac.txt&raw=1
>
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 2:53 AM John Mattsson <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01:
>
> >This document registers code points for using the Advanced Encryption
> Standard (AES) block cipher in Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
> (CMAC) mode within CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) messages.
>
>
>
> Can a MAC algorithm really be used in these structures? RFC 9052 seems
> quite clear: "MAC algorithms are used in the COSE_Mac and COSE_Mac0
> structures.".
>
>
>
> ---
>
>
>
> Russ Housley wrote:
>
> >Why do you think 64 bit authentication tags are desirable?  I would be
> much more comfortable with 96 bits.
>
>
>
> We should probably try to limit the number of options. The security
> properties of CMAC/CBC-MAC/HMAC depends very much on if the key is reused
> or not and if the tag is truncated or not. If you use a fresh key for each
> MAC, CMAC is great. If you reuse the key, untruncated CMAC gives a false
> sense of security and waste a lot of bytes. The narrow block size of AES is
> a problem and severely limits the security of AES-CMAC in these scenarios.
>
>
>
> ---
>
>
>
> Regardless of the tag length, if key reuse is permitted, the security
> properties under repeated use of the same MAC key need to be discussed. I
> think the draft need to specify limits on the message length l, the number
> of generation queries q, and the number of verification queries v.
>
>
>
> As long as l^2 <= q, my understanding is that the integrity advantage is ≈
> v / 2^t + q^2 / 2^128 and since a single successful full-tag forgery allows
> an attacker to generate an unbounded number of additional forgeries, the
> expected number of successful forgeries is ≈ v / 2^t + v * q^2 / 2^128. See
> [1].
>
>
>
> Truncated tags behave largely as expected: they provide approximately t
> bits of integrity up to a certain bound on q. By contrast, the security of
> untruncated tags degrade quickly and effectively provide 128-bit security
> only for the first message.
>
>
>
> Do we need key reuse? Without key reuse, the security properties are
> simple: a t-bit tag provides t bits of integrity.
>
>
>
> ---
>
>
>
> A security consideration missing from NIST SP 800-38B is that is that
> E_k(0^128) is not special. Revealing any bits of any X, E_k(X) pair breaks
> the security, see [1]. This should be explicitly stated in the security
> considerations.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> John Preuß Mattsson
>
>
>
> [1] Ericsson comments on 800-38B “The CMAC Mode for Authentication”
>
> https://emanjon.github.io/NIST-comments/2024%20-%20SP%20800-38B%20and%20800-38C.pdf
>
>
>
> *From: *Russ Housley <[email protected]>
> *Date: *Monday, 23 March 2026 at 21:49
> *To: *Brian Sipos <[email protected]>
> *Cc: *[email protected] <[email protected]>
> *Subject: *[COSE] Re: New Version Notification for
> draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt
>
> Brian:
>
>
>
> Why do you think 64 bit authentication tags are desirable?  I would be
> much more comfortable with 96 bits.
>
>
>
> Russ
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mar 23, 2026, at 10:47 AM, Brian Sipos <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> COSE WG,
>
> I have updated the individual draft referenced below based on the feedback
> so far. For the explanatory updates I think the new text is more clear
> about what is meant and about which sections some statements belong in.
> Part of this update adds truncated MAC tags, as suggested, which align with
> the strengths of existing registered MAC algorithms.
>
>
>
> With these changes, and from comments received so far, I think this draft
> is ready for an adoption call. Thanks for the support so far!
>
>
>
> Brian S.
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: <[email protected]>
> Date: Mon, Mar 23, 2026 at 10:30 AM
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt
> To: Brian Sipos <[email protected]>
>
>
>
> A new version of Internet-Draft draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt has been
> successfully submitted by Brian Sipos and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:     draft-sipos-cose-cmac
> Revision: 01
> Title:    AES-CMAC for COSE
> Date:     2026-03-23
> Group:    Individual Submission
> Pages:    7
> URL:      https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.txt
> Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sipos-cose-cmac/
> HTML:     https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01.html
> HTMLized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sipos-cose-cmac
> Diff:
> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-sipos-cose-cmac-01
>
> Abstract:
>
>    This document registers code points for using the Advanced Encryption
>    Standard (AES) block cipher in Cipher-based Message Authentication
>    Code (CMAC) mode within CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
>    messages.  Specifically, these uses are for computing authentication
>    tag values with no additional parameters.
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
> _______________________________________________
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>
>
>
>
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