Deb Cooley has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-18: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I'm balloting no obj, but there are substantial comments to address. I did consider abstaining, see my 'general comment' near the top of my ballot. Thanks to Corey Bonnell for their secdir reviews. I agree with many points in their review, and I would like to see their comments addressed. Thanks to Chris Inacio for deferring this draft for a telechat cycle, it is a complex draft for which I needed the extra time. General: While one can claim that CBOR encoded certs eliminate the need for ASN.1 implementation, that only works if the C509 cert can only be CBOR encoded. As it stands implementations now need both CBOR and ASN.1 depending on what certificates are being used. Instead of reduced complexity, there is now double the complexity. In addition, the choices that can be made for various field selections also increase the complexity, which under normal circumstances reduces interoperability. Sadly there is only one prototype implementation currently. I'll be curious to see what the uptake is for this idea as it stands. Section 1, para 5: This could easily be deleted as it is repetitive with the para above. If it is left in the specification, please look at the sentence construction (it is indeed only a single sentence) that makes little sense after the 'e.g,' and then 'or' and then 'and'. Section 1, #1: Please add a note to say that validating the signature on the certificate first requires that it is reverted back to the original X.509 certificate. Section 1, second to last para: I would incorporate this information in #2 above it. (again, a paragraph with a single sentence) Section 3.1.4, para 2: Why is the construction of serialNumber in this section vice Section 3.1.2? Section 3.1.4, para 4: Is this 'extension' part of the issuer name, or part of what is described in Section 3.1.10? Section 3.1.5: Do you need a reference for 'POSIX time'? Section 3.1.6: Should 'CBOR simple value' be 'CBOR simple value null'? (it is phrased that way in Section 3.1.4 and 3.1.5. Section 3.1.8 & 3.1.9: Where do these fields originate? Section 3.3, para 3: Does this mean that the actual OID is the same regardless of the name? Or that there are multiple registered OIDs for the same extension? Please clarify if it is the former. If it is the latter, then specifying which OID is expected will make implementation less complex. Section 3.3.1, key usage: Isn't key usage normally critical? Wouldn't an example of that be more useful? Section 8.1, para 1: I wonder how a DE will determine if a request can be solved in a 'better in a different way'. 'Better' being very subjective. Section 8.14: Why are SHA-1 algorithms being registered (even if they are marked as 'deprecated')? _______________________________________________ COSE mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
