without access to the white paper...i have only two observations:

1.  digital fingerprints.
These usually employ a 'snapshot' of PC configurations, installed hardware,
network location, serial numbers, etc.  if you study the literature on
mandatory access controls and trusted information systems, you'll find that
these schemes are usually frowned upon. this is because a) you do not know
the operator of the device (except through a 'what you have' scheme.) thus
you should not necessarily 'trust' that machine, and b) you do not know if
the operating system employs the proper covert channels for managing the
digital fingerprint (see
http://www.cs.utah.edu/flux/fluke/html/dtos/HTML/final-docs/users-manual.pdf
for some background info on the subjects of mandatory access control and
type enforcement to get an idea of how hard it is to be sure an operating
system is not running a malicious process or hosting a malicious user.)
this is especially problematic for small portable devices which don't have
the processing power or memory to employ proper security at the os level.

2.  using networks for random number generation.
concepts like this seem like a good idea at first glance (you could generate
a very large stream of random bits to produce a key..etc.)  i'm attracted to
the idea of a system which produces a lot of random bits (a problem for
random number generators today.)  plus if you have two different systems
monitoring the same 'random' network patterns you don't have to distribute
the key as you're transmitting the data (I assume this is their method, but
it's not described on the site.)  regardless of the implementation, systems
which rely on external data such as network information noise can't offer
true security. such systems could be manipulated by external seemingly
random events in order to produce a crib or predictable cycle for later
cryptanalysis.  the method they're seeking to generate pseudo-random bits
(the actual term they should be using) is open to such manipulation at one
or more layers of the OSI model, and even using protocols which are pretty
difficult for them to detect (for example, interfering with BGP routing from
a distance to influence packet velocity, size, etc.)

i remember one govt. experimented with the idea of taking the 'white noise'
picked up by antennas (similar to the snow you see on a tv set.)  this was
an improvement over johnson-noise systems because you could get high data
throughput and the output looked like white noise...a nice benefit.
however, we were able to xmit short bursts of repeated patterns into their
system to introduce streams of known bits, producing some cribs (even though
the system employed hamming.)  the system was dropped.

other random number generating systems i've seen manipulated from a distance
are: johnson-noise-based hardware (and btw employing farady cages hurts
their ability to produce random bits so they're difficult to shield) and
radiation detection systems (using beta or gamma particles...harder to
interfere with alpha particles.)  of course one would normally test the
output of the data stream for randomness, but depending on the selected
message length, etc. it becomes increasingly difficult to detect
interference from a distance. one system i've not experimented with yet is
one based on the random distribution of photons passing through a thin slit
in an opaque plate.  this kind of system could be shielded from external
interference and one could generate a considerable amount of data in a very
short timeframe.  but the system is expensive to build (difficult to build
single photon detectors which have a short recharge cycle between detected
photons.)

one last obeservation, this isn't a new idea...it's well researched and
there are competitors in the marketplace, universities and federal labs
using similar ideas (and yes they're subject to the same limitations.)

Anyway, the team seems pretty good.  I'm a little skeptical about the claim
of 'disruptive technology' and I'm concerned about external manipulation of
their data environment.  but i'm all for replacing pki (in fact it's a key
area of investment interest for me) and i'm happy to see people thinking
about new approaches.

phillip



> -----Original Message-----
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of David Akin
> Sent: Monday, May 14, 2001 11:26 AM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: NE2
>
>
>
> Hey gang --
> Anyone know anything about Non-Elephant Encryption Systems Inc. out of
> Calgary? (http://www.e-cryption.com)
>
> They've come up with an encryption scheme that doesn't require
> stored keys.
> Random, one-use only keys are generated on the fly out of the unique
> electronic pulses in any network. (Or so they say).
>
> This sounds like a big deal to me but then again, I spent my university
> career reading Viking history.
>
> Thanks.
>
> David Akin / Senior technology reporter
> National Post / http://www.nationalpost.com
> 300-1450 Don Mills Road, Don Mills, Ontario
> CANADA / M3B 3R5
> VOX: 416.383.2372 FAX: 416.383.2443
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] / AIM: DavidAkin
>
> Click to add my contact info to your organizer:
> http://my.infotriever.com/DavidAkin
>
>

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