without access to the white paper...i have only two observations: 1. digital fingerprints. These usually employ a 'snapshot' of PC configurations, installed hardware, network location, serial numbers, etc. if you study the literature on mandatory access controls and trusted information systems, you'll find that these schemes are usually frowned upon. this is because a) you do not know the operator of the device (except through a 'what you have' scheme.) thus you should not necessarily 'trust' that machine, and b) you do not know if the operating system employs the proper covert channels for managing the digital fingerprint (see http://www.cs.utah.edu/flux/fluke/html/dtos/HTML/final-docs/users-manual.pdf for some background info on the subjects of mandatory access control and type enforcement to get an idea of how hard it is to be sure an operating system is not running a malicious process or hosting a malicious user.) this is especially problematic for small portable devices which don't have the processing power or memory to employ proper security at the os level. 2. using networks for random number generation. concepts like this seem like a good idea at first glance (you could generate a very large stream of random bits to produce a key..etc.) i'm attracted to the idea of a system which produces a lot of random bits (a problem for random number generators today.) plus if you have two different systems monitoring the same 'random' network patterns you don't have to distribute the key as you're transmitting the data (I assume this is their method, but it's not described on the site.) regardless of the implementation, systems which rely on external data such as network information noise can't offer true security. such systems could be manipulated by external seemingly random events in order to produce a crib or predictable cycle for later cryptanalysis. the method they're seeking to generate pseudo-random bits (the actual term they should be using) is open to such manipulation at one or more layers of the OSI model, and even using protocols which are pretty difficult for them to detect (for example, interfering with BGP routing from a distance to influence packet velocity, size, etc.) i remember one govt. experimented with the idea of taking the 'white noise' picked up by antennas (similar to the snow you see on a tv set.) this was an improvement over johnson-noise systems because you could get high data throughput and the output looked like white noise...a nice benefit. however, we were able to xmit short bursts of repeated patterns into their system to introduce streams of known bits, producing some cribs (even though the system employed hamming.) the system was dropped. other random number generating systems i've seen manipulated from a distance are: johnson-noise-based hardware (and btw employing farady cages hurts their ability to produce random bits so they're difficult to shield) and radiation detection systems (using beta or gamma particles...harder to interfere with alpha particles.) of course one would normally test the output of the data stream for randomness, but depending on the selected message length, etc. it becomes increasingly difficult to detect interference from a distance. one system i've not experimented with yet is one based on the random distribution of photons passing through a thin slit in an opaque plate. this kind of system could be shielded from external interference and one could generate a considerable amount of data in a very short timeframe. but the system is expensive to build (difficult to build single photon detectors which have a short recharge cycle between detected photons.) one last obeservation, this isn't a new idea...it's well researched and there are competitors in the marketplace, universities and federal labs using similar ideas (and yes they're subject to the same limitations.) Anyway, the team seems pretty good. I'm a little skeptical about the claim of 'disruptive technology' and I'm concerned about external manipulation of their data environment. but i'm all for replacing pki (in fact it's a key area of investment interest for me) and i'm happy to see people thinking about new approaches. phillip > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of David Akin > Sent: Monday, May 14, 2001 11:26 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: NE2 > > > > Hey gang -- > Anyone know anything about Non-Elephant Encryption Systems Inc. out of > Calgary? (http://www.e-cryption.com) > > They've come up with an encryption scheme that doesn't require > stored keys. > Random, one-use only keys are generated on the fly out of the unique > electronic pulses in any network. (Or so they say). > > This sounds like a big deal to me but then again, I spent my university > career reading Viking history. > > Thanks. > > David Akin / Senior technology reporter > National Post / http://www.nationalpost.com > 300-1450 Don Mills Road, Don Mills, Ontario > CANADA / M3B 3R5 > VOX: 416.383.2372 FAX: 416.383.2443 > [EMAIL PROTECTED] / AIM: DavidAkin > > Click to add my contact info to your organizer: > http://my.infotriever.com/DavidAkin > >
