The Man Inside China's Bomb Labs
U.S. Blocks Memoir of Scientist Who Gathered Trove of Information 

By Steve Coll
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, May 16, 2001; Page A01 

Between the spring of 1990 and the summer of 1999, nuclear weapons scientist and 
intelligence analyst Danny B. Stillman made nine trips to China. He visited nearly all 
of its secret nuclear weapons facilities and held extensive, authorized discussions 
with Chinese scientists and generals.

In all, Stillman said he collected the names of more than 2,000 Chinese scientists 
working at nuclear weapons facilities, recorded detailed histories of the Chinese 
program from top scientists, inspected nuclear weapons labs and bomb testing sites, 
interviewed Chinese weapons designers, photographed nuclear facilities -- and then, 
each time he returned home, passed the information along to U.S. intelligence 
debriefers.

Now Stillman, 67, who worked for 28 years at Los Alamos (N.M.) National Laboratory 
before retiring in late 1993, is locked in a dispute with the U.S. government over 
whether he can publish a 500-page memoir detailing his and other little-known contacts 
between U.S. and Chinese nuclear scientists during the 1990s. The case involves 
complex First Amendment issues and reveals the extent to which both countries have 
used scientific exchanges to keep tabs on each other's nuclear programs.

Stillman submitted his manuscript, "Inside China's Nuclear Weapons Program," to the 
Defense Department and the Department of Energy 17 months ago for prepublication 
clearance required by a secrecy agreement he signed at Los Alamos. Both agencies have 
so far denied Stillman permission to publish, citing a Pentagon memo that says the 
memoir could "reasonably be expected to damage the security concerns of the United 
States" and "could also damage American foreign relations with China." Stillman has 
hired an attorney and intends to file a lawsuit to reverse that finding.

Stillman's disclosures could provide new context for allegations that China used 
contacts with U.S. scientists during the 1990s to steal U.S. nuclear secrets, showing 
that China also provided unprecedented access to its own nuclear program to visiting 
U.S. intelligence officials and scientists.

Stillman said in an interview that he believes the Chinese nuclear program made its 
important advances without resorting to espionage. While the Chinese looked for ways 
to steal secrets during their contacts with him and other U.S. scientists, he said, 
they also were "looking to brag about what they had done" on their own, while "trying 
to bring their program out into the open."

China invited Stillman to its closed nuclear facilities while seeking to rebuild ties 
disrupted by American outrage over the massacre of Chinese students around Tiananmen 
Square in 1989.

At the beginning of the 1980s, China had authorized intelligence-sharing with the 
United States to help contain the Soviet Union. These programs included smuggling arms 
to Afghan rebels and operating joint listening posts along the Soviet Union's southern 
borders.

In the nuclear arena, China had been slower to engage, but as Stillman began his 
travels, Beijing signaled a desire to enter arms control agreements such as the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Chinese scientists wanted to exchange information about 
how to maintain their nuclear stockpile after testing ended. They also repeatedly 
pressed Stillman to transmit requests to U.S. officials for safety locks that would 
make it harder for Chinese bombs to be detonated without authorization.

"They wanted me to bring information to the U.S. government," Stillman said. "If you 
want to weigh what we got versus what we might have said -- well, we got a whole lot."

Colleagues familiar with Stillman's work concur.

"We saw things no outsider had ever seen before," said Robert Daniel, who traveled to 
China with Stillman in 1991, when Daniel was an assistant energy secretary in charge 
of intelligence programs. "We went to the test site in the Gobi Desert and saw them 
getting ready to place a [nuclear explosive] device down a 600-meter hole. . . . I 
think we learned a lot, and I would emphasize, we didn't give anything away."

"Danny's approach was disarmingly simple: You just go to China, find the guys who 
designed the bombs and ask them questions," said Robert Vrooman, former director of 
counterintelligence at Los Alamos. Added Jay Keyworth, a former science adviser to 
President Ronald Reagan: "I would say the whole activity that he was involved in was 
extraordinarily successful for the United States."

But skeptics of the scientific exchanges argue that on balance, the United States has 
given up much more than it received, in part because the U.S. nuclear program is ahead 
of China's.

"There's just absolutely no way to do these exchanges without showing your hand in a 
way that there's security problems," said Gary Schmitt, a former White House and 
Capitol Hill intelligence analyst who is executive director of Project for the New 
American Century. "You had a cocktail of a large policy goal [to engage China] 
combined with the natural instincts of scientists to share everything. . . . I think 
what happens is you just kid yourself about what you're doing."

Stillman and his lawyer argue that the best way to resolve such debates is to allow 
publication of his memoir. But it isn't clear whether or when the U.S. government will 
do that.

Last year, after conducting an initial manuscript review, the Department of Energy 
proposed a few changes to remove what it said was sensitive information about nuclear 
weapons. Stillman agreed to the changes but soon learned that the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, backed by the CIA, had decided that none of his manuscript could be released.

A Pentagon spokesman said yesterday that the DIA's recommendations were not final and 
that a further Defense Department review was underway. A DOE spokesman also said its 
review "is ongoing."

Mark S. Zaid, Stillman's attorney, said the government's rulings have been overly 
broad because Stillman merely recorded in the book what he saw and heard during visits 
made at the invitation of Chinese officials, and in some cases was traveling as a 
private citizen after his retirement.

"Essentially, what the government has done is classify his postcards home," Zaid said.

There are few clear guidelines for Stillman's case, lawyers specializing in First 
Amendment issues said. The most relevant precedent, they said, was a 1972 dispute in 
which courts held that a former CIA agent, Victor Marchetti, had a right to publish 
unclassified information but that the government also had wide authority to deny 
clearance for any material that was properly classified.

"There's enormous ground for battle about what is properly classified," said Mark 
Lynch, a partner at Covington & Burling and former attorney at the American Civil 
Liberties Union.

Stillman joined Los Alamos in 1965 as a specialist in devices used to simulate and 
measure nuclear explosions. In 1978, he was promoted to run the lab's Division of 
International Technology, which contracted with the DIA, CIA and other U.S. agencies 
to analyze foreign nuclear programs.

As part of this work, Stillman met with visiting Chinese scientists whenever possible. 
Playing off the intelligence community's fondness for acronyms such as "SIGINT," or 
signals intelligence, and "HUMINT," or human intelligence, Stillman called his method 
"ASKINT," as in "Just ask them."

When five Chinese scientists visited New Mexico in 1988, Stillman invited them on a 
picnic. Later he learned they were all from the Chinese nuclear program. Stillman kept 
in touch and pressed for an invitation to China.

In April 1990 he made his first trip, and with two U.S. colleagues he visited China's 
equivalent of Los Alamos, the Southwest Institute of the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering Physics at Mianyang. On this and subsequent trips, the Chinese talked 
extensively about their program's history and operations, including how they had 
developed a neutron bomb.

"I had videos and cameras, and I was always taking notes," Stillman said.

Even after retiring from the lab in October 1993, Stillman continued to travel to 
Chinese facilities, sometimes escorting senior Los Alamos officials. More recently, he 
has traveled to China with John Lewis, a Stanford University political scientist who 
specializes in the history of China's nuclear program.

Before each trip, Stillman obtained permission to travel from the Department of 
Energy. Each time he returned, a U.S. intelligence debriefer came to his Los Alamos 
office for an interview, and Stillman said he voluntarily provided detailed diaries 
about everything he had seen and heard in China.

Stillman said Chinese scientists offered details that seemed to contradict a select 
congressional committee headed by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.). The committee 
alleged in 1999 that China had stolen U.S. secrets that helped it to miniaturize 
nuclear weapons for use on intercontinental missiles.

Stillman said Chinese physicists told him that they had begun research on 
miniaturization during the 1970s, but could not complete it because they lacked the 
computing power to carry out massive calculations. When the Chinese physicists got 
access to supercomputers, they pulled out their old research, ran the numbers and 
designed the new devices.

On a visit to China in the summer of 1999, Stillman said, Hu Side, one of China's 
leading weapons physicists, delivered an angry speech over dinner about distortions he 
ascribed to the Cox committee and the prosecution of Taiwanese American scientist Wen 
Ho Lee for security violations.

As for miniaturization, "We did not need you," Hu Side said, according to Stillman. 
"These allegations must have been made for political reasons."

Cox said yesterday that Chinese scientists provided a mixture of accurate insights and 
disinformation to their U.S. colleagues. "I think we were all in agreement that [the 
exchanges were] not a black-and-white question."

>From his first visit, the Chinese asked Stillman to press U.S. officials for help 
>with nuclear bomb locks known as permissive action links, or PALs. The Chinese said 
>that splits in their military during the Tiananmen crisis brought home the potential 
>danger of unauthorized control of nuclear weapons, and they wanted the United States 
>to provide older PAL technology that would make Chinese bombs safer but not 
>jeopardize U.S. bomb security.

"Every trip, they asked for that," Stillman said. "I always thought the world would be 
a safer place if they got that."

In Washington, after Stillman transmitted the Chinese request, "There was a big debate 
in the United States about how far we should go to assist them with that technology," 
said Kurt Campbell, a former Pentagon official during the Clinton administration, now 
senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "I think 
they [the Chinese] truly were interested in what they called positive control."

Ultimately, however, U.S. authorities declined to help, and by the mid-1990s China had 
turned to Russia for PAL technology as well as for other nuclear weapons assistance.

Stillman said that after years of maintaining a low profile, he decided to write his 
memoir because he had a great deal of information to add to the record about how the 
Chinese built their nuclear program.

"I retired and I couldn't find a job, frankly, and I had all this unique experience," 
Stillman said. "More Americans have walked on the surface of the moon than have walked 
on the surface of the Chinese nuclear test site."

� 2001 The Washington Post Company

Reply via email to