Dear Martin, > I must admit that I cannot easily answer large e-mails that mix up several > issues.
Yes, sorry for the mess. > Firstly, a philosophical question for the below: Why do make the distinction > of known knowledge? The CRM FOL are explicitly about being, not (only) about > knowing. If you implicitly argue that the CRM should describe only known > knowlegde, I'd recommend you to read the paper by Carlo Meghini (and me) > formalizing the CRM, and we discuss details!😁 I did read it. I skipped the skolemisation part and only read the Wikipedia article, though :-) The term "known knowledge" was not good. Let's go with "current knowledge" instead. I don't say that the CRM should describe only current knowledge. I do say specifically about P7 that it should make up its mind whether it is about being or about knowing. Concretely, I suggest that P7 statements should only describe what is currently known, especially since it is so important to you to model finding the best known approximation of the phenomenal place. In other words, I see P7 as a "declarative property" that encodes explicit attestations and inferred knowledge. P161, on the other hand, is a "phenomenal property" and about being rather than knowing. Both are fundamentally different. I think it is pointless to soften this up by saying that all places between the phenomenal place and an attested P7 are also P7. Then one has to distinguish between known and as-yet-unknown P7. Take this scale of P7 statements from small to big: phenomenal place … P7 places that are as-yet-unknown … the smallest inferrable P7 … some inferred P7 … an explicit attestation … more inferred P7 … the largest explicit attestation that we know of and still regard as P7 … places that are regarded as too big to be P7 … planet Earth So, my point is that the "P7 places that are as-yet-unknown" part at the beginning of the scale obscures the semantics of P7 and is neither useful nor necessary. It is enough to be able to find the smallest inferrable P7. In particular, I used to think that the relationship between P161 and P7 is vaguely similar to "has current X" and "has former or current X", but I now think it is pointless to say P161(x,y) ∧ E4(x) ⇒ P7(x,y) because it says that the phenomenal place is automatically the best P7 approximation of itself, only that it can never actually be known. Even if you see it differently, would you agree that my interpretation of P7 is consistent and "does the job"? > Secondly, > > I am a bit at loss what you mean by S1,S2,S2a. Perhaps my description was too terse. S1: P7 contains P161 (not "P7 => P161" as I wrote earlier) * this is the first statement in the FOL block of P7 (after the domain and range statements) * S1 states that each P7 provides an approximation of P161 * the exact form of S1 is discussed at length below S2: P7 => all places between phenomenal place and P7 are also P7 * this is the second statement in the FOL block of P7 * S2 covers the scale above from "phenomenal place" to "the largest explicit attestation that we know of and still regard as P7" * i.e. mixing up being and knowing S2a: S2 but with P7 instead of P161 * this is the version of the second statement where the term P161(x,z) is replaced by P7(x,z) * S2a covers everything between pairs of known P7 * if we can reach "the smallest inferrable P7", it covers the scale above from "the smallest inferrable P7" to "the largest explicit attestation that we know of and still regard as P7" * i.e. purely about knowing F: the (explicitly named) intersection of two P7 is also P7 * F makes sure that we can indeed reach "the smallest inferrable P7" * i.e. purely about knowing > I regard that P7(x,y) ∧ E53(z) ∧ P161(x,z) ⇒ P89(z,y) is wrong. It is > definitely that P7 implies that there exists a spatial projection inside the > y in the same reference space. NOT, that if a spatial projection exists, it > is inside the Y. It doesn't mean that. The convention in the CIDOC CRM document is that implicit quantifiers are always "for all", not "exists". So it's more like "if z is the spatial projection". P161 is one of the thingies that behave like a function. It depends on x and a reference system, and it exists independently of any P7. Let's call this function F161. It is defined as z = F161(x) ⇔ P161(x,z) The reference system is conveniently left out here but could easily be added as a second variable u, as in F161(x,u). With the usual implicit (∀x,y), all the following statements are equivalent: P7(x,y) ⇒ (∃z) [E53(z) ∧ P161(x,z) ∧ P89(z,y)] P7(x,y) ⇒ (∀z) [E53(z) ∧ P161(x,z) ⇒ P89(z,y)] P7(x,y) ∧ E53(z) ∧ P161(x,z) ⇒ P89(z,y) with an implicit (∀z) P7(x,y) ⇒ (∃z) [z = F161(x) ∧ P89(z,y)] P7(x,y) ⇒ (∀z) [z = F161(x) ⇒ P89(z,y)] P7(x,y) ∧ z = F161(x) ⇒ P89(z,y) with implicit (∀z) P7(x,y) ⇒ P89(F161(x), y) We haven't introduced function symbols yet. From the remaining versions I chose the one with P161 on the left-hand side because then I don't need to write down the implicit "for all" and can pretend there is no quantifier for z at all. Best, Wolfgang > Am 26.10.2022 um 21:18 schrieb Martin Doerr via Crm-sig > <crm-sig@ics.forth.gr>: > > Dear Wolfgang, > > I must admit that I cannot easily answer large e-mails that mix up several > issues. > > Firstly, a philosophical question for the below: Why do make the distinction > of known knowledge? The CRM FOL are explicitly about being, not (only) about > knowing. If you implicitly argue that the CRM should describe only known > knowlegde, I'd recommend you to read the paper by Carlo Meghini (and me) > formalizing the CRM, and we discuss details!😁 > > Secondly, > > I am a bit at loss what you mean by S1,S2,S2a. > > I regard that P7(x,y) ∧ E53(z) ∧ P161(x,z) ⇒ P89(z,y) is wrong. It is > definitely that P7 implies that there exists a spatial projection inside the > y in the same reference space. NOT, that if a spatial projection exists, it > is inside the Y. > > Please clarify! > > Best, > > Martin > > On 10/24/2022 11:15 AM, Wolfgang Schmidle via Crm-sig wrote: >> Dear Martin, >> >> Thank you for your insightful comments! Yes, I agree on your points about >> fuzziness and about FOL for outer bound approximations. >> >>> The "creation" of a spatial projection is probably a misunderstanding. >> Fair enough, my words were not chosen well. My point was that the >> intersection belongs to a group of phenomenal or unique declarative thingies >> that behave like functions. I was trying to elaborate that we can introduce >> a function symbol representing the intersection even if FOL doesn't "know" >> about intersections. >> >> And let's forget about the union of attested places. My point was simply >> that we shouldn't argue with wobbly terms like "reasonable" or "context". >> For example, especially in the case of Caesar's murder one could argue that >> the context is in fact the whole Roman Empire. I am fine with S2 on that end >> of the scale if we don't burden it with semantic ballast. >> >> On the other end we have, assuming a shared reference system: >> S1: P7 => P161 >> S2: P7 => all places between phenomenal place and P7 are also P7 >> S2a: S2 but with P7 instead of P161 >> F: the (explicitly named) intersection of two P7 is also P7 >> >> We know S2 => S2a and F >> >> With the help of your comments I can now sharpen my point to this: S1 plus >> S2a plus F are enough to describe the known knowledge. Everything else that >> could theoretically be inferred by S2 is not known knowledge. >> >> Take your example about detecting inconsistencies: >> >>> Ceasar dying on the Forum Romanum has an empty intersection with the >>> Theatrum Pompeii, on the Mars Field. Obviously inconconsistent. >>> Consequently, Curia Iulia must be wrong. >> This can be done with F. >> >> Best, >> Wolfgang _______________________________________________ Crm-sig mailing list Crm-sig@ics.forth.gr http://lists.ics.forth.gr/mailman/listinfo/crm-sig
