Denis,
Comments below.
On 27.08.2019 19:27, Denis Roy wrote:
Ed,
I think we're one of the last shops on earth that has SSH shell access
right into our mission-critical infra.
Being able to use vi in my home folder doesn't strike me as treading
into your mission-critical infrastructure, but hey, I'm clearly not
well-informed. I must point out though that like Markus, I provide
numerous services that are also mission critical. But, for the greater
good of ultra-security, of course I'll quickly set aside my summer and
my personal life to address, at my own expense, this latest pressing
security concern inorder to find alternative ways to make things work
nevertheless.
But wait, I couldn't do a build for days because Mac signing didn't
work. Oh, and suddenly today, out of nowhere:
[ERROR] The following artifacts could not be downloaded: [ERROR]
osgi.bundle,org.bouncycastle.bcprov,1.61.0.v20190602-1335 [ERROR]
Internal error: java.lang.RuntimeException: Some required artifacts
could not be downloaded. See log output for details. -> [Help 1] My builds fail again for another reason. In the end though, ulta-security waits for no person.
Even before 2009 this practice was pure insanity from a data/systems
security perspective but it was maintained as there were not many options.
Really? File access permissions are so insanely insecure? So if I login
and delete a file, that's just insane, but when I run my Jenkins job to
delete that file, it's totally secure and the world is safe. I totally
don't get it, but as I said, I'm ill-informed.
With Jenkins per Project (JIPP), there's just no reason to leave a
well-known security faux-pas enabled. It's like putting a credit card
number on LinkedIn.
As I assumed, it's all for the greater good. Much like that "It's so
reassuring that so many people will benefit from that new highway that
will consume your home and property." On that front, I know I always
feel so much more secure when I have to agree to yet another cookie
prompt on a web page. Thanks EU, I feel like my web experience is
totally ultra-cookike-secure now. I just need that highly in-demand
the-make-the-cookie-go-away app. And whenever I do anything around here
where I live now, I have to sign the data security form, that I can't
read, but must sign nevertheless. It totally makes me feel like my best
interests (security) are always the prime concern.
As I understand it, there were less than 30 people with full shell
access. If hundreds of projects don't need it, it's really hard to
justify.
Of course we were given ample opportunity for justification. And of
course trying to justify insanity would just be proof of insanity. So
good for us that there are those who decree that plain insanity is
something to which we must put and end, immediately, during the summer,
when of course no one has anything better to do than migrate to the new
improved ultra-secure non-insane better alternatives: run Jenkins jobs
for hours trying to do accomplish what you could do in minutes with a shell.
In the end, we're not here to intentionally piss folks off with
useless dogma -- we're here to help. Part of that mission statement is
making sure our systems don't suffer a catastrophic compromise/data
breach.
It's feels so much better to be pissed of unintentionally. :-P
Of course your role is to serve the best interests of the community, and
I feel bad to rag on you because I do feel you are doing your best to
serve the interests of the community. But it also feels like dogma to
me, much like the cookie-phobic, ultra-data security madness that
plagues me at home.
Perhaps if we better understand what you use the shell for, we can
help craft CI jobs which will both a) accomplish the task and b)
provide everyone with more visibility into what's going on, as opposed
to some cryptic cron job. Feel free to file bugs in Community /
Jenkins for the tasks you need assistance with.
Feel free to open problem reports that we can promptly do nothing
about. No, expect nothing and you will not be disappointed. I will try
to make due without.
Denis
On 2019-08-27 12:46 p.m., Ed Merks wrote:
Matt,
So in the end, a restricted shell is essentially so crippled as to be
effectively useless, and there exists no actual concrete "definition"
of what, if anything, useful might in reality be accomplished with a
restricted shell.
I should point out that this is quite different from the impression
that was presented earlier in this process, so I'm disappointed in
how this has been presented and handled. It feels to me like a
process of decree where there is no recourse:
"We've come to claim your property to build a new highway; we're
very sorry that you'll have to move out before the end of October,
but it is for the greater good."
Regards,
Ed
On 27.08.2019 16:44, Matthew Ward wrote:
Hi Ed,
The restricted shell was originally created with the goal of
providing committers a way to interact with the downloads/archive
filesystems for releng activities, and version control systems
without providing a general purpose shell. So naturally the command
set available leans in that direction(mv,cp,mkdir,git etc).
We are certainly willing to discuss adding extra commands either
temporarily or permanently, but I want to make it clear that the
goal is not to reproduce bash.
-Matt.
On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 9:58 AM Ed Merks <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
What will we be able to do in restricted shell? Using vi is a
very basic activity. I suppose there must be some good reason
why that's restricted? Earlier I was under the impression that
such simple things would continue to work, but now I have to
wonder. But then it was mentioned that things we discover
needed could become unrestricted...
On 26.08.2019 15:35, Matthew Ward wrote:
Hi David,
Thanks for the questions.
Users with the restricted shell will have the same home
directories that they do currently, which will remain the place
for authorized keys. You won't be able to edit(vi/emacs/ed)
files directly within the restricted shell, so you will need to
upload them via scp/rsync. If you want a more 'interactive'
type of access I'd suggest looking into using libfuse, and
specifically the sshfs file system.
The restricted shell allows rsync, so there should be zero
impact. If you'd like to test in advance, drop me a line and
I'll set you up.
-Matt.
On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 3:23 PM David Williams
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/23/19 14:24, Matthew Ward wrote:
Hi Everyone,
I just wanted to follow up with a reminder that on
August 28th we will be moving committers that have an
actual shell on Eclipse.org to our restricted shell.
I'd like to thank both Donat and Etienne on the Buildship
RelEng team who volunteered to test this change, and
helped me confirm that this change should be minimally
disruptive.
If you have any questions, please let me know.
-Matt.
Thanks for the reminder.
Will those of use that still want to use 'scp' and similar
still have a 'home directory' (on "build"?) and is that
still the place for .ssh/authorized_keys2? Or, does all
that change with "restricted shell"?
If a change, can you point me to instructions on how to set
that up? I would assume some form of "ssh-copy-id hostname"
but thought best not to assume and ask explicitly.
In case you are wondering, the use case, for using scp and
similar is to download a number of builds to my local
machine (without going through web interfaces).
Now that I think of it, I currently use rsync via ssh, such as
rsync -a -e ssh ${committer_id}@build.eclipse.org:$
<mailto:[email protected]:$>{dlpath}
"${output_dir}"
Will that still work with a restricted shell? Or, will I
need to convert to "scp"?
Thanks,
_______________________________________________
cross-project-issues-dev mailing list
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
To change your delivery options, retrieve your password, or
unsubscribe from this list, visit
https://www.eclipse.org/mailman/listinfo/cross-project-issues-dev
_______________________________________________
cross-project-issues-dev mailing list
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
To change your delivery options, retrieve your password, or unsubscribe
from this list, visit
https://www.eclipse.org/mailman/listinfo/cross-project-issues-dev
_______________________________________________
cross-project-issues-dev mailing list
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
To change your delivery options, retrieve your password, or
unsubscribe from this list, visit
https://www.eclipse.org/mailman/listinfo/cross-project-issues-dev
_______________________________________________
cross-project-issues-dev mailing list
[email protected]
To change your delivery options, retrieve your password, or unsubscribe from
this list, visit
https://www.eclipse.org/mailman/listinfo/cross-project-issues-dev
_______________________________________________
cross-project-issues-dev mailing list
[email protected]
To change your delivery options, retrieve your password, or unsubscribe from
this list, visit
https://www.eclipse.org/mailman/listinfo/cross-project-issues-dev
_______________________________________________
cross-project-issues-dev mailing list
[email protected]
To change your delivery options, retrieve your password, or unsubscribe from
this list, visit
https://www.eclipse.org/mailman/listinfo/cross-project-issues-dev
_______________________________________________
cross-project-issues-dev mailing list
[email protected]
To change your delivery options, retrieve your password, or unsubscribe from
this list, visit
https://www.eclipse.org/mailman/listinfo/cross-project-issues-dev
