On Tue, Oct 20, 2009 at 09:20:04AM -0400, William Allen Simpson wrote: > Nicolas Williams wrote: > >Getting DNSSEC deployed with sufficiently large KSKs should be priority #1. > > > I agree. Let's get something deployed, as that will lead to testing. > > > >If 90 days for the 1024-bit ZSKs is too long, that can always be > >reduced, or the ZSK keylength be increased -- we too can squeeze factors > >of 10 from various places. In the early days of DNSSEC deployment the > >opportunities for causing damage by breaking a ZSK will be relatively > >meager. We have time to get this right; this issue does not strike me > >as urgent. > > > One of the things that bother me with the latest presentation is that > only "dummy" keys will be used. That makes no sense to me! We'll have > folks that get used to hitting the "Ignore" key on their browsers.... > > http://nanog.org/meetings/nanog47/presentations/Lightning/Abley_light_N47.pdf
the use of dummy keys in the first round is to test things like key rollover - the inital keys themselves are unable to be validated and state as much. Anyone who tries validation is -NOT- reading the key or the deployment plan. > > Thus, I'm not sure we have time to get this right. We need good keys, so > that user processes can be tested. next phase. > > > >OTOH, will we be able to detect breaks? A clever attacker will use > >breaks in very subtle ways. A ZSK break would be bad, but something > >that could be dealt with, *if* we knew it'd happened. The potential > >difficulty of detecting attacks is probably the best reason for seeking > >stronger keys well ahead of time. > > > Agreed. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majord...@metzdowd.com