Cryptography-Digest Digest #257, Volume #11 Sun, 5 Mar 00 07:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: Passphrase Quality ? (jungle)
Re: Random bit generators (Guy Macon)
Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent (Eric Norman)
Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent (jungle)
Re: 'Free' services with tokens/puzzles ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Explaination of method question ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Crypto.Com, Inc. (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: On jamming interception networks (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: On jamming interception networks (Mok-Kong Shen)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss
Subject: Re: Passphrase Quality ?
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2000 08:34:19 GMT
IMO you did get all this wrong ...
my way is to never remember pass text ...
you will not spit a dummy only when you don't know the dummy,
is it clear now for you ?
Guy Macon wrote:
>
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (jungle) wrote:
> >
> >there is one huge difference, this one I can tell you ...
> >you know your pass text all the time [ you did your pass text memorized very
> >well ], therefore several methods that are child play simple to use & execute
> >exist to get this pass text from you
> >
> >to get your "simple two sentence mnemonic", irrespectively of your resistance
> >any time the AGENCY WOULD LIKE TO DO IT ...
> >when agency will like to get your "simple two sentence mnemonic", you will spit
> >it out on every request, like a baby spit a dummy
> >
>
> Let me get this straight. You are advocating using a passphrase that
> is hard to remember so as to avoid someone torturing it out of you?
> Let me guess... you keep it on a post-it note on your monitor, right?
>
> I have this mental picture of them increasing the torture and you
> REALLY, REALLY, *REALLY* wishing that you could remember your passphrase...
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Guy Macon)
Subject: Re: Random bit generators
Date: 05 Mar 2000 03:46:36 EST
(please set your line length to 75 characters. It's at 130 now and I have
to reformat to see what you wrote)
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>
>Another way to express my function is this
>
>F(x1, x2, x3) = x1.x3 + x2.~x3
>
>It is susceptible to correlation attack since F agrees with x1 75% of
>the time and with X2 75% of the time. So you may be right that this
>is not any better than XOR.
I never said that it wasn't any better than XOR, except in one extreme
test case I designed to make XOR look good. I don't know enough to
offer an opinion on how good it is. I just want to undersatand the
advantages, if any. Could you explain what those might be for me?
>I was inpired by the idea of changing the length of the bit string in
>each round and thought that the formula above would be easier to
>implement. Well, it was just an idea.
You lost me. I have no clue as to what you are talking about.
>BTW, how do you break 3 XORed congruential random number generators?
I hope that you aren't under the impression that I said that I could.
I am just asking questions to increase my understanding, not making
claims or trying to prove a point.
------------------------------
From: Eric Norman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2000 02:46:43 -0600
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> No..I have explained that in detail. But I will explain it again for
> you. The issue is not keeping the internals of the system secret from
> customers or potential customers. Any customer who is serious about our
> systems can view the source code and the algorithnms....
OK.
> What we want to do is keep our stuff out of the hands of copycats...and
> I think this is something that is perfectly ligit....
There are lots of other folks who also think it's ligit [sic].
What do you think copyrights and patents are for?
> Please visit NCipher....and other hardware crypto vendors...not only do
> they keep their keys in tamper resistant boxes...but also their
> softwrare...
True enough, but the reason their software is in tamper resistant
boxes is NOT to protect their intellectual propery; it is to
protect the keys.
Anyway, you could contact NCipher and ask them for a lead.
You also could try Siemens (http://www.siemens.com).
Or here: http://dow.se-com.com
There are doubtless many more; try a search engine with
"tamper resistant".
--
Eric Norman
"Congress shall make no law restricting the size of integers
that may be multiplied together, or the number of times that
an integer may be multiplied by itself, or the modulus by
which an integer may be reduced".
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2000 08:51:33 GMT
totally wrong wish ...
impossible to achieve ...
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> In order to protect our intelectual property (software) from decompiling
> freaks,
they are not freaks ... but experts ... in contrary, you looks like an
amateurish kid ...
this is nothing personal but professional assessment only
> we need to build our crypto software in a tamper resistent
> device for our network crypto cards.
>
> Any advice on how this may be done?. Is this some kind of special
> EEPROM or a sealent in the box?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: 'Free' services with tokens/puzzles
Date: 5 Mar 2000 08:51:11 GMT
In a previous article, "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I did not mean that you designate certain long-term
>customers as having trusted clients. I meant that you have a
>private store of a small handful of computers, dedicated to
>purely being the trusted clients. I was assuming that
>somewhere in the budget of doing this, the money for a $300
>(US) extra computer could be found, and that system could be
>used as the trusted client.
True, I can't imagine a reliable, workable and permanent solution that does
not involve "trusted clients" in the above sense. It seems like our
respective suggestions are only versions of each other.
But a crucial question must be how great the probability is that corrupted
data will be accepted. This probability might not only depend on the
reliability of the tests that once in a while are performed. There are a
number of questions involved: Will each client be tested at least once within
a given time span before the data it generated during that time period is
accepted? What is the probability that the client was actually performing
it's designated task when it was tested but not all of the rest of the time?
Is there even a slight probability that a task will be recognized as being a
corruption test?
Must must bear in mind that the total capacity of the trusted clients will be
far less than the total capacity of the untrusted clients (because otherwise
there would be no point in using untrusted clients at all). Also, using tests
that have known answers (a) will consume as much CPU capacity as a
corresponding genuine task but not give any useful, genuine results, and (b)
will essentially not tell you what the client was doing when producing
results that you intend to use, but only what the client was (or was not)
doing while completing the test.
I would go for using tests that in isolation might not conclusively identify
any corrupted client, but might be applied more frequently and at the same
time as the genuine tasks are performed, because they are less CPU consuming
on both the server side and the client side. But as you say: It is to some
extent a matter of taste.
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Explaination of method question
Date: 5 Mar 2000 08:57:50 GMT
In a previous article, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I'm curious as to why you would like me to explain it in these ways
For two reasons. Firstly, algorithms may often not be unequivocally described
in plain english, and a formal description is often a lot easier to read.
Secondly, if there are any weaknesses in the algorithm they are easier to
find given a reducible formal description of the system.
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: Decompiling/Tamper Resistent
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2000 10:54:56 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> totally wrong wish ...
> impossible to achieve ...
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > In order to protect our intelectual property (software) from
decompiling
> > freaks,
>
> they are not freaks ... but experts ... in contrary, you looks like an
> amateurish kid ...
> this is nothing personal but professional assessment only
He yjungle this forum is not for amateures like you ...I have seen some
of your previous postings ..they are hillarious and crazy.....just go
and take a walk...in the JUNLE ....
Here is one of your brilliant pieces, Pure Mind jibberish...
Author:
jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Message segment 1 of 2 - Get Next Segment - Get All 2 Segments
thanks for extended description
you did say that you installed illegal [ private ] software at US WEST
to utilize idle computer power to do
secondary calculations
what are actual charges from US WEST ?
did you plead guilty ?
have you been convicted ?
has charges been dropped ?
you did get fired from the contract
what level of damages you did suffer & are estimating ?
do not under - estimate, never under - estimate,
are material damages equal 500,000 OR 5,000,000 range OR different, do
not try include here any damages
that are NOT PURE MATERIAL in nature
you did say that eavesdropping on your phone has been installed /
recorded before FBI obtained permission
to do it, can you prove this ?
there is big difference between eavesdropping & recording 2 number
connection information [ caller /
receiver ] but not the factual conversation, what actually did happen
at US WEST in respect of your phone # ?
did FBI decrypt [ crack ] your pgp data ?
did FBI demand your keys for PGP encryption ?
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Crypto.Com, Inc.
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2000 12:24:31 +0100
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>
> It's called "spread spectrum" communications and is a well developed
> field. It offers advantages in noise reduction as well as privacy.
> The form you seem to have in mind is called "frequency hopping", and
> is used in many radios, including current combat gear. If you know
> the terms to search for, given in quotes above, you should be able
> to find numerous references on the Web.
It is the 'efficiency' of such measures 'in practice' that I suppose
could be interesting. If the efficiency is indeed very high, then the
'value' of encryption (in the narrow sense) would be correspondingly
somewhat lower in my humber view.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On jamming interception networks
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2000 12:24:47 +0100
Jerry Coffin wrote:
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
> > Simply saying your opponents are wrong is something any kid could
> > do in their talks. Clearly giving detailed and concrete reasons why
> > your opponents are wrong is what adult persons engaging in scientific
> > discussions do.
>
> I've already pointed out why I think you're wrong, but since you
> persist in the argument anyway, perhaps it's reasonable to point out
> a few other indications.
>
> IIRC, at one point you said you were interested less in the NSA per
> se, than the intelligence community in general. I personally believe
> they not only do very little covert surveillance, but in fact don't
> even bother collecting and processing huge amounts of data that are
> completely legally and publicly available.
[snip]
This is a misunderstanding, due however to my fault. I should
have written the title 'On jamming Echelon' instead. Echelon was
long time a secret project that (according to plausible informations)
was created during the cold war to intercept communications behind
the iron curtain and is now conjectured and believed by many to
use (now that the big threat USSR is no longer present) part of
its resources to intercept communications, including non-military
communications, of the free world. (See the STOA documents for
which I have given the links.) I chose to use the title as it is,
because it cannot be excluded (an in fact it is plausible to assume)
that there exist other apparatus that are similar in nature to
Echelon and because the suggested scheme is useful to jam all such
apparatus in my humble opinion.
>
> To me it seems downright ridiculous to assert that on one hand they
> ignore all sorts of information that they could obtain VERY easily
> and completely legally, but go to the trouble and risk of obtaining
> similar information in a manner that's illegal and MUCH more
> difficult to boot.
In one previous follow-up I have remarked on some other people's
suggestions on the internet in the past (I read many times
such suggestions) of intentionally putting words such as 'bombs'
in e-mails in order to 'waste' the resources of the interception
agencies and hence block these. (There was last year even an
action asking people to do that on a particular day.) I argued why
that is not useful to achieve the intended purpose. For those at
the agencies are certainly not unintelligent. They 'must' know
that no terrorist, unless he is a fool, would ever write such words
in plaintext in his messages to his companions. Thus I conjecture
that there is even a possibility that they in fact put such key words
in a 'negative' list to sort out from the outset stuffs that are
uninteresting. A person shouting lourdly in the street that he is
going to rob a bank is certainly and definitely not a gangster but
rather a candidate for the psychiartric clinic. Do you see my point?
So all publically available materials are barely of interest to
them. On the other hand, (it is trivial to say that) not all non-public
informations are interesting to them. On the contrary, only a
very extremely tiny fraction can be. Since their resources,
even though large, are finite and limited, they have to go about
in an optimal way. They can target on the communications of big
foreign commercial firms, which could contain sometimes top secrets
of their managers, for example. If, after having covered such fields,
there are still resources remaining, they could randomly select some
of the rest of the interceptable materials to see if by chance they
could find something interesting.
If I haven't well covered you comments, please kindly indicate that
clearly.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: On jamming interception networks
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2000 12:25:30 +0100
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>
> > ... and it isn't very
> > clear what 'that arguemt' being referred to exactly is.
>
> It was your argument (quoted in my posting) to which my statement
> "That argument isn't even worthy of a sophomore." was the response.
Natural languages could indeed be ambiguous, I believe. I don't
think that I was carrying out any 'argument' in the proper sense
of the word in the post you criticized. Let me reproduce your post:
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> ... Evidently that is beyond the capability of 'logic'. One should
> also remember that there is not even a 'unique' logic. I happen to
> be in possession of a copy of a master thesis of somebody entitled
> 'Nonclassical Logics' with 387 pages!
That argument isn't even worthy of a sophomore.
Which of my three sentences constituted my 'argument'? The second
sentence stated a fact. When most people talk about 'logic', they
implicitly mean the classical logic. Many don't even know about the
predicate calculi, not to mention nonclassical logics. Excepting
the disciplines mathematics and computing science, I really doubt how
high can be the percentage among the bachelors who have a concrete
idea of what these logics are, especially among those of disciplines
such as medicine, sociology, etc. Since presumably not every reader
of this group is a mathematician or computer scientist, 'stressing'
this fact doesn't seem to be much out of place. The third sentence
was presenting a tiny little fact which I thought somehow could
'aid' (or more or less add some 'entertainment' flavour to)
the second sentence in indicating that the field nonclassical logics
is quite large. On the assumption that not everyone of this group
has read 'concrete' literatures in that field, which appears to me
to be a reasonable assumption (same as e.g. about object-oriented
database technologies which I am also fairly sure is a subject that
not everyone of us has spent some time on), that sentence doesn't
seem to be much out of place either. Further, since these two
sentences are not 'arguing' anything, I infer that your phrase
'that argument' must refer to the first sentence. Am I right?
Now the first sentence referred to what preceded it in my post,
which I reproduce below:
By the very nature of the issues, it is impossible to put an end
to the rumors. Typical in such contexts (not only political or
military but also personal, e.g. concerning princesses, stars, etc.)
is always this: There have been secrets. When the secrets are later
revealed, how can one 'prove' that the revelation is indeed the
truth? (In principle the question is not very different from
the one discussed recently in another thread: How can one 'know'
that the public key of a certain person is indeed his?)
It is indeed a very 'trivial' fact that 'revealed' secrets cannot be
'proved' and be convinced by 'all' people. That should be 'clear' and
'known' to 'everyone' and hence the 'auxiliary' meaning of your
word 'sophomore' could apply (in fact you could have employed
'street cleaner' instead!). But the intention of that sentence was
more or less sarcastic, referring, among others, to the fact that
people sometimes (irrationally) expend much time and energy to
'resolve' some issues, for which one should however know from the
very beginning that there is no hope of success.
I was in fact confused by your word 'sophomore'. For I do have
quite an amount 'respect' to the knowledge and abilities of an
average first or second year university student, though I was a bit
surprised by Mr. Molnar's information that one of them has aptly
worked on the topic of nonclassical logics.
If you had written 'You are uselessly repeating trivial facts and
tautologies known to everybody!', I would not have commented on
your post, even though I would in that case have considered myself
not being fairly criticized by you for reasons given above.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
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