Cryptography-Digest Digest #573, Volume #11 Wed, 19 Apr 00 08:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: AEES-encryption (Runu Knips)
Re: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill ("Scotty")
Re: Should there be an AES for stream ciphers? (Runu Knips)
Re: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill (Alan Braggins)
Re: Should there be an AES for stream ciphers? (Runu Knips)
Re: My STRONG data encryption algorithm (Runu Knips)
GSM Man-in-the-Middle (Matt Linder)
Key generation in smartcards (Marcin Jaskolski)
Re: Fighting fire with fire: using encryption to bust encryption [0/2] (John Savard)
Re: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill (_Andy_)
Decrypting (Mr.Mr.)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 14:02:07 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: AEES-encryption
[EMAIL PROTECTED] schrieb:
> AEES is symmetric encryption algorithm, which is developed from the
> DES architecture. [...]
> Performance with my IP II,267 Mhz, 128 Mb is 64Kb/sec.
> Algorithm description and source code can be found
> at <www.alex-encryption.de> [...]
Okay, you've renamed your algorithm, but I've still no clue
of the (practial) use of a cipher with only 64 KB/s on a
PII 266. Even DES reaches 3,5 MB/s (= 28 MBit/s) on a
PPro 200 according to
http://www.btinternet.com/~brian.gladman/cryptography_technology/aes/
. And most of the AES candidates (at least those which are
still in the contest) are even faster than DES ! (with
improved speed).
------------------------------
From: "Scotty" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk,alt.computer.security
Subject: Re: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 13:09:18 +0100
_Andy_ wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>On Tue, 18 Apr 2000 05:49:17 -0400, "Trevor L. Jackson, III"
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>_Andy_ wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 18 Apr 2000 06:40:47 +0100, Philip Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >An absolute offence is one where intent is irrelevant. The prosecution
>>> >still have to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of
>>> >drink driving, that the correct procedure was followed and the
apparatus
>>> >showed you over the limit. That you were being forced to drive could
>>> >only be presented in mitigation. You'd still be guilty.
>>>
>>> How would the Bill cope with occasions where you do not have the key,
>>> and have never had the key?
>>>
>>> For example...
>>>
>>> Bob lives in UK and wishes to store an encrypted file on his computer.
>>> Papinski lives in the Ukraine and provides public and private keys.
>>>
>>> Papinski sends Bob only the public key, which Bob uses to encrypt the
>>> file. For Bob to decrypt the file, he must request the private key
>>> from Papinski. Papinski will not supply the key to anyone apart from
>>> Bob, and will not supply it to Bob if the police are involved.
>>
>>But Bob is forbidden to tell Papinski that the police are involved.
>
>Who by? You're free to tell anyone that you are under investigation by
>the police etc.
>
No not in this case, you are forbidden under penalty of 5 years imprisonment
if you tell anyone except you lawyer. If you do not co-operate in getting
your key you face 2 years imprisonment. Last, and most fantastically (in
its original form), someone complaining about a notice under
the Human Rights Act, must, of course, disclose the notice, and so commit an
offence. Can he get advice? Clause 13 (5) suggests that his lawyer might
have a defence for disclosing the notice to a court, but clause 13 (6)
specifically disapplies that protection to legal advice given in furtherance
of a crime, which is where we began. The words are simple, each on their
own, but their combined logic itself seems cruel and unusual punishment.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 14:13:45 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Should there be an AES for stream ciphers?
Albert Yang wrote:
> Well, I know that you can take a Block Cipher and make it into a stream
> cipher, but that's not the point. Should there be a standarized stream
> cipher, the same as the attempt to standarize the block cipher?
Hmm. One doesn't need stream ciphers too often, does one ? And if
one does, then performance is not THAT important (for example, when
used in some ssh-environment). So using a block cipher in stream
mode fits the purpose very well, doesn't it ?
> Thoughts? AES Stream Cipher just a waste of time? While on the
> subject, why not have a AES Hash contest too?
AFAIK there is only SHA-1 and RIPE MD160 at the moment. All the rest
of known one way hashfunctions have known weaknesses. So with what
do you want to make a contest ?
You see, on a theoretical basis I fully agree with you, but in
practice it seems to me like just adding unneccessary complexity.
------------------------------
From: Alan Braggins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk,alt.computer.security
Subject: Re: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill
Date: 18 Apr 2000 13:10:05 +0100
Philip Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >"(2) If any person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 1
> >believes, on reasonable grounds-
> >(a) that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any
> >person,
[...]
> >"49. - (1) A person is guilty of an offence if-
> > (a) he fails to comply, in accordance with any section 46 notice, with any
> >requirement of that notice to disclose a key to protected information; and
> > (b) he is a person who has or has had possession of the key. "
>
> But if your defense was that the data referred to in the section 46
> notice was not encrypted (but a randomly generated meaningless sequence
> of bytes) and there was no key and therefore one could never have been
> in possession of a key. The prosecution would have to show beyond
> reasonable doubt that you were lying ie that you are 'a person who has
> or has had possession of the key'.
On the other hand if your defence was that you were using a scheme
with forward secrecy, or that you have since revoked and deleted the
key used, and that although you had possession of the key at the time
you read the message you don't have it now, their belief on reasonable
grounds that you still have it is enough for you to be committing an
offence, even though there is no possible way for you to have complied
with the notice.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 14:17:15 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Should there be an AES for stream ciphers?
John Savard wrote:
> Albert Yang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
> >[...] While on the subject, why not have a AES Hash contest too?
> For the hash, they're just letting the NSA do it. (The SHA-2 thread)
But thats hardly the same than having an official contest, isn't it ?
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 14:42:14 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: My STRONG data encryption algorithm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I have developed a data encryption algorithm and I think it is very
> very strong, maybe the strongest ever. [...]
True. But unfortunately you have been put into a time
machine and now we write the year 2000 and no longer
1300 as before.
> The code is written in Turbo C++ and is easy to understand.
It is completely chaotic. You have a horrible programming
style, my dear. A wellstyled block cipher should have an
outfit such as:
________________________________
struct keyschedule {
... data elements ...
};
#define BLOCKSIZE ... size of block ...
--- > NO GLOBAL VARIABLES <--
void setkey (struct keyschedule *key, const char data[], size_t len)
{
... initialize key schedule ...
}
void encrypt (struct keyschedule *key, const char in[], char out[])
{
... encrypt data ...
}
void decrypt (struct keyschedule *key, const char in[], char out[])
{
... decrypt data ...
}
________________________________
Plus, of course you don't do any I/O in it.
> It is 32768-bit
It is less than strlen(passwd)*5.5 bit. You only allow a-z and
0-9 in passwords (36 distinct values), therefore each character
counts a little more than 5 bit.
------------------------------
From: Matt Linder <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: GSM Man-in-the-Middle
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 13:00:00 GMT
I was reading an old post entilted "Key exchange using Secret Key
Encryption" in which people were talking about a Man-in-the-Middle
attack on internet traffic, and it made me think of the recent thread
about GSM and A5/1.
Would it be possible to do a Man-in-the-Middle type of attack on GSM?
How could you prevent such an attack? (I got some ideas from old posts)
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: Marcin Jaskolski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Key generation in smartcards
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 15:12:47 +0200
Hi all,
I am doing some research for my Cryptography classes (I'm a computer
science student). I'm looking for a specific methods of generating
public keys (RSA, ElGamal), used mainly in smart cards, which allow
the producer/someone else posessing some kind of key to break the cipher
easily (to find the private key).
I'm also looking for information how to find out if a given public key
(or pair:public/private key) is weak in terms described above.
I'll be very happy if anyone can help me finding some info
Have a nice day,
Marcin Jaskolski
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Fighting fire with fire: using encryption to bust encryption [0/2]
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 12:56:14 GMT
On Mon, 17 Apr 2000 23:37:06 GMT, Gideon Samid <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>For details:
>See attached TAKE article.
You could have posted the article...unless it wasn't in text form.
Instead, you posted *nine* copies of this initial post, which seems a
bit excessive.
John Savard (teneerf <-)
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/index.html
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (_Andy_)
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk,alt.computer.security
Subject: Re: Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 13:36:01 GMT
On Tue, 18 Apr 2000 13:09:18 +0100, "Scotty"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>_Andy_ wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>>On Tue, 18 Apr 2000 05:49:17 -0400, "Trevor L. Jackson, III"
>><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>_Andy_ wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, 18 Apr 2000 06:40:47 +0100, Philip Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> >An absolute offence is one where intent is irrelevant. The prosecution
>>>> >still have to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of
>>>> >drink driving, that the correct procedure was followed and the
>apparatus
>>>> >showed you over the limit. That you were being forced to drive could
>>>> >only be presented in mitigation. You'd still be guilty.
>>>>
>>>> How would the Bill cope with occasions where you do not have the key,
>>>> and have never had the key?
>>>>
>>>> For example...
>>>>
>>>> Bob lives in UK and wishes to store an encrypted file on his computer.
>>>> Papinski lives in the Ukraine and provides public and private keys.
>>>>
>>>> Papinski sends Bob only the public key, which Bob uses to encrypt the
>>>> file. For Bob to decrypt the file, he must request the private key
>>>> from Papinski. Papinski will not supply the key to anyone apart from
>>>> Bob, and will not supply it to Bob if the police are involved.
>>>
>>>But Bob is forbidden to tell Papinski that the police are involved.
>>
>>Who by? You're free to tell anyone that you are under investigation by
>>the police etc.
>>
>
>No not in this case, you are forbidden under penalty of 5 years imprisonment
>if you tell anyone except you lawyer.
(I hadn't actually read as far as section 50!)
If one were not to state the full nature of the investigation, just "I
am being investigated..."
If one hadn't disclosed anything defined in Section 46, how could
Section 50 apply? Or would it come under the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996 as mentioned in Schedule 3?
------------------------------
From: Mr.Mr. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Decrypting
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 16:15:20 +0200
I need info on how to decrypt files. is there anybody who can give me
an reference to an website?
------------------------------
** FOR YOUR REFERENCE **
The service address, to which questions about the list itself and requests
to be added to or deleted from it should be directed, is:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can send mail to the entire list (and sci.crypt) via:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
End of Cryptography-Digest Digest
******************************
