Cryptography-Digest Digest #613, Volume #11 Sun, 23 Apr 00 12:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other equally secure
programs (Anthony Stephen Szopa)
Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other equally secure
programs (Anthony Stephen Szopa)
Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other (Tom St Denis)
Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other equally (Tom St
Denis)
Re: quantum computation FAQ? (David A Molnar)
Re: Checksum algorithm which is ASCII (Terry Neckar)
Re: The Illusion of Security (John Savard)
Re: The Illusion of Security (John Savard)
Re: Data Encryption in Applet? (Mick)
Re: Checksum algorithm which is ASCII (Tom St Denis)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other equally secure
programs
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 06:24:05 -0700
"Trevor L. Jackson, III" wrote:
>
> James Felling wrote:
>
> > This program is a clasic example of the assertion that any algortihim that
> > does not form a group over its keys can if reiterated enough be made
> > arbitrarially secure.
> >
> > I have withdrawn any criticisms that I have in re: the security of this
> > program provided that the Mix files are generated by a sulficient number of
> > passes of his processes.
>
> I think this begs the question of the definition of "sufficient". In another
> post the suggestion was made to have the user enter ~3000 characters of input,
> all of it "truly random". Since this is well over the average page of text (at
> ~2500 characters), we're not talking about a pass phrase, we're describing a
> "pass page".
>
> 1.) Given ~3000 "truly random" characters, or ~24K bits, one can find far more
> efficient application of that amount of entropy for security purposes. Even a
> 50% efficient application of the entropy should give a space of 2^12,000
> (10^~3600) rather than the quoted figure of 10^~459.
>
> 2.) Given that typing in a page of characters is an onerous, error prone
> process, one immediately considers automating it with a machine-readable
> representation of the input. But if the communicants using this system are
> going to pass around machine readable media why would they not pass around
> large keys and use a true OTP instead of a fake one?
>
> > I now wish for him to adress the severe usability and documentational
> > issues that his program possesses.
>
> I believe we have yet to see an adequate excuse for the existence of this
> software. I'm interested in learning it, if it becomes available.
"I believe we have yet to see an adequate excuse for the existence
of this software. I'm interested in learning it, if it becomes
available."
I find this comment intriguing.
So many in this news group have said that OAP-L3 is bogus and weak
and flawed, etc. When pressed they back off or change their opinion.
Whatever is said, the true test is whether anyone can break messages
encrypted using OAP-L3. No credible realistic approach has been
offered.
Surely everyone agrees that the processes are trivial and the concept
of the random digit generator is simple to understand.
But never has it been more true that the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts.
The software needs no excuse. It fulfills a need: extreme security
that is easily understood by its users (anyone with average
intelligence or better.) No specialized knowledge or faith required.
It uses no mathematical equations so attacks against mathematical
equations are of no concern. It has practicably unlimited security
that is user defined. All other encryption software has a very
limited security level (although it is claimed that they are
"adequate.") OAP-L3 lets the user decide how much security they
need.
All a cracker needs to do is determine what processes are run and how
many times they are run and in what sequence they are run then the
cracker must guess the true random numbers the user inputs for each
process to duplicate the OTP files.
If the user uses a sufficiently long key according to
recommendations, since the encryption can only be broken using brute
force (short of stealing the key or bugging the user's computer,
etc.), it soon becomes practicably impossible to crack the encrypted
messages.
Unbreakable encryption is the motivation resulting in the development
of OAP-L3.
Absolute privacy is the motivation for using OAP-L3.
Hundreds of people agree.
And we can be sure that these hundreds have given shareware copies to
their most trusted friends and associates.
Version 5.0 will demonstrate that this modified and enhanced random
digit generator and the random digits generated from it and the
triplets calculated from them and the random numbers from 0 - 255
calculated from these will be secure to encrypt messages directly.
See ya, fellas.
------------------------------
From: Anthony Stephen Szopa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other equally
secure programs
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 06:30:28 -0700
Tom St Denis wrote:
>
> Anthony Stephen Szopa wrote:
>
> > I thought you were a phony.
> >
> > You are in high school?
> >
> > You find abstract algebra difficult?
> >
> > You post in several news groups on many subjects?
> >
> > And I need to grow up, too?
>
> You are doubting I am in high school? I don't need to prove myself to
> you. Look me up if you want my DOB is April 7th 1982, My legal name is
> Thomas James St Denis, that should be enough to find where I am, you can
> call me up if you wish.
>
> >
> > Since it appears obvious to me that you misrepresented yourself to
> > me, I am interested as to how many others you have misrepresented
> > yourself to, and how may others you continue to misrepresent
> > yourself to. (no response expected. this is just a rhetorical
> > statement.)
> >
> > A liar like an adulterer can never be trusted again.
>
> But I am not lying.
>
> > When people look into your eyes I hope they see what I have learned
> > about you. Think about it when they gaze into your eyes.
> >
> > I am sure you can find others in this and other news groups to play
> > with. If they trust you it is at their own risk.
> >
> > So you should not waste anymore of your time conversing with me.
> > There are plenty of other suckers out there for your delectation.
>
> You see, you didn't respond to my questions. You just targteted *me*.
> How about you focus on your 'theory' and less the posters.
>
> Face it, your a troll.
>
> Tom
Take my advice:
Don't waste your breath.
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 13:34:12 GMT
Anthony Stephen Szopa wrote:
>
> Tom St Denis wrote:
> >
> > Anthony Stephen Szopa wrote:
> >
> > > I thought you were a phony.
> > >
> > > You are in high school?
> > >
> > > You find abstract algebra difficult?
> > >
> > > You post in several news groups on many subjects?
> > >
> > > And I need to grow up, too?
> >
> > You are doubting I am in high school? I don't need to prove myself to
> > you. Look me up if you want my DOB is April 7th 1982, My legal name is
> > Thomas James St Denis, that should be enough to find where I am, you can
> > call me up if you wish.
> >
> > >
> > > Since it appears obvious to me that you misrepresented yourself to
> > > me, I am interested as to how many others you have misrepresented
> > > yourself to, and how may others you continue to misrepresent
> > > yourself to. (no response expected. this is just a rhetorical
> > > statement.)
> > >
> > > A liar like an adulterer can never be trusted again.
> >
> > But I am not lying.
> >
> > > When people look into your eyes I hope they see what I have learned
> > > about you. Think about it when they gaze into your eyes.
> > >
> > > I am sure you can find others in this and other news groups to play
> > > with. If they trust you it is at their own risk.
> > >
> > > So you should not waste anymore of your time conversing with me.
> > > There are plenty of other suckers out there for your delectation.
> >
> > You see, you didn't respond to my questions. You just targteted *me*.
> > How about you focus on your 'theory' and less the posters.
> >
> > Face it, your a troll.
> >
> > Tom
>
> Take my advice:
>
> Don't waste your breath.
ARrg.. why don't you answer a real question?
Tom
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: OAP-L3: Secure, but WAY more dificult to use than other equally
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 13:38:14 GMT
Anthony Stephen Szopa wrote:
>
> "I believe we have yet to see an adequate excuse for the existence
> of this software. I'm interested in learning it, if it becomes
> available."
>
> I find this comment intriguing.
>
> So many in this news group have said that OAP-L3 is bogus and weak
> and flawed, etc. When pressed they back off or change their opinion.
Most people will not put up with your attititude. Your are an arrogant
ignorant person, and most professionals just say "he's a troll so I will
ignore him". Find one person that thinks your software is a) remotely
secure and/or b) remotely usefull.
> Whatever is said, the true test is whether anyone can break messages
> encrypted using OAP-L3. No credible realistic approach has been
> offered.
And the fact your method is slow, takes up too much ram and is not
public yet, tbose aren't good reasons to avoid your software?
> It uses no mathematical equations so attacks against mathematical
> equations are of no concern. It has practicably unlimited security
> that is user defined. All other encryption software has a very
> limited security level (although it is claimed that they are
> "adequate.") OAP-L3 lets the user decide how much security they
> need.
"Uses no mathematical equations" what the hell does that mean? You
wrote it as a computer program it must be at some level mathematical.
> All a cracker needs to do is determine what processes are run and how
> many times they are run and in what sequence they are run then the
> cracker must guess the true random numbers the user inputs for each
> process to duplicate the OTP files.
>
> If the user uses a sufficiently long key according to
> recommendations, since the encryption can only be broken using brute
> force (short of stealing the key or bugging the user's computer,
> etc.), it soon becomes practicably impossible to crack the encrypted
> messages.
>
> Unbreakable encryption is the motivation resulting in the development
> of OAP-L3.
>
> Absolute privacy is the motivation for using OAP-L3.
>
> Hundreds of people agree.
Hundreds of ignorant people agree.
> And we can be sure that these hundreds have given shareware copies to
> their most trusted friends and associates.
Same ignorant people.
> Version 5.0 will demonstrate that this modified and enhanced random
> digit generator and the random digits generated from it and the
> triplets calculated from them and the random numbers from 0 - 255
> calculated from these will be secure to encrypt messages directly.
How is V5 gonna be any better then v4? Maybe if you explain why your
changes make it "better" we will understand what analysis you have done
already. Making an algorithm more complicated doesn't really make it
more secure.
Tom
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: quantum computation FAQ?
Date: 23 Apr 2000 13:45:18 GMT
John Bailey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> To help the project, I can offer a key word indexed collection of
> reprints from Los Alamos National Archive on quantum computing topics
> from which I would be happy to glean articles (by URL to pdf) which
> answer key subjects--eg what's a good survey available on the web,
> where can I find Shor's or Grover's original papers, etc.
Thanks! Send that to me directly and I'll put it up on a web page at
http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~dmolnar/quantFAQ
> Also, I am sure many could contribute reviews of recent survey books
> which cover the subject: eg Feynman and Computation
> and lastly, there are web pages on the subject--some of which are
> current and coherent.
Yes. I know about some of these pages and had been planning to put
pointers in wherever possible. Not least because I am not a physicist.
Fortunately, it seems that some of the first questions regarding
quantum computing and crypto can be settled without too much physics.
> Lastly--there may be a need for it to be multi-lingual--computerspeak
> vs physicsspeak :-)--- or in some way manage a bridge between the two
> disciplines without talking down to monolinguals from either.
Yep. I'm a wannabe computer person, so I feel inadequate
here...
> A start would be to cross-post your original message to sci.physics
> (where you pick-up the nuts) or sci.physics.research (where if you are
> a non-physicist they may moderase your post)
Thanks for the suggestion. I'll try sci.physics .
Thanks,
-David
------------------------------
From: Terry Neckar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Checksum algorithm which is ASCII
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 14:43:04 GMT
The SHA-1 algorighm is not the right one. It puts out 5 words, 4 bytes
each. I need one that puts out one six ASCII character string, such as
"AXBQE3". Any other ideas?
Thanks,
Terry Neckar
Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> I have no reason to be paid for this, as it's a very simple
> recommendation, use SHA-1. It's available many places, even
> from several people on this ng. A simple search from yahoo
> or google should turn up hundreds of implementations, or you
> can simply use openssl or I believe cb (from Tom St Denis)
> has it.
> Joe
>
> "Terry Neckar" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:LzlM4.57559$[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ...
> > Does anyone know of a CRC algorithm that has six ASCII
> characters. The file
> > I use is a text file similar to below. If someone has the
> answer, I'll
> > gratefully pay them. This algorighm is at least 10 years
> old.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Terry
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> ------------------
> > ---------
> > KEY_FILE
> >
> > ISSUER: MY COMPANY
> >
> > SITE_ID: 000000
> > CUSTOMER NAME: DEFAULT
> >
> > KEY_VERSION: 1.0
> > KEY_SEQUENCE: 00000000
> > KEY_CREATION: 22 MAR 1995
> >
> > # PRODUCT FRAME_SN MB_SN OPTIONS
> > X 1234 000000000000 000000000000 M0
> $
> > Y 0000 000000000000 000000000000 M0
> $
> > 0 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 1 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 2 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 3 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 4 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 5 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 6 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 7 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 8 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > 9 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > A 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > B 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > C 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > D 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > E 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> > F 0000 000000000000 000099999999 M0
> $
> >
> > CHECKSUM: $ABCDE
> >
> >
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: The Illusion of Security
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 14:36:24 GMT
On Sun, 23 Apr 2000 07:20:37 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter) wrote,
in part:
>Once again we have the hidden assumption which I question: That you
>know the cipher to be more secure than other insecurities in the
>system. Now, you may think that, and you may believe that, and for
>all I know everybody else does too, but neither you nor anybody else
>actually *knows* that. That is an assumption for which there is no
>evidence. It is a particularly comforting belief, and no more.
>You do *not* know that there is no break which is easier than whatever
>other weakness is in the system. But I suggest we make the rest of
>the system hard instead of depending on it as an excuse to not worry
>about cipher strength.
Well, I _do_ "know that" in at least _one_ sense. Unlike information
about the vulnerabilities nobody who's _telling_ knows about in the
ciphers, the information on how to exploit the _other_ weaknesses in
the system is _already publicly available_.
And by this I don't just mean "kiddie scripts". Starting from general
principles of hacking, the effort required to break into a computer
system is simply in another league from the effort required to develop
new cryptanalytic attacks.
Worrying about, say, organized crime having access to cryptanalytic
research years in advance of public knowlege is not realistic, and
many users of cryptography do not have major governments as their
opponents.
John Savard (teneerf <-)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: The Illusion of Security
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 14:49:27 GMT
On Sun, 23 Apr 2000 07:21:56 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter) wrote,
in part:
>On Sun, 23 Apr 2000 04:32:38 GMT, in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>in sci.crypt [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard) wrote:
>>But I also see why calls for a more open-minded approach to cipher
>>choice are looked upon with great skepticism.
>Oddly, I do not.
The reason why is nothing more than those two previous points which
you acknowleged as true. Those are sufficient reason for skepticism. A
"more open-minded approach to cipher choice" is something that appears
likely to remove, for most users, the advantage of "following the
herd"; to leave them bereft even of resistance to known attacks.
But you are right if you mean they are not sufficient reason for
rejecting all new ideas out of hand completely. Your multi-ciphering
proposal, for example, met this particular objection.
I've raised what is, in my mind, the most serious objection to it in
its present form: that to realize some of the advantages that are
hoped for from it, specifically a broad marketplace for cipher
designs, one has to have a setup so open that vulnerability to
malicious code appears to stop being a controllable threat, without
elaborate precautions such as the use of P-code. The objections
concerning cryptographic security were met.
John Savard (teneerf <-)
------------------------------
From: Mick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
comp.lang.java.security,microsoft.public.java.security,comp.lang.java.programmer
Subject: Re: Data Encryption in Applet?
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 15:45:58 +0100
Hi Greg,
The problem with symmetric encryption is that applets can be decompiled.
PGP, for instance, although it uses symmetric encryption for the bulk of
the message, nevertheless uses RSA asymmetric encryption to communicate
the symmetric key. Your applet wouldn't do that, I guess.
I've implemented RSA encryption in an applet, originally to enable a
small business to responsibly get confidential details from web-site
visitors, without having to have a secure server running SSL.
The public key is in an applet parameter; the private key is only on the
private machine in the office (not net-accessible).
Using Java 1.1 this is pretty easy, as there is BigInteger support -
though you still need to generate a pair of keys, of course. The one I
wrote implemented some simple BigInteger routines itself, as it's Java
1.0.2 and runs in older Browsers.
See www.lair.demon.co.uk/SecureMsg/SecureMsg.html to see a version of
the applet running.
The whole package has a KeyGenerator program, a Decryptor program, and
an Encryptor applet. I'm still writing the documentation.. :)
Of course it looks better to the customer to use SSL, as then the
padlock/key logo in the Browser status line turns on, but not everyone
has a secure server..
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Abid Farooqui
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes
>Why not simply use SSL on your web server and limit the ciphers to 3A and 27
>(on apache). These are strong ciphers DES3 etc. Put the applet on a SSL
>protected page and then the applet will be downloaded with your secret key
>being sent in an encrypted fashion and thus allowing you the flexibility to
>generate the secret key on the server.
>Abid Farooqui
>
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> Hi
>>
>> I am looking for a way to encrypt data through an applet using symmetric
>> (or asymmetric) encryption. I thought of sending an applet containing a
>> symmetric key to a client. This is key is to perform encryption on some
>> data on the client side. Anybody has any idea how to do this in Java or
>> has any source codes in Java?
>>
>> Thanks in advance
>>
>> Greg
>
--
Mick
To mail me type my name instead of nospam and I'll be more likely to read it
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Checksum algorithm which is ASCII
Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2000 15:40:48 GMT
Terry Neckar wrote:
>
> The SHA-1 algorighm is not the right one. It puts out 5 words, 4 bytes
> each. I need one that puts out one six ASCII character string, such as
> "AXBQE3". Any other ideas?
Why not just truncate the output of SHA-1? Doesn't seem you are
thinking about this.
Tom
------------------------------
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