Cryptography-Digest Digest #841, Volume #11 Tue, 23 May 00 06:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Retail distributors of DES chips? (zapzing)
Re: Retail distributors of DES chips? (Paul Rubin)
OT: Long sentences (Runu Knips)
Re: Interesting differentials in BREAKME (Raphael Phan Chung Wei)
Re: Interesting differentials in BREAKME (Raphael Phan Chung Wei)
OT: Linux international kernel compilation (Runu Knips)
Re: how do you know your decyption worked? (Runu Knips)
Re: Yet another block cipher: Storin (Runu Knips)
Re: More on Pi and randomness (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Refs to "Hillclimbing" and other algorithms? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Crypto patentability (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Yet another block cipher: Storin (Mark Wooding)
Re: Yet another block cipher: Storin (Mark Wooding)
RE: Chosen plaintext attack, isn't it absurd? ("Manuel Pancorbo")
RE: Yet another block cipher: Storin ("Manuel Pancorbo")
Re: Crypto patentability (Mark Wooding)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Retail distributors of DES chips?
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 05:01:51 GMT
Where can I buy DES chips?
I've searched alot and I can't
find any retail distributors.
The only thing I found was one
Canadian company that was mentioned
in the FAQ, but their chips sound
much too "high end" for me.
Thanks in advance.
--
Do as thou thinkest best.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Subject: Re: Retail distributors of DES chips?
Date: 23 May 2000 06:14:13 GMT
In article <8gd3bq$qk5$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Where can I buy DES chips? I've searched alot and I can't find any
>retail distributors. The only thing I found was one Canadian company
>that was mentioned in the FAQ, but their chips sound much too "high
>end" for me. Thanks in advance.
If your application isn't high end, use software, not a chip.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 08:45:10 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: OT: Long sentences
Gordon Walker wrote:
>
> On Sat, 20 May 2000 02:09:44 -0600, Jerry Coffin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>
> >In case you care, these may be the longest sentences you've ever
> >seen, but as claims go they're really not terribly long -- I've seen
> >some that went on (still as a single sentence) for over a page.
>
> Off topic:
> George Harrison, the maker of the first timepiece accurate to measure
> longitude at sea wrote a book in which the first sentence went on for
> 178 pages.
OUCH !
When I was in school, we analysed different books and, beside of other
values, we computed the average word count per sentence.
The better books had in general the higher values.
Maybe Mr. Harrison had heared about the same phenomena and therefore
decided that his book should be the best one of all times ? ;-)
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 14:50:45 +0800
From: Raphael Phan Chung Wei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Interesting differentials in BREAKME
Ok, so we have a 10-round differential of prob. 2^-15.... how do we make use of
this to break the cipher? I still do not have a clear idea how to implement this
attack.. We need 2^26 chosen plaintext pairs... and then?
Raphael
Mark Wooding wrote:
> Raphael Phan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Ok, Mark, so how did you manage to get a differential of 32/256? Could you
> > enclose your difference distribution table for us?
>
> I only analysed output differences of zero. The table maps input
> differences to differential probability * 256. The entry for an input
> difference of zero is zero because I didn't bother trying it: the result
> is predictable and it makes spotting the maximum probability harder.
>
> x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 xa xb xc xd xe xf
>
> 0x 00 04 12 0a 0c 0c 0c 10 08 16 18 0c 18 16 12 0e
> 1x 04 16 0a 10 12 08 0a 18 16 10 0a 14 12 18 0a 06
> 2x 14 0c 12 0e 0e 0c 12 18 18 0c 10 14 0a 14 0e 12
> 3x 0a 0a 0e 08 0c 0e 14 08 0a 08 0e 0c 0e 0a 0a 16
> 4x 12 14 0e 0c 10 0e 08 08 12 10 0a 18 12 10 12 0a
> 5x 14 0a 1e 08 0c 0e 14 16 12 0c 18 0c 1e 12 0e 16
> 6x 18 10 0a 16 0a 20 0e 0a 10 12 0e 10 12 08 12 0c
> 7x 16 10 16 0a 10 04 06 0e 12 0a 10 08 0c 0e 14 0a
> 8x 0e 10 14 0e 0e 14 0c 0e 0c 10 0c 14 12 0c 12 0a
> 9x 0e 10 08 14 16 0c 10 0e 12 0a 08 0e 06 18 0a 08
> ax 0c 06 14 0c 0a 0e 10 10 0c 12 16 0e 0a 10 1e 0c
> bx 12 0e 10 12 10 14 0a 0a 02 12 06 14 0a 08 0c 14
> cx 12 10 12 08 16 12 16 14 14 10 0a 16 0e 1c 0c 10
> dx 08 10 08 0c 16 18 12 12 10 14 12 0e 0c 0c 0c 08
> ex 0e 0e 16 18 0a 0a 10 12 08 0c 0c 16 12 0a 14 12
> fx 0a 0a 1a 0e 0e 0c 10 12 10 0e 0a 16 06 0a 0c 10
>
> The Perl program which generated the table can be found below.
>
> #! /usr/bin/perl
>
> @s = (
> 3, 7, 1, 9, 5, 6, 3, 8, 6, 2, 3, 14, 5, 4, 11, 2,
> 12, 4, 2, 12, 1, 12, 1, 0, 10, 12, 10, 13, 6, 10, 1, 9,
> 9, 7, 8, 0, 6, 11, 10, 6, 0, 9, 6, 7, 8, 5, 6, 14,
> 4, 9, 10, 13, 1, 14, 8, 12, 10, 1, 8, 0, 6, 9, 14, 9,
> 12, 5, 13, 15, 12, 9, 11, 5, 4, 6, 14, 12, 8, 15, 14, 11,
> 4, 15, 1, 13, 1, 11, 10, 3, 3, 12, 6, 0, 15, 14, 15, 14,
> 7, 5, 9, 2, 5, 13, 0, 9, 5, 13, 7, 15, 2, 9, 10, 4,
> 12, 7, 6, 7, 4, 6, 15, 1, 13, 11, 1, 4, 6, 10, 8, 0,
> 1, 0, 11, 3, 6, 15, 12, 8, 15, 11, 14, 7, 7, 12, 14, 2,
> 4, 0, 12, 13, 3, 11, 0, 13, 0, 15, 10, 2, 8, 4, 3, 0,
> 5, 1, 4, 4, 11, 5, 7, 11, 0, 14, 9, 13, 7, 15, 15, 10,
> 13, 7, 14, 3, 7, 8, 1, 10, 8, 2, 13, 2, 7, 5, 4, 12,
> 0, 2, 3, 5, 4, 11, 2, 13, 15, 6, 4, 13, 5, 0, 14, 5,
> 15, 0, 9, 10, 12, 0, 11, 11, 2, 14, 5, 9, 3, 8, 11, 13,
> 13, 1, 8, 7, 14, 15, 3, 2, 14, 2, 3, 8, 3, 12, 7, 5,
> 2, 3, 15, 10, 9, 8, 9, 8, 10, 11, 6, 1, 1, 3, 4, 10
> );
>
> @d = ();
>
> for ($d = 1; $d < 256; $d++) {
> for ($x = 0; $x < 256; $x++) {
> if ($s[$x] == $s[$x ^ $d]) { $d[$d]++; }
> }
> }
>
> @max = ();
> $m = 0;
>
> for ($i = 0; $i < 256; $i++) {
> printf("%02x ", $d[$i]);
> print "\n" if $i % 16 == 15;
> if ($d[$i] > $m) { $m = $d[$i]; @max = (); }
> if ($d[$i] == $m) { push(@max, $i); }
> }
>
> printf("%02x: ", $m);
> foreach $i (@max) { printf("%02x ", $i); }
> print "\n";
>
> -- [mdw]
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 14:55:23 +0800
From: Raphael Phan Chung Wei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Interesting differentials in BREAKME
How do we implement the generation of for example 2^32 chosen plaintexts pairs? For
example, for the breakme cipher, we would like plaintext pairs with the input XOR of
0x65000000... how do you translate that into C code?
Raphael
Raphael Phan Chung Wei wrote:
> Ok, so we have a 10-round differential of prob. 2^-15.... how do we make use of
> this to break the cipher? I still do not have a clear idea how to implement this
> attack.. We need 2^26 chosen plaintext pairs... and then?
>
> Raphael
>
> Mark Wooding wrote:
>
> > Raphael Phan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > Ok, Mark, so how did you manage to get a differential of 32/256? Could you
> > > enclose your difference distribution table for us?
> >
> > I only analysed output differences of zero. The table maps input
> > differences to differential probability * 256. The entry for an input
> > difference of zero is zero because I didn't bother trying it: the result
> > is predictable and it makes spotting the maximum probability harder.
> >
> > x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 xa xb xc xd xe xf
> >
> > 0x 00 04 12 0a 0c 0c 0c 10 08 16 18 0c 18 16 12 0e
> > 1x 04 16 0a 10 12 08 0a 18 16 10 0a 14 12 18 0a 06
> > 2x 14 0c 12 0e 0e 0c 12 18 18 0c 10 14 0a 14 0e 12
> > 3x 0a 0a 0e 08 0c 0e 14 08 0a 08 0e 0c 0e 0a 0a 16
> > 4x 12 14 0e 0c 10 0e 08 08 12 10 0a 18 12 10 12 0a
> > 5x 14 0a 1e 08 0c 0e 14 16 12 0c 18 0c 1e 12 0e 16
> > 6x 18 10 0a 16 0a 20 0e 0a 10 12 0e 10 12 08 12 0c
> > 7x 16 10 16 0a 10 04 06 0e 12 0a 10 08 0c 0e 14 0a
> > 8x 0e 10 14 0e 0e 14 0c 0e 0c 10 0c 14 12 0c 12 0a
> > 9x 0e 10 08 14 16 0c 10 0e 12 0a 08 0e 06 18 0a 08
> > ax 0c 06 14 0c 0a 0e 10 10 0c 12 16 0e 0a 10 1e 0c
> > bx 12 0e 10 12 10 14 0a 0a 02 12 06 14 0a 08 0c 14
> > cx 12 10 12 08 16 12 16 14 14 10 0a 16 0e 1c 0c 10
> > dx 08 10 08 0c 16 18 12 12 10 14 12 0e 0c 0c 0c 08
> > ex 0e 0e 16 18 0a 0a 10 12 08 0c 0c 16 12 0a 14 12
> > fx 0a 0a 1a 0e 0e 0c 10 12 10 0e 0a 16 06 0a 0c 10
> >
> > The Perl program which generated the table can be found below.
> >
> > #! /usr/bin/perl
> >
> > @s = (
> > 3, 7, 1, 9, 5, 6, 3, 8, 6, 2, 3, 14, 5, 4, 11, 2,
> > 12, 4, 2, 12, 1, 12, 1, 0, 10, 12, 10, 13, 6, 10, 1, 9,
> > 9, 7, 8, 0, 6, 11, 10, 6, 0, 9, 6, 7, 8, 5, 6, 14,
> > 4, 9, 10, 13, 1, 14, 8, 12, 10, 1, 8, 0, 6, 9, 14, 9,
> > 12, 5, 13, 15, 12, 9, 11, 5, 4, 6, 14, 12, 8, 15, 14, 11,
> > 4, 15, 1, 13, 1, 11, 10, 3, 3, 12, 6, 0, 15, 14, 15, 14,
> > 7, 5, 9, 2, 5, 13, 0, 9, 5, 13, 7, 15, 2, 9, 10, 4,
> > 12, 7, 6, 7, 4, 6, 15, 1, 13, 11, 1, 4, 6, 10, 8, 0,
> > 1, 0, 11, 3, 6, 15, 12, 8, 15, 11, 14, 7, 7, 12, 14, 2,
> > 4, 0, 12, 13, 3, 11, 0, 13, 0, 15, 10, 2, 8, 4, 3, 0,
> > 5, 1, 4, 4, 11, 5, 7, 11, 0, 14, 9, 13, 7, 15, 15, 10,
> > 13, 7, 14, 3, 7, 8, 1, 10, 8, 2, 13, 2, 7, 5, 4, 12,
> > 0, 2, 3, 5, 4, 11, 2, 13, 15, 6, 4, 13, 5, 0, 14, 5,
> > 15, 0, 9, 10, 12, 0, 11, 11, 2, 14, 5, 9, 3, 8, 11, 13,
> > 13, 1, 8, 7, 14, 15, 3, 2, 14, 2, 3, 8, 3, 12, 7, 5,
> > 2, 3, 15, 10, 9, 8, 9, 8, 10, 11, 6, 1, 1, 3, 4, 10
> > );
> >
> > @d = ();
> >
> > for ($d = 1; $d < 256; $d++) {
> > for ($x = 0; $x < 256; $x++) {
> > if ($s[$x] == $s[$x ^ $d]) { $d[$d]++; }
> > }
> > }
> >
> > @max = ();
> > $m = 0;
> >
> > for ($i = 0; $i < 256; $i++) {
> > printf("%02x ", $d[$i]);
> > print "\n" if $i % 16 == 15;
> > if ($d[$i] > $m) { $m = $d[$i]; @max = (); }
> > if ($d[$i] == $m) { push(@max, $i); }
> > }
> >
> > printf("%02x: ", $m);
> > foreach $i (@max) { printf("%02x ", $i); }
> > print "\n";
> >
> > -- [mdw]
--
Raphael Phan
Faculty of Engineering
Cyberjaya Campus
Multimedia University
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 09:06:17 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: OT: Linux international kernel compilation
Torsten Mohr wrote:
> i'd like to compile the cryptographic file system for Linux.
> There are several options in the Makefile to choose, they are
> mostly related to rpc_gen. Sadly i didn't find any that work
> for me.
>
> Does anybody know a way to compile it? I use the german
> distribution SuSE 6.4, Kernel 2.2.14.
You're completely offtopic, because this is a NG about crypto
and not about kernel compilation. However, why to you gamble
arround in the ->MAKEFILE<- ??? Just do
make menuconfig
or
make xconfig
and then configure what you want. Btw, I'm not sure if the
SuSE standard kernel ist an international one; if it isn't
you will have to get it from 'www.kerneli.org'. Also get
the Openwall patch from 'www.openwall.com', and use Kernel
2.2.15 because 2.2.14 has still some (minor) security
problems.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 09:16:58 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: how do you know your decyption worked?
Carb Unit wrote:
> An extremely green question, I'm sure. I'd just like to know.
Nono, thats not a 'green question'. Its an important issue.
The AFAIK most secure way is to store a one way hash (SHA-1 or
RIPE MD 160) of the cipher key at the end or start of the
plaintext. An attacker then knows absolutely nothing about it,
unless he has the key anyway, or he is able to break the one
way hash function.
A not much less secure way is to store a one way hash of the
plaintext at the end or start of the plaintext.
Many people will be satisfied by just storing a far faster to
compute CRC32. The later already MIGHT give an attacker much
information to help him breaking the cipher, but it is still
unlikely.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 09:20:36 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Yet another block cipher: Storin
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> A quick look brought a question to mind. It appears that it is
> possible to get two plaintext to encrypt to one cipher text. It is
> possible that the 4X4 matrix can give two multiplies that both give a
> zero vector as a result?
But the paper states the matrices have to be invertible ? If there
is an inverse matrix, then the whole thing is bijective, isn't it ?
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: More on Pi and randomness
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 09:50:26 +0200
Clive Tooth wrote:
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> > A question of ignorance: How about the rounding errors in these divisions?
>
> As in any high precision computation an analysis of the various sources
> of error must be done. It is possible to analyze the worst-case effect
> of these floating point errors, particularly if the floating point
> arithmetic is known to be IEEE compliant.
I am a complete outsider. But I conjecture that interval arithmetics
might be useful in the present issue. Long time ago IBM has made
corresponding software available for its systems, as far as I know.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Refs to "Hillclimbing" and other algorithms?
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 09:50:33 +0200
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
> Actually, "hill climbing" refers to a general and fairly obvious
> approach to solving for parameters of some model. Gillogly has
> explored this more than many in the "open" community, but with
> all due respect, he did not originate the method.
In optimization there is the term 'gradient method' or 'method of
steepest descent' which seems to be parallel to the 'hill climbing'.
However, it would be interesting to know how to formulate
(in concrete useful ways) the object function that is to be
optimized and the manner (method of varying the parameters)
of approaching the optimum point in cryptanalysis work and, of
course, the efficacy of the method in practice.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Crypto patentability
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 10:37:58 +0200
The Hitachi-AES issue has clearly indicated that there
are things occuring in the environment that essentially
concern us but that we barely know of.
I suppose that our group, as the largest (as far as I
am aware) public crypto community, should form certain
unified standpoint as to what is and what is not
patentable in crypto in our conviction, so as to
(hopefully) influence the future patent policy in the
same way as in fields of e.g. human gene sequencing.
As a start, I would personally suggest that all single
operations in the common computer instruction set are
not patentable, since these have been used in all sorts
of computations since the very first generation of
automatic scientific computing. Specific sequences of
operations are only patentable, if they are clearly
defined and narrowly delimited with respect to their
intended purposes and such that they are novel and can
be demonstrated to lead to significant cryptographical
advantages (confusion, diffusion etc.). Further, in
general, The meaning of the sentences in patents should
be accompanied by mathematical formulations such that
their proper sense can be easily and unambigiously
understood by the scientific community.
M. K. Shen
=========================
http://home.t-online.de/home/mok-kong.shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: Yet another block cipher: Storin
Date: 23 May 2000 09:25:14 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> A quick look brought a question to mind. It appears that it is
> possible to get two plaintext to encrypt to one cipher text. It is
> possible that the 4X4 matrix can give two multiplies that both give a
> zero vector as a result?
2^24 isn't prime, so Z_{2^{24}} isn't a proper field. However, there
are invertible elements (the odd numbers), so it is possible to
construct an invertible matrix using the usual method -- you just have
to work hard to find one.
Empirically, the test vector generator generates random plaintexts using
a fibonacci generator, encrypts them, and ensures that they decrypt.
I've not found one that failed yet. ;-) I'm sure of my maths here
anyway.
> A quick example. Let the modulo be 16 i.e. 2^4
>
> 1 2 3 4
> 0 1 2 3
> 0 0 1 2
> 0 0 0 2
Your matrix is singular, since it's triangular and the nonzero element
in the last row, 2, is noninvertible in Z_{2^{24}}. Use an invertible
matrix and you have no problem, I believe. For example, change the 2 in
the last row to a 1 and you should have no problem: the inverse matrix
is
[ 1 14 1 0 ]
[ 0 1 14 1 ]
[ 0 0 1 14 ]
[ 0 0 0 1 ]
You can try this with an arbitrary column vector [ a b c d ]^T if you
like. I've just made Emacs grind through the algebra and it's not ever
so pretty, but it does work.
> I have not verified this idea with the actual cipher so I may be
> totally offbase.
I think you might be, for once.
I'm not sure my construction is secure, but I've spent a while thinking
about it and fixing the occasional little niggle as I've noticed it. I
look forward to seeing your analysis of the real thing. ;-)
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: Yet another block cipher: Storin
Date: 23 May 2000 09:31:45 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> You are using Hill's method. Am I right?
No, not really. The matrix is fixed, not key-dependent. The structure
is that of a standard iterated SP-network.
Quick summary:
* The cipher works exclusively with 24-bit words.
* The key schedule expands the user key to give 36 words of subkey
material. Four subkeys are used each round, and there's a final
postwhitening stage at the end. There are eight rounds.
* The plaintext consists of 4 words.
* Each round consists of three steps:
-- Key mixing. Each word of the block is XORed with a key word.
-- Matrix multiplication. The plaintext is considered as a column
vector and premultiplied by a fixed invertible matrix M.
Addition and multiplication are performed modulo 2^{24}. The
matrix M is carefully chosen to be invertible, and to have
other properties which provide good diffusion.
-- Linear transformation. Each word of the block x is replaced by
x XOR (x LSR 12).
* The output of the final round is subjected to one final key mixing
step.
* Each step is invertible. Key mixing starts using keys from the
other end of the key schedule. Matrix multiplication is inverted by
using the inverse matrix M^{-1}. The linear transform is its own
inverse.
-- [mdw]
------------------------------
From: "Manuel Pancorbo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: Chosen plaintext attack, isn't it absurd?
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 11:26:01 +0200
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> >I mean, if the attacker is able to access the encipher machinery (but not
> >the actual key) and then test the ciphertexts she wants, what stops her
to
> >access the DEcipher machinery?
>
Thanks everybody for the explanations. Thus I surrender of my involution
algorithm and I'll make it asimmetric (and resistant to chosen plaintext
attacks, I hope). Soon on sci.crypt contest.
--
____________________________________________________________________
Manuel Pancorbo
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"...
Más vale aprender una sola línea de Ciencia
que postrarse cien veces en oración. (Corán)
Pli valoras lerni ech nur unu linion de Scienco
ol preghe genui cent fojojn. (Korano)
..."
____________________________________________________________________
------------------------------
From: "Manuel Pancorbo" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: Yet another block cipher: Storin
Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 11:39:34 +0200
Mark Wooding <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> escribió en el mensaje de noticias
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> I've submitted a block cipher to the contest. It's called Storin, and
> it's been designed to take advantage of the fast multiply-and-
> accumulate instructions available on DSPs. It's an 8-round SP-network
> (ish), not a Feistel network; it works on 96-bit blocks. The main
> operation is multiplication by a fixed invertible 4x4 matrix over
> Z_{2^{24}}.
> (...)
>
> My objective is to test the strength of the matrix multiplication as a
> primitive.
>
I'm designing an algorithm based on matrix multiplication and from my
experience the higher the field is, the worse the diffusion is, mainly in
the higher bits of the plaintext. As I see you use GF(2^24) which is very
high. So, the effort on diffusion must be made by other part of your
algorithm.
--
____________________________________________________________________
Manuel Pancorbo
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"...
Más vale aprender una sola línea de Ciencia
que postrarse cien veces en oración. (Corán)
Pli valoras lerni ech nur unu linion de Scienco
ol preghe genui cent fojojn. (Korano)
..."
____________________________________________________________________
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mark Wooding)
Subject: Re: Crypto patentability
Date: 23 May 2000 10:03:47 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I suppose that our group, as the largest (as far as I am aware) public
> crypto community, should form certain unified standpoint as to what is
> and what is not patentable in crypto in our conviction,
That's not likely while Terry Ritter and myself are in the same
newsgroup. Much as I respect Terry's contributions, both to sci.crypt
in particular and to cryptography in general, I cannot agree with him
over patent issues. I'm a strong believer that the patent system, both
in the US and elsewhere, needs to be either massively overhauled or
scrapped entirely.
Further discussion on this subject is inappropriate for sci.crypt.
People who have an interest in the issue may find discussions ongoing in
gnu.misc.discuss and misc.int-property. Followups set to poster.
-- [mdw] --rabid-stallmanist
------------------------------
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