Cryptography-Digest Digest #367, Volume #12 Sun, 6 Aug 00 19:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Has RSADSI Lost their mind? (Matthew Skala)
Re: Secure Operating Systems ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Applications for One-Way Function? ("Ed Suominen")
Re: Secure Operating Systems ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: Secure Operating Systems ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
Re: Private secret discussions (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Secure Operating Systems (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: New William Friedman Crypto Patent (filed in 1933) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: New William Friedman Crypto Patent (filed in 1933) (Steve Rush)
Re: New William Friedman Crypto Patent (filed in 1933) (Mike Andrews)
Re: Note on text compression (tomstd)
Re: Functions that are slow to invert ("Scott Fluhrer")
Re: Secure Operating Systems ("CMan")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Matthew Skala)
Subject: Re: Has RSADSI Lost their mind?
Date: 6 Aug 2000 12:12:37 -0700
In article <8mj5j6$et5$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I just checked that URL and it says you haven't heard what happened
>with that hearing!! Doesn't your lawyer know?!
I'm sure they'll mail him the documentation eventually. One of the
interesting aspects of this case is that the people doing the appeal are
*not* the same people who were original defendants. I was one of the
original defendants, but I'm just a spectator for the appeal, and I'm not
eager to approach the appellants directly because one of the things
they're using in their case is the fact that they aren't closely
associated with me.
>And yet, when Phil Zimmermann released PGP 2.5 with RSAREF integrated,
>RSADSI's hair practically caught on fire. They tried to revoke the
>free redistributability of RSAREF, but apparently after a conversation
My gut feeling is that formal free-distribution licenses like the GPL
can't be revoked. After all, if they could be revoked, they'd be
practically worthless. Any revocation of such a license would be
practically impossible to police, as well - anyone who made a copy could
just say, "Oh, I didn't know it was revoked". If (as is generally the
case) the license doesn't have a built-in revocation mechanism, I don't
think there's any way to put one in after the fact.
It's like the certificate revocation problem in crypto: to deal with keys
that might become bad, we post a certificate revocation list, and then
clients check the list before accepting a key as good. It's possible to
imagine a GPL-like license that said "this license is good unless the
document at such-and-such URL says it's no longer good"; but the GPL is
*deliberately* not written that way.
I don't think the fact that no money changes hands is important. I've
heard some comments about the GPL only holding when it's accompanied by a
copyright assignment to the FSF, but I don't think that makes any sense at
all either.
I don't know how the revocability of formal free-distribution licenses
relates to the cp4break case because whatever license may have existed on
that code was extremely vague - the cp4break semi-license might be
revocable even if the properly-applied GPL wouldn't be. Then again, even
the vague statements in the cp4break package may be irrevocable, in which
case the properly-applied GPL would appear to be more solid still.
--
Matthew Skala
[EMAIL PROTECTED] I'm recording the boycott industry!
http://www.islandnet.com/~mskala/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Secure Operating Systems
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 19:37:16 GMT
There is a paper which might interest you all:
"The Inevitability of Failure: The flawed assumptions of Security in
Modren computing environments"... by Loscocco et al ...NSA
Check it out...
I am interested in any B1 rated OS.
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Anne & Lynn Wheeler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mack) writes:
> > The higher the level, the less 'User Friendly' the system becomes.
> >
> > Example:
> >
> > Certain systems will forbid printing without supervisory approval.
> > Good for security, bad for your typical home user.
> >
> > Certain other systems allow remote users to use printers
> > without even a login.
> > Bad for security, very convienent for users.
>
> some of this has had to do with where the security perimeter and
> policies are established. in some cases the computers lay totally
> within a security perimeter. once thru a physical security perimeter,
> those computers could be more user friendly since the policies are
> established via other techniques.
>
> in other situations the security perimeter and policies are supposed
> to be implemented and maintained by the computer, its operating
> system and applications.
>
> --
> Anne & Lynn Wheeler | [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ http://www.adcomsys.net/lynn/
>
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Ed Suominen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Applications for One-Way Function?
Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2000 12:54:52 -0700
"Mok-Kong Shen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> If a oneway function is used to store passwords in a file, then
> that file is naturally protected by system-level access capability.
> Anyone that could get that file is likely also to be able to
> install a piece of software that intercepts what the user inputs
> to the module that computes the oneway function. So it appears
> that a oneway function doesn't really offer much more than a
> scheme that simply employs a block algorithm with a key, the
> storage of which certainly means a risk. Thanks.
Mr. Shen, you're absolutely right that simply transforming a password with a
one-way function (even if the one-way function is "perfect") does not
protect against sniffing out passphrases. Key loggers are a real issue in
crypto, which is why virus protection and firewalls are so important.
--
Ed Suominen
Registered Patent Agent
Web Site: http://eepatents.com
PGP Public Key: http://eepatents.com/key
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 16:09:49 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Secure Operating Systems
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > I am just wondering why has someone not developed a secure OS which is
> > built from the ground up using Crypto for acces control, file handling,
> > Porcess security and Intrusion detection..
> >
> > I am aware of the efforts of free BSD and Open BSD in adding security
> > to Open Unix....but I think something need to be built from the ground
> > up rather than an addon
>
> I am not sure that my answer is correct but I venture to give one:
> The making of OS is by itself extremely complicated and difficult
> to get correct and efficient so that it can be more economical to
> separate out the crypto issue. An OS is often designed with a
> layered approach. Crypto could then be an outer layer. At the time
> of design of UNIX, intrusion detection wasn't yet a word in the
> vocabulary of CS, I suppose. To give a (certainly far-fetched)
> analogy about the point of economy: A machine part can be made of
> normal steel and then painted to protect it against corrosion. It
> can also be made of corrosion-free steel. The latter approach is
> generally more expensive, however.
Actually the original unix was derived from the disenchantment with of multics
which was supposed to be a secure OS in addition to all things to all people.
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 16:15:08 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Secure Operating Systems
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [...]
> > layered approach. Crypto could then be an outer layer. At the time
> > of design of UNIX, intrusion detection wasn't yet a word in the
> > vocabulary of CS, I suppose. To give a (certainly far-fetched)
> [...]
>
> When Unix was written, the world was a whole different place. It was
> normal for most places to simply leave the administrative account
> logged in on the console all day. (Because any console user was
> authorised to use it). Offices in the building didn't generally have
> locks on the doors, and the standard login mechanism provided abundant
> security against networked intrusion. (After all, there were no
> unfriendly hosts, and networks were primarily dial-up connections)
> Indeed, crypt(3) itself was impervious to exhaustive search, since a
> typical large, timesharing system could manage just over a single key
> check per second.
>
> The real answer though, is probably that the average user doesn't need
> or want what most people are talking about when you say secure
> operating system. It doesn't even make sense on personal
> computers. For example, Unix based systems hold Orange Book Ratings as
> high as B3, but the market for them is very limited.
>
When did you start learning about computers? There's a _whole_lot_ of history
missing from your perspective. And average or below average computer users
probably need more security that above average users. They are more
vulnerable. OF COURSE it makes sense on personal computers -- they are very
personal. IMpersonal computers don't have secrets to protect.
And the market for secure systems is not very limited it is extremely large.
But the high price of rigorous security prevents its widespread adoption.
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Private secret discussions
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 22:28:45 +0200
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Everyone these days can easily obtain a website or email address
> for free (hotmail.com, geocities.com, etc) I am sure many
> people in this forum has their own. But would you like to
> have your own private discussion forum for readers who visit your
> website to talk about encryption or whatever?
>
> Well, if you do, I have the most simple setup possible for you...
> Make up a name, and add a link to a website. That's IT! The
> discussion forum becomes yours, and you can link to it from your
> website. No need to setup anything. No need to register
> anything. And I am providing it to you for free.
I have no intention at all of belittling your offer. But
internet discussions thrive exactly because they are absolutely
and widely public. Excepting the very few number of monitored
groups, everyone reads what the other people freely think and
spontaneously write and hence is able to share all the informations,
experiences, ideas and knowledges that are available. That there
is a certain amount of chaffs from time to time, including some
(unintentionally) produced by myself, is the price that one has
to pay. I have even the optimism and impression that our group
continues to improve in all aspects. The absolute openness is all
the more important for a field like crypto, which certain
authorities would very much like to suppress in case that were
possible. Private secret discussions on crypto amount to a return
to the epoch of WWII or earlier.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Secure Operating Systems
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 22:31:55 +0200
"Trevor L. Jackson, III" wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > >
> > > I am just wondering why has someone not developed a secure OS which is
> > > built from the ground up using Crypto for acces control, file handling,
> > > Porcess security and Intrusion detection..
> > >
> > > I am aware of the efforts of free BSD and Open BSD in adding security
> > > to Open Unix....but I think something need to be built from the ground
> > > up rather than an addon
> >
> > I am not sure that my answer is correct but I venture to give one:
> > The making of OS is by itself extremely complicated and difficult
> > to get correct and efficient so that it can be more economical to
> > separate out the crypto issue. An OS is often designed with a
> > layered approach. Crypto could then be an outer layer. At the time
> > of design of UNIX, intrusion detection wasn't yet a word in the
> > vocabulary of CS, I suppose. To give a (certainly far-fetched)
> > analogy about the point of economy: A machine part can be made of
> > normal steel and then painted to protect it against corrosion. It
> > can also be made of corrosion-free steel. The latter approach is
> > generally more expensive, however.
>
> Actually the original unix was derived from the disenchantment with of multics
> which was supposed to be a secure OS in addition to all things to all people.
Could you give a reference to that fact? Thanks.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: New William Friedman Crypto Patent (filed in 1933)
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 20:37:54 GMT
Sander Vesik <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Except it must have been that 'do not open in 50 years' box in 1950, not
> 1933 which is 67 years in teh past (and i kinda doubt they have boxes
> labeled 'do not open for 67 years').
> The count of years is odd.
Odd yes, inexplicable no. There's really no way of telling how long it
lingered in either the patent office, or NSA. As someone else pointed
out, there is sufficient classified material waiting to be
declassified that they may never catch up. I'm only saying it may well
be a problem of not enough people, rather than anything nefarious.
--
Matt Gauthier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Steve Rush)
Subject: Re: New William Friedman Crypto Patent (filed in 1933)
Date: 06 Aug 2000 20:45:59 GMT
>Except it must have been that 'do not open in 50 years' box in 1950, not
>1933 which is 67 years in teh past (and i kinda doubt they have boxes
>labeled 'do not open for 67 years').
No, but I can easily imagine some archivist finding a dusty box that should
have been opened 37 years ago, but the record of that fact had been lost.
Remember that room full of undelivered mail that was found in a scrapped
aircraft carrier? An emergency repair during WWII had left that room without a
door, and if anyone wondered where that load of mail went, he probably assumed
that it had been burned up in the battle.
==========================================================================
==============
If it's spam, it's a scam. Don't do business with Net abusers.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike Andrews)
Subject: Re: New William Friedman Crypto Patent (filed in 1933)
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 21:03:22 GMT
Scripsit Douglas A. Gwyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
: There is a fairly recent Executive Order requiring all classified
: material to be reviewed and re/declassified after 50 years. The
: amount that was classified over 50 years ago is staggering, and
: very likely the backlog is such that they'll never catch up to
: the point that they are reviewing just material from 50 to 51
: years old. In addition to this supposedly automatic review,
: re/declassification occurs when special attention has been
: directed toward specific items, e.g. in response to a FOIA query.
: I don't know what triggered the patent declassification; it might
: have been in response to the USPTO trying to clean up their own
: files.
Even the "CATEGORY 1 - NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING"
material? If _that_ is the case, then the NSA is going to be
going through files for a _very_ long time.
--
...most SF writers are small blokes; they spent a lot of time grubbing
around on the floor for old SF mags, not stretching up to the top shelf for
pornography...As an aside, Douglas Adams is quite tall -- Terry Pratchett
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Note on text compression
From: tomstd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Sun, 06 Aug 2000 14:32:16 -0700
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>Texts that are normally entered via keyboards consist of 7-bit
>ASCII symbols but are stored by computer as 8-bit bytes, if I
>don't err, i.e. the leading bit is not used.
>
>I suppose one could consider doing the following which may be
>beneficial as a pre-processing step for compression schemes that
>use the Huffman algorithm.
>
>Complile a list of 128 most common words. Let these, including
>the accompanying space at end of words, be coded into 7 bits
>to be prefixed by a leading bit of '1' to form a byte. Let
>everything not coded this way be as usual.
>
>Thanks for comments in advance.
You would be better served using 128 common trigrams and digrams
instead of whole words. The world "there" could be encoded
as "the" and "re"...
However, you won't be able to edit the file in text editors
without decoding it first...
So... You might as well compress the file normally...
Tom
===========================================================
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
------------------------------
From: "Scott Fluhrer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Functions that are slow to invert
Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2000 14:24:37 -0700
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> Are there practically implementable functions that are easy
> to compute but rather expensive (but not comparable to the
> oneway functions) to invert? What is desirable are such that
> the cost factor could be varied to suit one's need by varying,
> say, the size of the function argument. Thanks.
Depending on exactly what you need it for, one possibility would be to use
SHA-1 (or other one-way function), and give enough of the answer to reduce
the difficulty to the desired level. For example, if you want something
that takes O(2**N) operations to invert, the function will result in the
SHA-1 of the argument, along with all but N bits of the argument. To
invert, you try all 2**N possible combinations of the missing bits until you
get it. Of course, this exposes all but N bits of the argument immediately,
and so may not be practical.
Another possibility would be to pick a random N bit key, and encrypt the
argument with it, along with enough redundancy so that the solver can
recognize the correct key. As long as you use a cipher which has brute
force as the strongest attack, this appears to meet your criteria.
BTW: what's this for?
--
poncho
------------------------------
From: "CMan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Secure Operating Systems
Date: Sun, 6 Aug 2000 16:08:39 -0700
In 1974 I was working at Honeywell and they were talking about designing a
secure multi-user operating system called MULTICS. The management thought
they could knock out the design after church one Sunday along with a cool
design for a water cooled super computer with unheard of dissipation levels
per chip.
They fell flat on their collective ass, of course, as all managers and
marketers who are technically clueless do.
Unix was a play on multics that was designed by people who knew what they
were doing (actually by whole teams of competent people) in an evolutionary
style of development.
The problem is a difficult one as is evidenced by the fact that the original
security goals have not yet been reliably achieved.
The problem may just be too hard!
JK
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:8mh4k1$h3m$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I am just wondering why has someone not developed a secure OS which is
> built from the ground up using Crypto for acces control, file handling,
> Porcess security and Intrusion detection..
>
> I am aware of the efforts of free BSD and Open BSD in adding security
> to Open Unix....but I think something need to be built from the ground
> up rather than an addon
>
>
> Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
> Before you buy.
------------------------------
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