Cryptography-Digest Digest #637, Volume #12 Fri, 8 Sep 00 14:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: infosec career [OT?!] (rot26)
Re: ExCSS Source Code (Wim Lewis)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: ZixIt Mail (Richard Herring)
Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet? (Thomas Pornin)
Re: ISO9796 signature format implementation (Ulrich Kuehn)
Re: RSA Patent Dead Today ("Julian Lewis")
Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet? (James Felling)
Re: RSA Patent Dead Today (Bill Unruh)
Correction to Paul Garrett's newly released crypto text (MikeAt1140)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks (-m-)
Camellia, a competitor of AES ? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet? (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: Camellia, a competitor of AES ? (Quisquater)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks ("MichaelC")
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks (John Winters)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks ("Joshua R. Poulson")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: rot26 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: infosec career [OT?!]
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 14:58:43 GMT
> Go for it. I didn't quite have people breaking down my door when I
> finished (Ph.D.) but did have plenty of interest. And it is
> EXTREMELY interesting work, IMNSHO.
>
> Doug
Doug, thanks for the info and the positive attitude! That's exactly what
I needed!
Meanwhile any more suggestions?
TIA
rot26
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Wim Lewis)
Subject: Re: ExCSS Source Code
Date: 8 Sep 2000 15:17:45 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Your remark reminds me of the fact that copyright applies
>to almost every country, while patents are restricted to
>the coutries where the patents are granted. So my dumb
>question is: Is it possible to have a copyright on a
>general encryption algorithm (instead of a patent)?
I am not a lawyer, but my understanding is that copyright applies
to a "fixed, tangible" expression, such as a chunk of text or
a recorded image, and not to the more abstract idea which the
expression expresses. Char_mander has the copyright on the ML
code it posted (but has implicitly given license for it to be
distributed on Usenet), but it would not violate char_mander's
copyright for me to read the code, understand the algorithm, and
then write my own code to do the same thing.
(And I *think* that DeCSS, etc., don't violate copyright law;
they violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which has
"copyright" in its title but isn't strongly related to previously
existing copyright law except that it benefits copyright holders.)
--
Wim Lewis * [EMAIL PROTECTED] * Seattle, WA, USA
PGP 0x27F772C1: 0C 0D 10 D5 FC 73 D1 35 26 46 42 9E DC 6E 0A 88
The netcom address will be unreliable after September. Use the hhhh address.
------------------------------
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2000 14:33:10 GMT
Barry Margolin wrote:
> This is why strong authentication is generally based on multiple criteria,
> usually at least two of: who you are, what you know, and what you have.
And the entire system seems to invariably also rely on
trusting some specific agent somewhere.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Richard Herring)
Subject: Re: ZixIt Mail
Date: 8 Sep 2000 15:20:58 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
In article <8paonq$irg$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Cork ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Steve) wrote:
> >
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> > Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com>
> > Comment: PGP ADK BUG FIX: Upgrade to Ver 6.5.8 at MIT or PGP INT'L
> So what & where is the best program for sending/receiving secure mail?
> Thanks.
There might be a clue in that signature you failed to snip...
--
Richard Herring | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Pornin)
Subject: Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet?
Date: 8 Sep 2000 15:23:00 GMT
According to SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> I have made technigues for chainging in two directions but they do not
> invovle the standard 3 letter chainning modes approved the the US FIPS
> stuff.
CBC-mode (and others) are actually not meant to provide a full
cryptographic dependancy of any output bit from all input bits; their
purpose is to provide an easy way to build a MAC, which guarantees
detection of loss of integrity of the file, which is most people want
anyway.
Block ciphers are solid as long as the block size if large enough;
having full dependancy throughout the whole file does not buy much
security (there is a point where a system in unbreakable, that means
that it is beyond the reach of mankind; no system can be more solid than
that, by definition), but it has a cost (for instance, it is inadequate
for on-the-fly enciphering of network data).
--Thomas Pornin
------------------------------
From: Ulrich Kuehn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ISO9796 signature format implementation
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 09:22:12 +0200
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tor Rustad wrote:
>
> "David Hopwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> >
> > Tor Rustad wrote:
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > I'm looking for a (source code) implementation of ISO9796 padding and
> > > formating.
> >
> > Bear in mind that ISO 9796-1 padding has been broken (with about 3000
> > chosen signatures for a 1025-bit modulus); see
> >
> > Don Coppersmith, Shai Halevi, Charanjit Jutla,
> > "ISO 9797-1 and the new forgery strategy,"
> > Working draft, August 23 1999.
> >
> > (I think this was on the P1363 web site, somewhere around
> > http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/P1363/index.html)
>
[...]
> I didn't know that it was as bad as 3000 chosen...plain texts? Shit! But, its
> only that bad for ISO9796-1, right?
Yes its only ISO9796-1, but that is bad enough.
> We are currently using the signature format in production, but as far as I
> remember we only use ISO9796-2, anyway we are hashing with SHA-1, so this
> complicates the job with generating those 3000 chosen messages.
That should be practically secure for a while, but one never knows. Some
more references:
1) Jean-Sebastian Coron, David Naccache, Julien P. Stern. On the
Security of RSA Padding.
Crypto 99, LNCS 1666.
2) Francois Grieu. A Chosen Messages Attack on the ISO/IEC 9796-1
Signature Scheme. Eurocrypt 2000, LNCS 1807. Also document No ISO/IEC
JTC1/SC27 N2418.
3) Marc Joye, Jean-Jacques Quisquarter. On Rabin-type Signatures.
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 N2434.
4) ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 N2365. USA contribution to project 1.27.07 (9796)
regarding some countermeasures against the new forgery strategy.
Including:
Mihir Bellara, Philip Rogaway. The Exact Security of Digital Signatures
- How to sign with RSA and Rabin. (Should be available online from the
authors' websites).
Don Coppersmith, Shai Halevi, Charanjit Jutla. ISO 9796-1 and the new
forgery strategy.
Good luck with your analysis.
Ulrich
------------------------------
From: "Julian Lewis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA Patent Dead Today
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2000 17:35:18 +0200
Reply-To: "Julian Lewis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> > Forgive my ignorance, but did the patent only stand in the USA ??
>
> Yup. They had published it before they applied for a patent, and you
> can't get patents elsewhere on something that's already been disclosed.
>
> (Only in the US, and only within a year of publishing)
and is it true it wasn't invented by R.S.A. in the first place, but in the
UK ?
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet?
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2000 14:37:53 GMT
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> ... to be
> conservative, one should best use something of one's
> own in addition to presumably good stuffs that are
> offered by others
So long as one's own contribution does not actually
weaken the system (which is easier to do than one
might think).
------------------------------
From: James Felling <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet?
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 10:56:39 -0500
Thomas Pornin wrote:
> According to SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > I have made technigues for chainging in two directions but they do not
> > invovle the standard 3 letter chainning modes approved the the US FIPS
> > stuff.
>
> CBC-mode (and others) are actually not meant to provide a full
> cryptographic dependancy of any output bit from all input bits; their
> purpose is to provide an easy way to build a MAC, which guarantees
> detection of loss of integrity of the file, which is most people want
> anyway.
>
> Block ciphers are solid as long as the block size if large enough;
> having full dependancy throughout the whole file does not buy much
> security (there is a point where a system in unbreakable, that means
> that it is beyond the reach of mankind; no system can be more solid than
> that, by definition), but it has a cost (for instance, it is inadequate
> for on-the-fly enciphering of network data).
>
> --Thomas Pornin
Agreed. The big advantage of a "Whole File Dependent" encoding is that an
adversary has to make at least 1 pass through the file to "test a key".
This slows down an attacker if they make use of trial decryptions. by a
factor of (roughly) # of blocks in file / Q where Q is the number of blocks
that would be needed to isolate plaintext in the chaining method used.
This methodology is best for retained records or other such things where
security becomes more important than speed/ flexibility.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: RSA Patent Dead Today
Date: 8 Sep 2000 16:18:52 GMT
In <8pb0vk$9i6$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "Julian Lewis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
]> >
]> > Forgive my ignorance, but did the patent only stand in the USA ??
]>
]> Yup. They had published it before they applied for a patent, and you
]> can't get patents elsewhere on something that's already been disclosed.
]>
]> (Only in the US, and only within a year of publishing)
]and is it true it wasn't invented by R.S.A. in the first place, but in the
]UK ?
Probably yes, but it was kept secret by GCHQ for general security
reasons-- the story is that they themselves did not want to use it, but
after all, what good are secrecy classifications if you don't use them.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (MikeAt1140)
Subject: Correction to Paul Garrett's newly released crypto text
Date: 08 Sep 2000 16:37:14 GMT
In Paul Garrett's newly released crypto text, "Making,Breaking Codes: An
Introduction to Cryptology",Prentice Hall (2001) Arithmetica Key Exchange
protocol is discussed on pp. 183-185 based on the paper
Iris Anshel,Michael Anshel and Dorian Goldfeld, "An Algebraic Method for
Public-Key Cryptography", Mathematical Research Letters 6 (1999) 1-5.
The paper is cited on p.512 as
I.Anschel, M. Anschel and Goldfeld, "An Algebraic Method for Public-Key",
Cryptography Mathematical Research Letters 6 (1999) pp. 1-5.
The following statement is found on page 183:
"However the length attack of [Hughes and Tannenbaum 2000] gives a convincing
heuristic argument that seems to break the cipher (and related ciphers)."
The paper cited is listed on p.513 as
J.Hughes and A.Tannenbaum 2000 "Length-based attacks for certain group-based
encryption rewriting systems", preprint, 2000.
In response to communication with Dorian Goldfeld the following correction
appears on Paul Garrett's Home Page:
>From Paul Garrett's Crypto and Number Theory Page
[ [EMAIL PROTECTED] ] ... [ my homepage ] ... [ updated 07 Sep 00]
[this page is http://www.math.umn.edu/~garrett/crypto/]
Introduction to cryptology, number-theory, algebra, and algorithms. Protocols.
Symmetric versus asymmetric systems. Stream, block ciphers. One-way functions,
signatures. Key management issues. (Pseudo-) random number generation.
Permutation groups, primes, Euclidean algorithm, finite fields, quadratic
reciprocity. Discrete logs, RSA, pseudoprimes, rho method. Elliptic curve
methods. Quadratic sieve. And so on and so on... [3:45-5:00 in Fraser 101]
This course will use my book based on notes that I've developed over the last
few years specifically for this course. ( errata, Rrrr... )
Oops! More serious corrections concerning Arithmetica cipher
http://www.math.umn.edu/~garrett/crypto/arithm.html
Corrections Concerning Arithmetica Cipher
[ [EMAIL PROTECTED] ]
========================================================================
My book's statements concerning the Arithmetica cipher were (accidentally)
misleading, in part possibly making the length attack appear stronger than it
probably is.
* At most I should have said that it was UNCLEAR what impact the length
attack would have on parameter settings, etc., in the cipher.
* It is patent-pending , not yet patented (as of Sept 07, 2000).
* And I mis-spelled "Anshel".
© 1996-2000, Paul Garrett ... [ home ] ... [ [EMAIL PROTECTED] ]
The University of Minnesota explicitly requires that I state that "The views
and opinions expressed in this page are strictly those of the page author. The
contents of this page have not been reviewed or approved by the University of
Minnesota."
**************************************************************************
**********************************
Professor Michael Anshel
Department of Computer Sciences R8/206
The City College of New York
New York,New York 10031
------------------------------
From: -m- <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 12:55:50 -0400
Barry Margolin wrote:
Perhaps this will make it to the list, perhaps not. It really depends
upon factors beyond my control.
>
> I think I'm confused about just what kind of spoofing you're talking about.
> Carnivore is a sniffer that tries to reconstruct the TCP sessions
> (currently just SMTP, I believe, but presumably they could extend it to
> other protocols), right?
This kind:
http://www.gncz.cz/kra/index.html
>
> If someone is trying to hide what they're doing, how can spoofed packets
> achieve that?
Think of a packet as if it were a letter. Put name of the person you
wish
to mail in the return address. Now address the mail to someomne who
either
does not exist or who will write "return to sender on it." There you
have
it. Who sent the mail?
> If they confuse Carnivore, won't they also confuse the
> actual destination machine, resulting in connection resets, etc. And if
> you're sending this spoofed traffic all the time, just in case you're being
> monitored, how would you get any real work done?
No they wont. Yes you will.
>
> The other thing you might be talking about is some third party trying to
> make it appear that someone is doing something wrong,
A third party trying to make it look like YOU are doing what they are
doing.
> so they create fake
> email that appears to be from him. Of course, this won't just show up in
> the Carnivore monitoring, it will also show up in the mailbox of the
> recipient.
If he thinks it is spam... and he has a url to reply with an
unsubscribe...
He will forward the whole message somewhere else.
> So not only will the FBI think that this person is sending mail
> to a mobster, the mobster himself will!
Perhaps the mobster already knows mail from [EMAIL PROTECTED] is
for him...
> Well, I suppose the perpetrator
> could let the mobster know via some other means that any messages from this
> person should be ignored since they're being faked.
Or perhaps they will tell the mobster that they are valid and he should
read
them.
>
> Is either of these what you're talking about?
All of these... and more.
>
> --
> Barry Margolin, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Genuity, Burlington, MA
> *** DON'T SEND TECHNICAL QUESTIONS DIRECTLY TO ME, post them to newsgroups.
> Please DON'T copy followups to me -- I'll assume it wasn't posted to the group.
--
If children don't know why their grandparents did what they did, how
shall
those children know what is worth preserving and what needs to
change?
Public Key at http://pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371
Public Key Encryption? http://www.cryptography.org/getpgp.htm
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Camellia, a competitor of AES ?
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 19:34:19 +0200
The designers of E2 has produced a new cipher named
Camellia which is claimed to have good performances:
http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/Publications/sac_camellia.pdf
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet?
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 19:52:22 +0200
"Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > ... to be
> > conservative, one should best use something of one's
> > own in addition to presumably good stuffs that are
> > offered by others
>
> So long as one's own contribution does not actually
> weaken the system (which is easier to do than one
> might think).
For any non-trivial modern cipher (not of the snakeoil
category), the chance of having a superencipherment that
weakens it is negligible in my humble view, unless one
intentionally does that (and knows quite a lot about the
cipher that is to be weakened).
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Losing AES Candidates Could Be a Good Bet?
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 19:52:16 +0200
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mok-Kong Shen) wrote:
> >"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
> >>
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mok-Kong Shen) wrote
> >
> >> >James Felling wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> It may be accomplished in a number of ways. The simplest way of
> >> >> viewing it is put the file in a ring buffer, and using your
> >> >> favorite chaining mode run through it 2X or more times. This will
> >> >> result in an efffective all or nothing encypherment of the
> >> >> plaintext.( other potential modifications include altering the
> >> >> direction that you pass through the file, or more than 2 passes
> >> >> through.
> >> >
> >> >Thanks for explaination of wraped CBC. I personally prefer
> >> >using two IVs to do non-linear block chaining (cf. a recent
> >> >thread) once in the forward and once in the backward
> >> >direction. That achieves as you pointed out both the large
> >> >block effect and the all-or-nothing effect.
> >> >
> >> >M. K. Shen
> >>
> >>
> >> Actually you have given this little thought because what you are
> >> suggustng does not all that much more security and the data is
> >> still localized. To show this just do your encryption on a large
> >> file. Then edit a byte in the middle third of file. Now run it
> >> through you decryption process. Only a few blocks are different
> >> from the original. So it did not achieve the mixing you really
> >> would like to get.
> >
> >With two passes (in opposite directions), where the chaining
> >value at each step involves all the preceding blocks (see
> >the recent thread 'Nonlinear block chaining and whitening'),
> >there is actually quite a lot of mixing of informations. As I
> >said, this is one way that one can advantageously do if one
> >sticks to using a (small) block algorithm. There are other
> >approaches possible to exploit the benefit of processing the
> >whole file, as I remarked.
> >
> >BTW, may I suggest that you post a clear description of
> >your ciphers the next time you make reference to them?
> >It would greatly help others to understand what you say.
> >
> >M. K. Shen
> >
>
> I see you have not tried my suggestion or you would see how
> little mixing is done using standard chaining in opposite
> directions. I have made technigues for chainging in two directions
> but they do not invovle the standard 3 letter chainning modes
> approved the the US FIPS stuff.
> If you check out my site there is explanation of my code even
> people who can't turn off JavaScritpt can use it now. Look
> under Horces disscussion. Also pointers to newer versions that
> may be easier to compile incuding a german version.
I explicitly mentioned a chaining mode that is not 'standard'
(i.e. not found in the textbooks), didn't I?
I repeat my suggestion: If you like to have people of the
group to be interested to your stuffs at all, then you have
to post a good description to the group.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
From: Quisquater <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Camellia, a competitor of AES ?
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 19:56:27 +0200
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> The designers of E2 has produced a new cipher named
> Camellia which is claimed to have good performances:
>
> http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/Publications/sac_camellia.pdf
>
> M. K. Shen
A working link is http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/camellia/index.html
------------------------------
From: "MichaelC" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 17:51:50 GMT
> > Mathematicians are routinely excluded from juries for this reason.
> > The proofs that are offered in court would never convince them
> > in a professional context.
>
> This doesn't sound healthy to me. I hope you live in a
> different country from me :-)
United States, which I believe is different than the U.K. <g>
> One could exclude scientists and computer programmers for
> the same reason, and perhaps engineers and medics on the
> grounds that they'd been exposed to the same "culture", or
> on the grounds that "risk management and estimation" forms
> a significant part of their day job.
>
> We'd end up with juries populated exclusively by the kind of
> folks who believe TV adverts offer convincing proof of product
> effectiveness.
An amazing fact is that this is precisely what has happened over here. I've
been rejected from jury duty twice now because I let loose the dangerous and
obviously subversive information that I had a college degree after being
asked about it point blank. The lawyer didn't even ask what my major was,
whether it had any relevence to the trial. I was just given a summary
dismissal and a direction to leave the room.
We have juries sitting now who's sole attribute is being too stupid to get
out of jury duty.
> As society gets more complicated, it becomes more important
> to ensure that people can't get off jury duty, and can't be
> thrown off juries, simply because they might have a clue.
Excellent point. Unfortunately, it profits lawyers and lawmakers far too
much to keep the current system as it is rather than change it. Which is
going to get you a nice fat fee in a product liability case, for example?
An intelligent, randomly selected jury of individuals who can see through
claims of pseudo-scientific claims made by the defense, or a jury composed
of individuals who do not even know how to spell the word hypothesis? IMO,
jury screening should cosist of three questions:
1. Are you or were you ever a police officer?
2. Do you know or have you ever made the aquaintence of the defendent or
defendent's family/group?
3. Do you have an interest in this case which would bias your judgement in
any way (a VP for a soap company sitting on a jury that was suing soap
manufacturers for some type of product defect, for example)?
Other than that, it should be open roads. Unfortunately prospective jurors
are asked everything from their sexual preferences to their political
opinions, as if these kinds of things had any relevence to the trial. The
intelligent are quickly whittled away, leaving a core of individuals who
are, how can I say this kindly, *not* likely to choose rocket science as a
career.
--
Want to vote for further socialization of medicine and bolstering the
current socialized medicine scheme? Want to vote for a candidate that
promises to sign gun control legislation? Want to vote for a candidate that
promises to get the Federal government involved in your local school? Then
vote
for Bush.
MichaelC
www.harrybrown2000.org
"Ken Hagan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:newscache$lqfi0g$h1k$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> "Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote...
> >
>
>
> We had a case in the UK recently in which some expert
> asserted that the chances of two cot deaths occuring in the
> same family were millions to one against and therefore the
> mother must be a murderer. The idea that cot death might by
> *caused* by something had clearly never occured to this
> expert, who treated the two deaths as independent events and
> simply multiplied the probabilities together. I would expect
> such woolly reasoning to be spotted by competent members of
> all the above professions, and indeed a great many other
> people, but the jury were convinced and the woman convicted.
> (I think she got off on appeal.)
>
>
>
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Winters)
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: 8 Sep 2000 18:55:24 +0100
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
>Taking notes is also bad because the notes may have errors
As opposed to memories which will be perfect.
>and the lawyers do not have opportunities to challenges. Also, if
>1 juror out of 12 takes notes, the other 11 might assumes that
>he knows what is going on and give his opinion undue weight.
>
>(Yes, I know how wacky all this sounds.)
Indeed.
John
--
John Winters. Wallingford, Oxon, England.
The Linux Emporium - the source for Linux CDs in the UK
See http://www.linuxemporium.co.uk/
------------------------------
From: "Joshua R. Poulson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto,or.general
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2000 10:46:25 -0700
Reply-To: "Joshua R. Poulson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Paranoid people assume it as well. (Many double agents ought to be
> paranoid, come to think of it.) Paranoia is not necessarily based
> on irrational suppositions.
Actually, paranoia is a debilitating irrational fear, and caution
is the "reasonable" form of this condition.
After all, that's the difference between any true "phobic" and
a person who just doesn't like some things but can tolerate them.
--jrp
------------------------------
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