Netscape has received validation from NIST of its triple-DES
(or DES-EDE3) code in its Security Module 1.X. This means
that NIST does recognize triple-DES as a use of DES (FIPS
46-2) that it is willing to test under its NVLAP [vendor validation
process].
Security Module 1.X is present in Communicator 4.02>and
4.0 Netscape server products.
For evidence of this, please refer to triple-DES certificate# 10 at
http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/cryptval/des/desval.htm (as far as triple-DES).
See also certificate #34. Overall, our DES, SHA-1,DSA and
DES-EDE3 implementations have been explicitly validated by NIST
on 17 different operating system platforms (NT, UNIX, etc.).
Also, NIST allows Netscape client and server products to enable
triple-DES ciphers in its FIPS 140-1 mode of operation, due to this
explicit validation of triple-DES.
So, what does "Netscape Security Module (ALG
3 DES) v1.8 (when operated in
the single DES mode)" mean?
It means NIST only has a validation process for single key (in other
words, all 3 of the DES keys set to the same key), which makes the
effect of Encrypt/Decrypt/Encrypt the same as DES. Thus, their
FIPS 46-2 validation process can test a triple-DES implementation,
since they are setup to test DES-ECB / CBC / OFB,etc. but only
for single DES.
If you at the 1999 RSA conference, come to the panel discussion on
FIPS 140-1 and bring up this question. Representatives from NIST
and CSE will be there, so you can get a somewhat authoratative
reponse to this question.
See our FIPS FAQ at
http://home.netscape.com/products/security/resources/faq/fips140-1.html
to know more about Netscape compliance to various cryptostandards
(FIPS 46-2, 180-1, 186, 140-1).
Vin McLellan wrote:
> Rodney Thayer reported:
>
> >> Curiously enough, there seem to be no references to a standard before
> >> the X9.52 effort, which appears to be only a year or two old. NIST calls
> >> Triple DES a "private" standard.
>
> Josh Hill <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> responded variously:
>
> >?
>
> >Before things become standards, they are just good ideas. Triple DES is
> >widely used, despite the fact that there is no absolute standard. The
> >draft standard, itself, is actually quite straight forward... Nothing
> >really interesting about it, aside from ANSI's blessing.
>
> >NIST does the "we'll just refer to another standard and call it ours"
> >thing a fair bit... Look at FIPS 186-1: The RSA signature scheme accepted
> >is the one specified in ANSI X9.31.
>
> Actually, as I recall the tale, the Amercian Bankers
> Association-sponsored ANSI-accredited X.9 Committee's blessing of DES3 was
> itself pretty interesting.
>
> I understood that the NSA lobbied bitterly against the X9 effort to
> standardize 3DES as an ANSI standard, insisting that DES would surfice
> until its successor was chosen.
>
> A couple years ago, when the X9 committee -- or maybe one of the X9
> crypto subcommittees -- rejected that advice and initially recommended that
> 3DES be made a standard, I was told that the NSA rep angrily declared that
> 3DES would _never_ get an export license and would never be shipped
> overseas. (Which may have put a damper on the 3DES standardization
> effort;-)
>
> Unfortunately, these standards development efforts usually escape
> the media's attention. Anyone on the list active in X9 and can give us the
> real story?
>
> Since the birth of X9 in the late 70s, the US National Security
> Agency has its own representative on the X9 Committee. As one might
> expect, the NSA has traditionally had significant influence over the ANSI
> "F" (crypto) subcommittees and cryptographic standards in financial
> services. There was a time when Ft. Meade effectively dictated those
> standards. Now, that is not necessarily so....
>
> (After the NSA blundered so badly in trying to force the Banking
> industry to switch from DES to CCEP/Clipper in the late 80s, the Agency's
> mesmerizing control broken. The initial intro of CCEP/Clipper -- at an ABA
> meeting -- proposed that only US owned institutions could have access to
> Clipper. At the time, as I recall, maybe 10-15 percent of the US banks
> were foreign owned;-) The bankers couldn't believe that these idiots --
> obviously so ignorant about the workings of the industry they were trying
> to defacto regulate -- were from the NSA of Legend and Lore.)
>
> I always felt that the NSA's alienation of the Bankers was probably
> the single most important factor in the collapse of the government's Cipper
> campaign.
>
> Suerte,
> _Vin
>
> -----
> Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548
> -- <@><@> --
