David Honig wrote: > > At 09:54 PM 5/24/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: > >As to inserting a trapdoor in an FPGA, I don't see any reason at all that > >a trapdoor can't be inserted with the appropriate understanding of the > >state space and chosing a rare state to trigger your bypass. > > Yes but *once* you've verified the RTL (and from them the masks) > you don't have to worry about some stray applet hosing your security. > You do with software. Errr ... you do with an FPGA, surely? Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html Coming to ApacheCon Europe 2000? http://apachecon.com/
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors John Young
- Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: Andrew Fernandes on NSA back doors John Young
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Jim Choate
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Ben Laurie
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Eugene Leitl
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products David Honig
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products John Young
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Rick Smith
- Re: NSA back doors in encryption products Arnold G. Reinhold