On Sun, 10 Dec 2000, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >> A more important problem with passphrase-based keys is collisions - >> two people picking wimpy passwords can end up with the same keys. > >Salt should take care of this (as well as reducing the effectiveness >of dictionary attacks). There are times and places where you can use salt, and times and places where you can't. In order to use salt with a passphrase, you have to store it somewhere. And that means that a person who has only the ciphertext and the passphrase cannot decrypt. If you use salt, then the ciphertext can be decrypted only in an environment where that particular salt is available. That makes it nearly useless for networks or backups. Bear
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