tom st denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > --- Eric Rescorla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > This is all fine, but irrelevant to my point, which is that > > if you're designing a channel security protocol it should > > provide channel level integrity and anti-replay unless there's > > some really good reason not to. > > For the love of god the horse is dead. Let it be! > > I've pulled the code [and the rest of the site]. I admitted you were > right, I admited it had unintentional flaws. > > What more do you want?
Tom, I'm sorry you're taking this personally, since it's not really about you. I take Ian to be making a generic argument that there's not a need for these features in a channel security protocol. I've certainly hear this argument before and I think it's worth discussing--even though I think he's wrong. -Ekr --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]