| When it comes to the PC's operating system, | there is apparently no economic way to achieve | what you suggest - ensuring that it hasn't | been tampered with - so few bother to worry | about it. If more security is desired, the | preferred method is to bypass the PC's OS | completely. ...which is, I would think, the only reasonable approach! In fact, even TCPA takes exatly this approach. And it's hardly new, from identification (a SecureID token is a separate, secure box, not a piece of software to run on your PC) to IP protection (dongles being exactly tamper-resistant secure computing kernels).
In no case does you, as the end-user, have any real say over what the secure kernel does or how it is used. By its nature, it operates, for the most part, outside of your control. Which brings up the interesting question: Just why are the reactions to TCPA so strong? Is it because MS - who no one wants to trust - is involved? Is it just the pervasiveness: Not everyone has a smart card, but if TCPA wins out, everyone will have this lump inside of their machine. I think many of the reasons people will give will turn out, on close reflection, to be invalid. Sure, you can choose not to buy software that uses dongles - and you'll be able to chose software that doesn't rely on TCPA. (In both cases, depending on the kind of software, you may find that your choice is "run it our way, or do without".) You can choose not to use a bank that requires you to have a smartcard - but in practice you would be chosing less security. We've met the enemy, and he is us. *Any* secure computing kernel that can do the kinds of things we want out of secure computing kernels, can also do the kinds of things we *don't* want out of secure computing kernels. if the kernel can produce *our* unforgeable signature, it can produce someone else's as well. Sure, we can decline to allow our secure computing kernel to be used for that purpose - but someone else may then choose not to do business with us. I think the real threat of TCPA is not in any particular thing it does, but in that it effect 'renders the world safe for dongles". MS *could* today require that you have a dongle to use Word - but to do so, even with their monopoly power, would be to quickly lose the market. Dongles are too inconvenient, and carry too much baggage. But when the dongle comes pre-installed on every machine, the whole dynamic changes. -- Jerry --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]