> Perry E. Metzger wrote: > > I'm a believer in the KISS principle. > > A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by > machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you > verify it and drop it in a slot. Ideally, the cards would be marked > with something like OCR-B so that the correspondence between machine > marking and human marking is trivial. > > You can't have "hanging chads" or mismarks on optical cards because a > machine marks it for you. You can always do a recount, just by running > the cards through the reader again. You can prevent ballot stuffing by > having representatives of several parties physically present during > the handling of the ballot boxes -- just like now. You can verify that > the counting mechanisms are working right by manually counting if > needed. > > Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are > simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard. > > Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED] > I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens the way for serial voting fraud.
The receipt should be exposed to the voter behind glass, and when he/she presses the 'accept' button, it visibly drops into the sealed, opaque ballot box. Peter --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]